United States
Displaying 1361 - 1370 of 4858
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Title |
Summary |
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| FL - Trust, animal - Chapter 736. Florida Trust Code | This Florida statute provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates on the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, on the death of the last surviving animal. |
| FL - Vehicle - 316.0825. Vehicle approaching an animal | Every person operating a motor vehicle shall use reasonable care when approaching or passing a person who is riding or leading an animal upon a roadway or the shoulder thereof. A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction. |
| FL - Veterinary - Veterinary Medical Practice. | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 379. Fish and Wildlife Conservation. | These Florida laws concern the keeping and taking of captive wildlife. Places where wildlife is held in captivity are subject to inspection by the officers of the state commission at any time. The commission shall promulgate rules defining Class I, Class II, and Class III types of wildlife. A companion statutory& section provides that, in order to assure humane treatment of captive wildlife, no person, firm, corporation or association shall be in possession of captive wildlife for public display unless a permit has been obtained. The cost of the permit depends on whether the species fall into Class I, II, or III). |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-1. General: Ownership, Short Title, Severability and Definitions | This chapter of the Administrative Code provides the definitions for the remaining chapters of the Code, and includes a declaration of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's authority to regulate all wild animal life within the state. |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-15. Type I Wildlife Management Areas | These Florida rules provide that no person shall knowingly or negligently allow any dog to pursue or molest any wildlife during any period in which the taking of such wildlife by the use of dogs is prohibited. No person shall knowingly allow a dog under their care to enter or remain upon a critical wildlife area during any period in which public access is prohibited by the order establishing such area. |
| Fla. Dep't of Health v. Pups Pub TPA, LLC | The appellate court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the Florida Department of Health (DOH) had enforced an unadopted rule by prohibiting non-service dogs in bars, holding instead that DOH’s directives merely reiterated the plain language of rule 64E-11.003(6)(c), which broadly bans live animals, including dogs, from food service establishments, defined under § 381.0072(2)(c) to include bars and lounges. Pups Pub argued DOH’s authority was limited to regulating areas where food and drinks are prepared and served, but the court rejected this narrow interpretation, finding the statute unambiguously grants DOH jurisdiction over the entire premises of such establishments. The court emphasized that DOH’s interpretation aligned with the text and purpose of the regulatory scheme, which encompasses sanitation controls beyond immediate food-handling zones, rendering formal rulemaking unnecessary. Consequently, DOH’s enforcement actions were upheld, affirming its authority to exclude dogs from bars unless exempted as service animals. |
| Flanders v. Goodfellow |
This landmark decision fundamentally reshapes New York's dog bite jurisprudence by overturning Bard v. Jahnke and reinstating negligence as a viable cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The Court held that Bard's strict liability framework, which required proof of an owner's actual or constructive knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, created an unfair exception to ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice. Recognizing that most jurisdictions permit negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 509 and 518, the Court established a dual-path system: plaintiffs may now pursue either strict liability (if vicious propensities are shown) or traditional negligence claims against animal owners. The decision also reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim, finding triable issues regarding whether defendants should have known of their dog's aggressive tendencies based on postal workers' affidavits describing the animal's repeated violent window-banging behavior. The Court's disposition reversed the Appellate Division's order and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, reinstating both causes of action. |
| Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana | This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, raised questions on the merits, and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, although defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring. |
| Flikshtein v. City of New York |
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