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People v. Haynes |
In this Michigan case, the defendant pleaded no contest to committing an “abominable and detestable crime against nature” with a sheep under MCL 750.158. In addition to sentencing consistent with being habitual offender, the trial court found that defendant's actions evidenced sexual perversion, so the court ordered defendant to register under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (“SORA”). The Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that while sheep was the “victim” of the crime, registration was only required if the victim was a human being less than 18 years old. SORA defines “listed offense” as including a violation of section 158 if a victim is an individual less than 18 years of age. Relying on the plain and ordinary meaning of "victim," the court concluded that an animal was not intended to be considered a victim under the statute.
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People v. Henderson |
The court of appeals held the owner of 69 emaciated and neglected horses liable under its animal cruelty statute, even though the owner did not have day-to-day responsibility for tending to the horses.
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People v. Hock |
Defendant was denied his motion to set aside convictions under New York animal cruelty statute. The Criminal Court, City of New York, held that the 90 day period for prosecuting a Class A misdemeanor had not been exceeded. It also held that the jury was properly instructed on the criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to not provide an animal with a sufficient supply of good and wholesome air, food, shelter, or water. It would be contrary to the purpose of the law and not promote justice to require that all four necessities be withheld for a conviction.
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People v. Hsiung |
In this appeal arising from convictions for trespass and conspiracy related to animal rights protests at poultry farms, the defendant, Wayne Hansen Hsiung, co-founded Direct Action Everywhere (DxE) and participated in "open rescues" at Sunrise Farms and Reichardt Duck Farm, where he and others entered private property without permission to document animal conditions and remove animals they believed were suffering. The defendant asserted that the trial court erroneously deprived him of presenting a complete defense by excluding evidence and jury instructions on his good-faith mistake of law predicated on the necessity defense. The court held that while the necessity defense was legally unavailable as a justification because the actions were premeditated rather than responses to an imminent emergency, the defendant was constitutionally entitled to present his honest but mistaken belief that necessity justified his conduct to negate the specific intent required for trespass with intent to interfere with a business (Penal Code § 602(k)) and conspiracy. The appellate court found that the trial court’s limitation of the mistake-of-law instruction solely to Penal Code § 597e (providing a narrow justification for providing food or water to impounded animals) and its exclusion of expert legal opinions on necessity violated the defendant’s right to present a defense, as such evidence was relevant to whether he possessed the requisite criminal intent. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions for conspiracy to commit trespass (count 1) and trespass with intent to interfere with a lawful business (count 4) and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the conviction for trespass by refusing to leave property (count 2). |
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People v. Iehl |
Defendant appealed his conviction for killing another person's dog. On appeal, defendant contended that the term "beast" provided by the anti-cruelty statue did not encompass dogs. The court disagreed, finding the statute at issue covered dogs despite its failure to explicitly list "dogs" as did a similar statute.
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People v. Johnson |
Defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of cruelty to animals, arguing that there was not proof that the horses were under his charge or custody. While the court agreed and reversed his conviction because he could not be convicted under the statute merely as the owner of the horses, absent proof of his care or custody of the horses, it further explained that the "owner or otherwise" statutory language was designed to punish cruelty to animals without regard to ownership.
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People v. Jornov |
This New York case stems from an attack on Philip Mueller and his dog by Defendant-Appellant Jornov's "two pit bull-terrier mixed breed dogs.” During proceedings in City Court, the court determined that defendant's dogs were dangerous dogs and directed that they be euthanized. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the finding that the dogs were dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 121 and Agriculture and Markets Law § 350[5] because there was clear and convincing evidence that the dogs attacked a companion animal and behaved in a manner that a reasonable person would believe posed a serious and imminent threat of serious physical injury or death. However, under the amended version of the statute, a judge or justice may not automatically direct humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of a dangerous dog where none of the aggravating circumstances are present.
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People v. Koogan |
Defendant was guilty of cruelty to animals for allowing a horse to be worked he knew was in poor condition.
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People v. Land |
In 2009, Jenell Land was found guilty by jury of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal, a Class 4 felony under Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act. Specifically, Land placed a towing chain around the neck of her pit bull, which caused a large, gaping hole to form in the dog’s neck (the dog was later euthanized). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the defendant’s conviction and, in so doing, rejected each of Land’s four substantive arguments on appeal. Among the arguments raised, the appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove a specific intent by Land to injure her dog did not rise to the level of "plain error."
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People v. Larson |
In December 2005, defendant Alan J. Larson was found guilty of possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card and committing aggravated cruelty to an animal when he shot and killed the Larsons’ family dog Sinai in October 2004. Evidence included conflicting testimony among family members as to the disposition of the dog and whether he had a history of biting people, and a veterinarian who concluded that a gunshot to the brain was a conditionally acceptable method of euthanasia. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the aggravated-cruelty-to-an-animal statute was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to address how an owner could legally euthanize their own animal. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant’s conviction. |
