Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALDF v. Glickman | 204 F.3d 229(2000) | 340 U.S.App.D.C. 191(2000) |
Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act |
Case | |
| ALDF v. Quigg | 932 F.2d 920(Fed. Cir. 1991) | 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7884 | This case establishes the relative inability of third parties to challenge the veracity of an existing patent for genetically engineered animals. Judicial review is rare in such cases because third party plaintiffs, under the Administrative Procedures Act, lack standing to challenge the Patent and Trademark Office's interpretation of existing law. | Case | |
| All Hands On Deck: Biopiracy & the Available Protections for Traditional Knowledge | Shannon F. Smith | 10 J. Animal & Nat. Resource L. 273 | As the United States and other developed countries seek better protections for their intellectual property, Southern developing countries rich in biological resources seek better protections for these resources and the knowledge of their indigenous peoples. The story goes that Northern scientists are bioprospecting within Southern countries and obtaining knowledge about traditional plants and their uses from the countries’ native people. The Northern scientists then take this traditional knowledge and develop new uses or products, which they patent in their own countries. They do this, however, without compensating the indigenous groups who initially supplied the base knowledge. The indigenous people also claim that the cost of medicine and other goods rises, as their traditional knowledge may now come with a licensing fee. This Note discusses “traditional knowledge,” as this indigenous knowledge has been termed. It looks at what this knowledge is and the difficulties in defining it. It further looks at the problems traditional knowledge presents in terms of finding a solution both parties are satisfied with. As traditional knowledge generally does not fit in the Western concept of protectable intellectual property, this Note looks to the problems this conflict between differing property systems creates. Finally, this Note considers the current protections that are available for individual tribes or nations to choose between to fit their own individual needs, despite numerous failed attempts to integrate such protections into international treaties. | Article | |
| Allanson v. Toncich | 2002 WL 1897936 (Austrailia) | 2002 WASCA 216 |
Appeal uphold the judgement against the dog owner for damages, but recalculates damages upward. |
Case | |
| Allen v. Camp | 70 So. 290 (Ala.App. 1915) | 14 Ala.App. 341 (1915) |
Defendant shot and killed Plaintiff's dog, which had bitten Defendant's daughter several days earlier, for the purpose of sending the dog's head to a laboratory for examination for rabies. The Court of Appeals of Alabama found that Plaintiff's wife's injuries were too remote to be compensable, when the wife was not home at the time of the incident and became excited and hysterical upon hearing of the incident several hours later. The Appeals Court also held that although one may protect himself or his family from injury by a dog or other animal when on his own private property or on public property, the destruction of an animal is wrongful when the danger of attack and subsequent injury by that animal no longer exists, and where the animal is not trespassing. |
Case | |
| Allen v. Cox | 942 A.2d 296 (Conn. 2008) | 285 Conn. 603 (2008) |
The plaintiff (Allen) brought this action against the defendants (Jessica Cox and Daniel Cox) alleging that she was injured by the defendants' cat after the defendants negligently allowed the cat to roam free. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendants. Relying mainly on the Restatement (Second), this court held that when a cat has a propensity to attack other cats, knowledge of that propensity may render the owner liable for injuries to people that foreseeably result from such behavior. |
Case | |
| Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage | 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska App., 2007) | 2007 WL 2965781 (Alaska App.) |
Krystal R. Allen pleaded no contest to two counts of cruelty to animals after animal control officers came to her home and found 180 to 200 cats, 3 dogs, 13 birds, and 3 chickens in deplorable conditions. She was sentenced to a 30-day jail term and was placed on probation for 10 years. One of the conditions of Allen's probation prohibits her from possessing any animals other than her son's dog. In first deciding that its jurisdictional reach extends to claims not just based on the term of imprisonment, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by restricting Allen's possession of animals during the term of her probation. |
Case | |
| Allen v. Pennsylvania Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals | 488 F.Supp.2d 450 (M.D.Pa., 2007) | 2007 WL 1454514 (M.D.Pa.) |
This is a § 1983 civil rights action brought by Robert Lee Allen against certain state actors arising from their search of his property, seizure of his farm animals, and prosecution of him for purported violations of Pennsylvania's cruelty-to-animals statute. The animals Allen typically acquires for his rehabilitation farm are underweight, in poor physical condition, and suffer from long-standing medical issues. After receiving a telephone complaint regarding the condition of the horses and other livestock on Allen's farm, humane officers visited Allen's property to investigate allegations. Subsequently, a warrant to seize eight horses, four goats, and two pigs was executed on a day when the officers knew Allen would be away from his farm with "twenty five assorted and unnecessary individuals." The court held that the farmer's allegations that state and county humane societies had a custom, policy or practice of failing to train and supervise their employees stated § 1983 claims against humane societies. Further, the defendants were acting under color of state law when they searched and seized farmer's property.
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Case | |
| Allendorf v. Redfearn | 2011 IL App (2d) 110130 (2011) | 2011 WL 3105714 (Il. App. l2011); 352 Ill.Dec. 554 |
After a farm employee was injured in an all terrain vehicle (ATV) while trying to round up a bull, he sued the farm owners under the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act. The Appellate Court held that the employee could not recover under the Act, which protects members of the general public who cannot be expected to appreciate the risk posed by an animal. Because the employee was not an innocent bystander but rather was attempting to exercise control over the bull at the time he was injured, he fell within the Act's definition of an “owner” of the bull. |
Case | |
| Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Austin | 55 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Mont. 2014) | 2014 WL 5439589 | Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims. | Case |