|Nuzzaci v. Nuzzaci||1995 WL 783006 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 19, 1995) (unpublished opinion).||The court refused to sign a stipulation and order (prepared by the parties and signed by each of them and their attorneys) concerning visitation of the divorcing couple’s dog. The court held that a court can only award dog in its entirety to one party or the other. The court advised the couple to come to their own private agreement instead, reasoning that the court has no jurisdiction in this matter and further no way to side with one party or the other in the event of a future dispute.|
|Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Association||1996 WL 1186942 (Mass. 1996)||A tenant with multiple sclerosis took in her mother's cat when her mother became ill. The housing authority had a no pets policy and requested that the tenant remove the pet from the premises. The tenant in turn offered a letter from her physician stating that "there would be serious negative consequences for her health if she was compelled to remove the cat." The court held that the tenant did not meet her burden of proving a nexus between the cat and her multiple sclerosis, reasoning that the physician's note does not state that the cat is necessary to alleviate her symptoms and that a more reasonable accommodation may be available.|
|Fisher v. Liptak||1996CarswellAlta33||
Two pet llamas owned by the plaintiff Fisher were attacked on two separate occasions by dogs, including by a dog owned by the defendant Liptak, causing the death of one llama and, two weeks later, injury to the second llama. After the first attack, Liptak's dog returned covered with saliva and blood, although it had no bleeding wounds; he suspected the dog had been in a fight or attack but did not investigate. His dog was later discovered injuring the second llama. The court ruled that Liptak's finding indications of the first attack put him on notice that the dog had a 'vicious or mischievous propensity to attack other animals,' sufficient to make him strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter, for the second llama's injuries, but not for the first, for which Liptak lacked the requisite knowledge. Similarly, Liptak was not liable in negligence in the first attack, since in that rural area all the local owners let their dogs run at large and Liptak had no prior reason to suspect his dog would attack; the judge did not discuss whether Liptak was liable in negligence for the second attack.
|Shelvey v. Bicknell||1996CarswellBC1131||
Both plaintiff (appellant) Shelvey and the defendant (respondent) dog owners were guests of an unnamed third party at that party's beach cabin, where the defendants left their Rottweiler unrestrained on the cabin's deck overnight. The friendly dog jumped over the deck railing to follow the plaintiff to the beach where she was walking; the large, energetic dog bumped her legs while playfully chasing a seagull, knocking her down and leaving her unconscious. The dog had previously knocked its owner and a child down at one time due to its large size and weight. A trial judge earlier found that the defendant owners were not liable to the plaintiff in negligence as the freak accident was not reasonably foreseeable; the Court of Appeal concurred, finding no negligence. Scienter was not argued or discussed at either level.
|Housing Authority of the City of New London v. Tarrant||1997 WL 30320 (Conn. 1997)||
A mother renting housing alleged that her son was "mentally challenged" and required the companionship of a dog pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court rejected the tenant's allegations that her son had a qualifying mental disability, reasoning that the son received high marks in school prior to the commencing of the eviction proceedings. The court held that without evidence of a mental or physical disability, no reasonable accommodation is required.
|State v. Troyer (Unpublished)||1997 WL 760954(Ohio App. 9 Dist.,1997) (unpublished)||Defendant was convicted of killing a non-game bird (owl) while defending his collection of exotic and native birds. The court finds that defendant rightfully engaged in conduct to defend his property against depredation by owls. The court carefully notes the owl is an abundant species in Ohio, and that the burden on the property owner would be greater if the species at issue were endangered or threatened, like an eagle.|
|State v. Schuler (Unpublished)||1997 WL 76337 (Unpub. Minn. 1997)||
This Minnesota lawsuit arose from the enforcement of a Little Canada ordinance prohibiting the keeping of more than three adult dogs in any residential dwelling within the city's residentially zoned districts. In reviewing a challenge to the law, the court first noted that a city's police power allows it both to regulate the keeping of animals, and to define nuisances and provide for their abatement. Further, municipal ordinances are presumptively constitutional and the burden rests on the party challenging it. Here, Schuler failed to offer evidence that regulating the number of dogs per household was unrelated to controlling the problems of dog noise and odor as they affect the health and general welfare of the community.
