Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management v. State | 71 P.3d 644 (Wash. 2003) | 149 Wash.2d 622 (Wash. 2003) |
A citizen groups filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Washington seeking a determination that the 2000 initiative 713 barring use of body-gripping traps, sodium fluoroacetate, or sodium cyanide to trap or kill mammals was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that appellants did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Initiative 713 violated the constitution, and thus affirmed the superior court's denial of the summary judgment motion. The court also held that the initiative was exempt from the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation that revises or amends other acts without setting them forth at full length. |
Case |
| Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. The New England Aquarium | 836 F. Supp. 45 (1993) |
The primary issue addressed by the court was whether a dolphin, named Kama, had standing under the MMPA. The court found the MMPA does not authorize suits brought by animals; it only authorizes suits brought by persons. The court would not impute to Congress or the President the intention to provide standing to a marine mammal without a clear statement in the statute. |
Case | |
| CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn. 1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 (1898) |
In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." |
Case |
| Citizens' Rapid-Transit Co. v. Dew | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn.1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 |
This is an action for negligently injuring and killing a dog by the driver of a streetcar. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that since large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and since they are regarded as companions to many in society, they now have "a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." Thus, the owner of a dog has property rights in that dog to maintain an action at law. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the killing of Dew's dog, that his death could have been prevented by the exercise of proper care and diligence. |
Case |
| City and County of Denver, a Home Rule municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; and John W. Hickenlooper, as Mayor of the | In 2004, the Colorado General Assembly passed changes to the state's dangerous dog laws; part of the law prohibited municipalities from adopting any breed-specific dog laws. Denver previously enacted an ordinance that regulated dogs by breed (Section 8-55). In this current action, the City instituted an action seeking declaratory judgment that Section 8-55 preempts the state law under the Home Rule Amendment. The court found that the regulation of dogs by breed on an intra-city basis was purely a matter of local concern, and thus fell under Home Rule authority. The state was permanently enjoined from taking any action against Denver based on the language of the amended state law. The state then filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently withdrew it. | Pleading | ||
| City of Armidale v Kiraly | [2009] WASC 199 |
The respondent, an owner of a brindle boxer dog, was charged with the dog attacking a person and for having the dog in a public place without a leash. The dog had escaped from the respondent's house and allegedly ran to and lunged at a lady delivering pamphlets. On appeal, the question of whether the dog's behaviour constituted an 'attack' for the purposes of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) s 33D(1) was a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. |
Case | |
| City of Boston v. Erickson | 877 N.E.2d 542 (Mass.2007) | 450 Mass. 1010 (2007) |
This very short case concerns the disposition of defendant Heidi Erickson's six animals (four living and two dead) that were seized in connection with an animal cruelty case against her. After Erickson was convicted, the city withdrew its challenge to the return of the living animals and proceeded only as to the deceased ones. A single justice denied the city's petition for relief, on the condition that Erickson demonstrate “that she has made arrangements for [t]he prompt and proper disposal [of the deceased animals], which disposal also is in compliance with health codes.” Erickson challenged this order, arguing that it interfered with her property rights by requiring her to discard or destroy the deceased animals. However, this court found no abuse of discretion, where it interpreted the justice's order to mean that she must comply with all applicable health codes rather than forfeit her deceased animals. |
Case |
| City of Canton v. Harris | 489 US 378 (1989) |
Detainee brought civil rights action against city, alleging violation of her right to receive necessary medical attention while in police custody. The Supreme Court held that inadequacy of police training may serve as basis for § 1983 municipal liability only where failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact. |
Case | |
| City of Cleveland v. Lupica | 2004 WL 2340639 (Ohio, 2004) |
Defendant plead no contest to failure to confine and insure her dog after her pit bull attacked a mail carrier. The trial court's decision to have the dog turned over to the city and destroyed was reversed. The Court of Appeals found Defendant's no contest plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. |
Case | |
| City of Cleveland v. Turner | --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 3974089 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-3378 (2019) | Defendant was convicted by bench trial of one count of sexual conduct with an animal (bestiality) in violation of R.C. 959.21(B). He was sentenced to 90 days in jail (with credit for time served), a $750 fine, with five years of inactive community control that included no contact with animals and random home inspections by the Animal Protection League (APL). The evidence supporting his conviction came from explicit letters defendant wrote to his boyfriend (who was incarcerated at the time) that described acts of bestiality. Defendant was also a sex offender parolee at the time of the letter writing. The letter, which was intercepted by jail officials, recounted a sexual act defendant engaged in with a dog that was under his care. Other similarly explicit letters were entered as evidence. In addition to the letters, the dog's owner testified that she left her dog with defendant and, after picking up the dog, the dog's behavior markedly changed from friendly to anxious and afraid. In addition, the dog was skittish for many days after, licked her genitals excessively, and was uncomfortable with any person near her backside, including the veterinarian. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred by admitting his extrajudicial statements without independent evidence of a crime. Specifically, defendant contends the city failed to establish the corpus delicti to permit introduction of his purported confession. The court noted that this was a case of first impression since there is no Ohio case law that has analyzed the corpus delicti issue in the context of R.C. 959.21. Relying on the Indiana case of Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841 (Ind.2017), this court found that while there was no direct evidence of a crime against the dog, the circumstantial evidence corroborates defendant's statements in his letter. The corpus delicti rule requires that the prosecution supply some evidence of a crime to admit the extrajudicial statements. Here, the city did that with the dog owner's testimony concerning the dog's altered behavior after being left alone with defendant. The court also found the evidence, while circumstantial, withstood a sufficiency of evidence challenge by defendant on appeal. On the issue of sentencing and random home inspections as a condition of his community control sanctions, the court found that the trial court did not have "reasonable grounds" to order warrantless searches of real property for a misdemeanor conviction. The finding of guilt for defendant's bestiality conviction was affirmed, but the condition of community control sanction regarding random home inspections was reversed and remanded. | Case |