Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thurston v. Carter | 92 A. 295 (Maine, 1914) | L.R.A. 1915C,359, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, Am.Ann.Cas. 1917A,389 | This action of trespass is brought for the recovery of damages for the killing of the fox hound of plaintiff by defendant. Defendant claimed that he shot and killed the plaintiff's dog while it was chasing and worrying a cat belonging to and upon the land of the defendant. After the introduction of all the evidence, the court ordered a verdict for defendant. To this direction, plaintiff filed his bill of exceptions in which it is stipulated that if a cat is a domestic animal, the ruling below is to stand, otherwise judgment is to be entered for plaintiff in the sum of $50. | Case | |
| Tiger Conservation in a "Globalized" World: Tying Humans, Forests, and Tigers Together | Ross Hammersley | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This Paper will discuss the current trends in tiger conservation and management. Part I will discuss the statutory protections afforded to tigers in India’s Wildlife Protection Act and the operation of CITES. Part II will cover the primary reasons for renewed concern over the fate of the tiger, focusing on the demand for Asian medicines and other tiger derivatives. This Part will also discuss the current state of conservation efforts in India, focusing on how nearby rural villages have been affected by the establishment of the tiger reserves and wildlife conservation areas in India. Finally, Part III will propose some ways to begin to curb some of the demand in the international tiger derivative market and to improve community involvement and enforcement of India’s current regulations, as well as exploring potential avenues for strengthening aid efforts from and within the United States. |
Article | |
| Tighe v. N. Shore Animal League Am. | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 142 A.D.3d 607, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 |
In this New York case, the defendant appeals denial of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries after the dog she adopted from defendant-North Shore Animal League America bit plaintiff's face causing severe personal injuries. Plaintiff alleges causes of action that include negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interposed a claim for punitive damages. After defendant opposed the filing, plaintiff submitted evidence that the dog previously had been returned to defendant animal shelter after biting another individual in the face. This court noted that, under long-standing rule, the owner of a domestic animal who knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities is liable for harm. However, here, even if defendant failed to disclose the dog's vicious propensities, that breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In fact, the dog showed aggressive behavior during the three-and-a-half months the plaintiff owned the dog (including a previous bite to plaintiff's hand). This, in effect, placed the plaintiff on notice of the dog's vicious propensities. The court found that the lower court erred by not granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. With regard to the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found that even if a transaction from an animal shelter is subject to the warranty, the plaintiff failed to notify defendant of the "nonconformity of the goods" (to wit, the dog) within a reasonable period of time. The order was reversed. |
Case | |
| Tighe v. North Shore Animal League | 142 A.D.3d 607, 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 | In May 2012, Tighe adopted a dog from the North Shore Animal League after having been warned that the dog was possessive regarding food. After taking the dog home, Tighe noticed that the dog exhibited aggressive behavior, such as jumping at the backyard fence and growling at her when she attempted to feed the dog. In July of 2012, the dog bit Tighe’s hand when she tried to pick up a cookie off of the floor. As a result, Tighe spent three days in the hospital due to severe blood loss and swelling. Additionally, in September of 2012, the dog bit Tighe in the face causing severe injuries. After the incident in September, Tighe filed suit against the North Shore Animal League to recover damages for negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the claim of emotional distress but granted summary judgment in favor of Tighe with regard to the other claims of negligence. The North Shore Animal League appealed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New York overturned the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the North Shore Animal League on all claims. The court found that the North Shore Animal League was not a proximate cause to Tighe’s injuries for failing to adequately warn her about the dog’s aggreesive behavior because Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior three months prior to the incident that caused Tighe’s injuries. According to the court, once Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive tendencies, she was in the best position to take “precautionary measures to prevent harm to herself.” So, even if the North Shore Animal League had failed to warn Tighe of the dog’s aggressive tendencies prior to the adoption, Tighe “independently” learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior prior to the incident which eliminated the North Shore Animal League as being a proximate cause of her injuries. | Case | |
| Tilbury v. State | 890 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1994). |
Cruelty conviction of defendant who shot and killed two domesticated dogs. Defendant knew dogs were domesticated because they lived nearby, had demeanor of pets, both wore collars, and had been previously seen by defendant. |
Case | ||
| Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc. | 842 F.Supp.2d 1259 (S.D.Cal.,2012) | 2012 WL 399214 (S.D.Cal.,2012) |
Plaintiffs sued aquarium for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that wild-captured orcas were being held in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude. The court dismissed the action, holding that Plaintiffs had no standing because the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. |
Case | |
| Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises, Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc | In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests. | Pleading | |||
| Tilikum’s Splash: Lessons Learned From Animal Rights-Based Litigation Strategies | Brittany J. Mouzourakis | 10 J. Animal & Nat. Resource L. 223 | The animal advocacy movement is divided between those who believe in animal welfare and those who believe in animal rights. Although these two factions of the animal advocacy movement hold the overall goal of making the lives of animals better, practical differences do arise in the way in which these two factions litigate animal issues to achieve this goal. This Note explores Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, a case in which five orca whales "sued" Sea World for violating their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude. The case received widespread publicity as it was the first time a U.S. federal court had been asked to determine whether the Thirteenth Amendment to the United affords protection to non-humans. The Tilikum case departed from the traditional model of litigating animal issues by utilizing what this Article deems an animal rights-based litigation strategy. This Note first provides an overview of the traditional animal welfare-based model of litigating animal issues. This Note then analyzes the Tilikum litigation strategy to show how it departed from the traditional animal welfare-based model. Additionally, this Note weighs the advantages of both litigation strategies, ultimately recommending that animal advocacy organizations not depart from the animal-welfare based litigation strategies. Finally, this Note explores the theoretical possibility of expanding legal rights to animals based upon the expansion of legal rights to other non-human entities, such as corporations. | Article | |
| Tiller v. State | 218 Ga. App. 418 (1995) |
Defendant argued that being in "possession" of neglected, suffering animals was not a crime. The court held that where a veterinarian testified that the horses were anemic and malnourished and where defendant testified that he had not purchased enough to feed them, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of seven counts of cruelty to animals. The court held the trial court did not err in admitting a videotape depicting the horses' condition and that of the pasture when the horses were seized, where the videotape was relevant to the jury's consideration. |
Case | ||
| Tillett v. Bureau of Land Management | Slip Copy (unpublished decision), 2016 WL 1312014 (D. Mont. Apr. 4, 2016) | In this case, plaintiff (proceeding pro se) filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) challenging its management of wild horses on the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range (PMWHR). Plaintiff filed suit challenging BLM’s fertility control and gather programs. BLM argued that plaintiff’s claims should be denied as a matter of summary judgment. The court ultimately held that plaintiff failed to provide any “legal authority” or “jurisdictional basis” for the remedies in which she was seeking. The court held that BLM was within its own authority to rely on its own data and surveys of its programs and was under no obligation to review its programs based on plaintiff’s alleged observations. Finally, the court held in favor of BLM as a matter of summary judgment. | Case |