|Janota-Bzowska v. Lewis||1997CarswellBC1957||
The respondent Janota-Bzowska was an invited guest at the home of the appellant Lewises, where another guest (appellant Holtzman) had tied his Labrador dog outside; the dog lunged at the respondent, causing her to fall and break her finger. A trial court earlier found both dog-owner and home-owners liable to Janota-Bzowska under the doctrines of scienter (strict liabilty) and negligence. On appeal, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the dog had a propensity to lunge at people, or that the owner knew of such propensity, although the dog was known to chase deer. However, this was not sufficient to allow recovery under scienter. On the issue of negligence, the court also held that the dog's behaviour being 'unexpected and out of character' showed no suggestion of a risk for which the owner had failed to take reasonable precautions, so there was no negligence shown.
|Tulloch v. Melnychuk||1998 CarswellAlta 573||
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed.
|Strahan v. Linnon||1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314 (1st Cir.)||
Coast Guard vessels struck and killed Northern Right whales. Plaintiffs claim that these incidents constitute takings in violation of the ESA and MMPA. Court holds that the Coast Guard could implement reasonable and prudent alternatives that would reduce the striking of whales.
|In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry||1999 NOAA LEXIS 1||
In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity. The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release. An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA.
|In the Matter of: Thomas E. Rainelli||1999 NOAA LEXIS 10||
This case involves violations of the MMPA by taking, in the form of harassment by feeding or attempting to feed wild dolphins. The respondents, a captain of a vessel used in a dolphin-feeding encounter, and the sole shareholder of a boat renal company, were both found guilty and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $4500. Though the shareholder was not on the vessel when it committed the feeding violations, he was found guilty of violating the MMPA, by providing a platform from which feeding is conducted or supported.
|Vargas v. Vargas||1999 WL 1244248 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999) (unpublished opinion).||Court awarded custody of rottweiler to wife, after considering testimony adduced (husband was not treating the dog very nicely) and the state of the husband’s home (scrap metal yard and fact 5-year-old child visits regularly). This decision was made notwithstanding the fact that dog was gift from wife to husband and the dog was registered to husband with AKC.|
|People v. Parker (Unpublished)||1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999)||
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial.
|Leider v. Lewis||2 Cal. 5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055 (2017)||The Plaintiffs, Residents of Los Angeles, brought a taxpayer action against the Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Zoo, alleging elephant abuse in violation of various Penal Code provisions. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, granted the Defendants summary judgment. The Residents appealed. At trial, the Residents were awarded injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court rejected many of the Resident’s claims, but issued limited injunctions prohibiting use of particular forms of discipline, requiring the elephants to have specific amounts of exercise time, and requiring the rototilling of soil in exhibit. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the prior Court of Appeals decision was not law of the case as to the argument that the Residents was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated Penal Code, and (2) the Residents' challenge to the city's treatment of elephants improperly sought injunctive relief for Penal Code violations.|
|Stray from Heart, Inc. v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene of City of New York||20 N.Y.3d 946 (N.Y., 2012)||
Petitioner, an animal rescue organization, filed suit seeking the enforcement of the Animal Shelters and Sterilization Act. The court held that the act does not provide for a private right of action for money damages. Instead, the legislative history reveals the law was designed to benefit the general public in New York City as well as stray cats and dogs. The court affirmed the lower court's decision with costs.
|State v. Dan||20 P.3d 829 (Or. 2001)||
This is an appeal of a circuit court decision in an aggravated animal abuse case. A defendant was convicted in circuit court of aggravated animal abuse and other charges. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's testimony that he loved his children more than the dog he shot was not evidence of his character, thus the evidence offered by the state in rebuttal (that the defendant assaulted his spouse) was not admissible and not harmless error by the trial court.
