Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cetacean Cmty. v. President of the United States | 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D.C. Hawaii, 2003) | Plaintiff, a community of whales, dolphins, and porpoises, sued Defendants, the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of Defense, alleging violations of the (NEPA), the (APA), the (ESA), and the (MMPA). The Plaintffs were concerned with the United States Navy's development and use of a low frequency active sonar (LFAS) system. The community alleged a failure to comply with statutory requirements with respect to LFAS use during threat and warfare conditions. | Case | ||
| Cetacean Community v. Bush | 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1257, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,120, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9331, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,791 |
In this case, the court was asked to decide whether the world's cetaceans have standing to bring suit in their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cetaceans challenge the United States Navy's use of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar ("SURTASS LFAS") during wartime or heightened threat conditions. In finding that the Cetaceans lacked standing, the court here agreed with the district court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., that "[i]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly." 836 F.Supp. at 49. In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMPA, or NEPA, or the APA, the court concluded that the Cetaceans do not have statutory standing to sue. |
Case | |
| Chadd v. U.S. | 794 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 4509174 (9th Cir., 2015) | The issue in this case was whether the United States may be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) relating to a mountain goat that attacked and killed a Park visitor. Wife of the visitor, on her own behalf and as representative of his estate, sued the NPS, claiming officials breached their duty of reasonable care by failing to destroy the goat in the years leading up to her husband’s death. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied. The court found the NPS’s management policies manual did not direct or mandate the NPS to take action to kill the mountain goat, and thus the NPS's management of the goat fell within the discretionary function exception. Further, the NPS’s decision to use non-lethal methods to manage a mountain was susceptible to policy analysis, which fell within the discretionary exception as well. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. Senior Circuit Judge Kleinfield filed a dissenting opinion. | Case | |
| Chalmers v. Diwell | 74 LGR 173 |
Defendant was an exporter of pet birds. He kept birds at a premises in the course of his business. Usually the birds remained on the premises for less than 48 hours before continuing their journey to their purchasers but on occasion birds had remained on the premises for up to 12 days. A magistrates' court acquitted him of keeping a pet shop without a licence (contrary to Pet Animals Act 1951, s.1). Prosecutor appealed. Result: appeal allowed. Held: even though the premises was being used as no more than a holding center, the defendant was carrying on from that premises a business of selling pets and the premises therefore required a pet shop license. |
Case | ||
| Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One | 95 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2006) | 2006 WL 1792842 (Tex.App.-Dallas) |
In this Texas case, a justice court divested an animal owner of over 100 animals and ordered that the animals be given to a nonprofit organization. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed appellant's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Code, an owner may only appeal if the justice court orders the animal to be sold at a public auction. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the statute limiting right of appeal in animal forfeiture cases precluded animal owner from appealing the justice court order. |
Case | |
| Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru | 01936-2017-PHC/TC | The plaintiff brought a habeas corpus lawsuit on behalf of himself and his two young daughters against the defendant for violating their rights to individual liberty and family tranquility. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s dogs barked so frequently and loudly that the family could not rest at night and travel through the halls out of fear of being attacked. The court discussed the abstract subject matter’s constitutionality, the purpose of a habeas corpus lawsuit, and the right to personal integrity regarding the plaintiff’s claim. It ultimately held that the claim must be admitted for processing in the present constitutional venue on an exceptional basis. | Case | ||
| Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru | 01936-2017-PHC/TC | El demandante interpuso una demanda de habeas corpus en su nombre y en el de sus dos hijas pequeñas contra el demandado por violación de sus derechos a la libertad individual y a la tranquilidad familiar. El demandante alegó que los perros del demandado ladraban con tanta frecuencia y tan fuerte que la familia no podía descansar por la noche ni desplazarse por los pasillos por miedo a ser atacada. El tribunal debatió la constitucionalidad de la materia abstracta, la finalidad de una demanda de habeas corpus y el derecho a la integridad personal en relación con la reclamación del demandante. En última instancia, sostuvo que la demanda debía admitirse a trámite en la presente sede constitucional con carácter excepcional. | Case | ||
| Changing the Tax System to Effect Humane Treatment of Farm Animals | Eden Gray | 3 J. Animal L. 159 (2007) |
The meat, egg, and dairy industries in the United States slaughter over ten billion land animals each year. The majority of these animals are raised on capital intensive factory farms. Large farming operations use factory farms to cut production costs and thereby increase their profit margins. Although this industrialization of the animal agriculture business reduces monetary costs, it causes immense suffering to the farm animals and raises significant costs to society, including a reduction in the number and profitability of family farms, an increase in the health risks related to meat consumption, a proliferation of damage to the environment, and a rise in threats to farm workers' health. Current federal and state legislation fails to protect farm animals from the cruel, inhumane conditions common on factory farms. This paper discusses changes that could be made to the tax code to provide incentives to farms to treat farm animals more humanely. |
Article | |
| CHAPMAN v. DECROW | 93 Me. 378, 45 A. 295 (1899) | 74 Am.St.Rep. 357 (1899) |
In this Maine case, the defendant was found liable for trespass after he killed the plaintiff's dog. Defendant asserted that the dog was trespassing on his premises, and was “then, or had been immediately before the shooting, engaged, with two other dogs, in chasing and worrying his domesticated animals, to wit, tame rabbits." As a result, he claimed that the killing was justified. This court first disagreed with defendant's claim that an unlicensed dog is not property because it constitutes a nuisance. This court found that, by the common law, a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie. Moreover, the statute to which defendant claims authority to kill an unlicensed dog only allows a constable to do so after a proscribed lapse. |
Case | |
| CHAPTER 21 STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY FISH AND WILDLIFE ORDINANCE |
CHAPTER 21 STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY |
Local Ordinance |