United States

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Titlesort descending Summary
Lesher v. Reed


Seizure of pet dog violated Fourth Amendment where police acted unreasonably in going to canine police officer's house to seize the dog after the dog bit a child.

Lesser v. Epsy
Owner had a rabbitry, and the rabbits were sold for scientific research.

 

Inspection of the rabbitry without a warrant occurred, and Owner claimed that his constitutional rights were violated.

 

Search without a warrant was appropriate because any deficiencies could have been easily concealed if notice of a search was provided to the Owner.

 

Lessman v. Rhodes


Plaintiff, a participant in a horse show, was injured when a stallion bucked and kicked him; he sued the show’s sponsor, and the stallion’s rider and owner alleging negligent and willful and wanton misconduct, by failing to conduct background checks into the horses and by failing to separate the stallions participating in the show,

inter alia

.

 

The Equine Activity Liability Act, which was established to shield those persons who participate in equine activities from liability, provides an exception to the general rule by permitting liability for equine activity sponsors that commit “an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury.”

 

In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that showed that the defendants behaved in a reckless or intentional manner, therefore the summary judgment in favor of the defendant entered by the trial court was founded to be proper.

Levine v. Knowles


This negligence action for both compensatory and punitive damages results from the premature cremation of 'Tiki,' a Toy Chihuahua dog, who died while undergoing apparently routine treatment for a skin condition. Plaintiff instructed the veterinarian to keep Tiki's body so that he could have an autopsy performed, but the dog's body was cremated before it could be claimed so that, according to plaintiff, defendant could avoid malpractice claims. 



In this case, the court only determined that under the facts peculiar to this case, an action for damages was sufficiently alleged by the complaint and the defendant has failed to conclusively demonstrate the non-existence of all material issues of fact so as to be entitled to a summary final judgment.

Levine v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation This action arose from plaintiff’s experience of bringing her service dog on Amtrak trains. Plaintiff brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of other disabled passengers against Amtrak pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Each claim related to Amtrak′s alleged practice of storing luggage in its train's “mobility aid” seating areas. Amtrak argued, amongst other things, that plaintiff lacked Article III Constitutional Standing because she had not suffered an injury in fact. The district court agreed and granted Amtrak′s motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed in its entirety.
Levine v. Vilsack


Animal advocates filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging the USDA's interpretive rule excluding chickens, turkeys, and other domestic fowl from the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).  The United States District Court for the Ninth District of California had entered summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the USDA and the Plaintiffs appealed.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Plaintiffs-Appellants lacked standing to challenge the USDA's interpretive rule and vacated and remanded the case to the district court. 

Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. This case was brought by the owners of two dogs that were cremated by a private pet cremation company, who allege the cremation service sent them the ashes of random dogs instead of those of their dogs. Plaintiffs allege breach of contract and several tort claims, including trespass to chattel and negligence. On this appeal, the judgement of the lower court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The plaintiffs failed to establish an implied contract between them and the pet cremation company, were granted leave to amend their breach of contract complaint against the company, the other actions for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were dismissed, and the court found that the plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for negligence.
Lewis v. Chovan


This Ohio case raises the issue of whether an employee of a pet grooming establishment is a "keeper" under state law, thereby preventing the application of strict liability for injury. The employee

was bitten by dog while attempting to assist the establishment's owner and another employee in giving the dog a bath. She then brought an action against dog's owners asserting, among other things, that the owners were strictly liable for her injuries. The court relied on its previous definition of the word "keeper" in the context of R.C. 955.28(B) as "one having physical charge or care of the dogs." Based upon this precedent, the court found that a person who is responsible for exercising physical control over a dog is a "keeper" even if that control is only temporary.

LIBERATING ANIMAL LAW: BREAKING FREE FROM HUMAN-USE TYPOLOGIES
Liberty Humane Soc., Inc. v. Jacobs
This case concerns the authority of the Department of Health to revoke certifications of animal control officers who willfully contravened the state law on impounding dogs.

 

The court found that “[s]


ince the Department acknowledged that it is charged with revoking certifications of animal control off


icers when those officers pose ‘


a


threat to the health and safety’


of the community, it should follow that allegations of officers willfully and illegally taking a dog from its owner and falsifying records to claim it a stray so as to expose it to adoption by another or euthanasia calls for the Department to take action.





It


would be


both arbitrary and capricious for the Department to ignore its duty to determine if revocation of certification is required.




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