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Titlesort descending Summary
NE - Trusts - Chapter 30. Decedents' Estates; Protection of Persons and Property. This statute represents Nebraska's pet trust law. The law adopts the language of Section 408 of the Uniform Trust Act and states that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.
NE - Veterinary - Article 33. Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners.
NE - Wildlife - Article 2. Game Law General Provisions These statutes comprise the definitional section of Nebraska's wildlife code. Among the definitions include game, aquaculture, wildlife, hunt, and take.
Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. United States Department of Agriculture


Eight Circuit Court of Appeals decided not to allow Nebraska Beef to pursue a

Bivens

remedy --remedy allows a party to recover damages when federal officials violate a person's constitutional rights when Congress has not provided an adequate remedy-- after the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) allegedly breached a mutual consent decision agreed upon after the USDA issued

Noncompliance Records for perceived regulatory violations.

Nebraska Complied Laws 1887: Chapter X: Offenses Related to Domestic Animals Nebraska Compiled Statutes from 1887. The statutes cover cruelty to animals from transportation to negligence in handling.  Also covered is the stealing or interfering with various types of domestic animals.
Neita v. City of Chicago Vaughn Neita brought this suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, alleging false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment arising from an animal cruelty arrest. He was ultimately found not guilty on all counts by an Illinois judge. In 2012, Neita owned a dog-grooming business and rescue shelter. He brought two dogs to the Chicago Department of Animal Care and Control because one dog had attacked another dog in Neita's care and another dog had become ill after whelping a litter of puppies. When Neita arrived with the dogs, an animal control employee contacted police officers who then arrested Neita and searched his business premises, resulting in 13 counts of animal cruelty. With regard to this § 1983 action and Illinois state claims, while Neita amended his complaint twice, it was ultimately dismissed with prejudice for failure to adequately plead any constitutional violation. This appeal then followed. The Seventh Circuit held that to prevail on a false arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his or her arrest. Neita arrived at Animal Control to surrender two dogs that showed no signs of abuse or neglect without evidence that he mistreated either dog. Those statements in the amended complaint are sufficient to permit a false arrest claim to proceed. As to the claim of illegal searches, the court found that a plausible claim for false arrest also allowed his claim for an illegal search incident to his arrest to move forward. The dismissal of Neita's claims was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Neita v. City of Chicago This case concerns a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the warrantless seizure of a pit bull named Macy and the arrest of her owner, Vaughn Neita, for alleged violations of the Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act following an anonymous tip. The investigation was triggered by reports of a dog kept in inhumane conditions, specifically alleging the animal was tied up outside all day without shelter, food, or water in freezing weather. Upon arrival at the property, officers observed a fenced lot with parked vehicles where Macy was tethered to a truck bumper with two rope leashes, allowing her access to a custom-built plywood doghouse that contained an electric heater and bowls. The central animal law issue was whether the officers had probable cause to believe Neita violated the Act by failing to provide adequate shelter from the 19-degree Fahrenheit weather, sufficient unfrozen water, and by allegedly using a choke-type collar. The appellate court, reversing the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, found genuine issues of material fact, noting Macy was a robust, muscular dog, her shelter was free of feces and lacked the snow accumulation present on other vehicles, and the officers' brief investigation failed to fully ascertain the adequacy of the heater or the type of collar. The court construed the Act's "adequate shelter" and "sufficient quantity" requirements through an objective, reasonable person lens but concluded the record did not support a finding of arguable probable cause as a matter of law, thereby reviving the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims for the unlawful seizure of the animal and false arrest. A dissenting opinion contended that the law was not clearly established in a fact-specific manner and would have found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity based on the conditions observed, including the frozen water bowl and the dog's exposure to the elements. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Nelson v. Lewis


Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct.  The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation.  The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts.  Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously.

Never Enough: Animal Hoarding Law ABSTRACT

Animal hoarding, a disorder that causes sufferers to acquire animals compulsively despite the inability or unwillingness to provide them with adequate care, is a widespread, costly, often underestimated problem that causes more animal suffering than all acts of intentional cruelty combined. Not only are animals harmed, but humans are as well, from dependents that live with hoarders to members of the surrounding communities to the hoarders themselves. Current laws do not address the issue effectively, and recidivism rates are close to 100%. This Article seeks to increase awareness of the animal hoarding problem and offers suggestions as to how the law might evolve to better manage and resolve these complex cases.
New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS.

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