|New Orleans Bulldog Soc'y v. Louisiana Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals||200 So. 3d 996 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), writ granted, 2016-1809 (La. 1/9/17), 214 So. 3d 859, and aff'd, 2016-1809 (La. 5/3/17), 222 So. 3d 679||The Plaintiff, the Bulldog Rescue Mission, is a nonprofit dog welfare organization organized under Louisiana law to advocate for dog welfare in New Orleans. The plaintiff sought information under Louisiana’s Public Records Law related to the dogs euthanized by the Defendant, the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (LSPCA). LSPCA declared that they were not a public body and thus, not subject to the Public Records Law. The Bulldog Rescue Mission filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed their petition and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held that LSPCA was a quasi-public entity subject to Public Records Law because the organization performed municipal functions on behalf of the municipal government. The court found LSPCA receives an annual compensation of almost two million dollars for providing services for quasi-municipal functions such as enforcing code violations and taking and receiving animals. Thus, it cannot characterize the service as "voluntary" since it "clearly operates[s] under the color of City Authority." Bulldog rescue also claims error with the trial court ruling that, even if LSPCA is subject to public records laws, these obligations are met through its Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) reporting requirement. This court found that the CEA contractual agreement made between the city of Louisiana and LSPCA allowing the organization to provide mandated city services related to animal control could not be used to circumscribe Public Records Law compliance. In other words, the limited statistical reporting required under the CEA is not a valid substitute for a public record request that would show all governmental functions and duties performed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed where this court found the trial court clearly erred in dismissing the Bulldog Rescue petition for a writ of mandamus.|
|Lay v. Chamberlain||2000 WL 1819060 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2000) (Not Reported in N.E.2d)||Chamberlain owned a dog breeding kennel with over one hundred fifty dogs. An investigation was conducted when the Sheriff's Office received complaints about the condition of the animals. Observations indicated the kennel was hot, overcrowded, and poorly ventilated. The dogs had severely matted fur, were sick or injured, and lived in cages covered in feces. Dog food was moldy and water bowls were dirty. Many cages were stacked on top of other cages, allowing urine and feces to fall on the dogs below. A court order was granted to remove the dogs. The humane society, rescue groups, and numerous volunteers assisted by providing food, shelter, grooming and necessary veterinary care while Chamberlain's criminal trial was pending. Chamberlain was convicted of animal cruelty. The organizations and volunteers sued Chamberlain for compensation for the care provided to the animals. The trial court granted the award and the appellate court affirmed. Ohio code authorized appellees' standing to sue for the expenses necessary to prevent neglect to the animals. The evidence was sufficient to support an award for damages for the humane society, the rescue groups, and the individual volunteers that protected and provided for the well-being of the dogs during the months of the trial.|
|Fitch v. Eiseman||2000 WL 34545801 (Alaska 2000) (unpublished opinion)||The trial court approved a divorcing couple’s agreement for dogs to be with their children (and so travel to the husband's and wife’s houses as part of a shared custody agreement of their children). The wife did not abide by the agreement, so the Supreme Court remanded back to the trial court to determine sole ownership of the dog.|
|State v. Scott||2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561||The appellant pled guilty to one count of animal fighting, one count of cruelty to animals, and one count of keeping unvaccinated dogs, and asked for probation. The trial court denied the appellants request for probation and sentenced him to incarceration. The appellant challenged the trial court's ruling, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny probation, stating that the heinous nature of the crimes warranted incarceration.|
|U.S. v. Wilgus||2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700; 32 ELR 20031; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3976 (10th Cir. 2001)||
This opinion was vacated by the Hardman order. Defendant was not a member of a federally-recognized tribe nor a person of Native American ancestry, but sincerely practiced Native American religions. In response to Wilgus's free exercise challenge, the court held that the Act is a neutral, generally applicable law, falling within the safe-harbor created by Employment Division v. Smith . For further discussion on the status of formerly recognized tribes under the BGEPA, please see Detailed Discussion.
|Friedli v. Kerr||2001 WL 177184 (Tenn. 2001)||
This case involves two passengers who were injured when the horse-drawn carriage that they were riding in turned over after the horse was startled and the driver lost control of the horse. The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the defendant’s carriage business was not immune from liability to its passengers under Tennessee’s equine liability statute. There were three reasons for this decision: 1) the defendant is not an “equine activity sponsor,” 2) his business is not an “equine activity,” and 3) the plaintiffs were not “participants” engaging in an “equine activity” when they were injured.
|State v. Woods||2001 WL 224519 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.)||Defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of kidnapping in an incident following a dogfight. Following a jury trial, d efendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.|
|Allison v. Johnson||2001 WL 589384 (Ohio 2001)||
Appellant was injured by appellee’s horse when appellant was standing outside a horse arena waiting for the appellee. The horse began to shuffle backwards and backed into a gate, which popped out of a bracket and struck the appellant in the face. The trial court found and the court of appeals upheld the finding that the appellant was an “equine activity participant” because she was a spectator to the “normal daily care of an equine.” In addition, the appellee was determined to be an “equine activity sponsor” due to the fact that he was an “operator” of a stable where the equine activity occurred. Thus, the equine immunity statute of Ohio is applicable to the appellee.
|Montier v. Hall||2002 CarswellAlta 156||
This is a Provincial Court Civil Claims appeal from an award to plaintiffs/respondents for $865.00 in veterinary expenses as against defendant/appellant. This matter arose out of the sale of a black female Belgian Sheepdog that was eventually euthanized by the respondents at four months of age, two months after it was purchased due to serious hereditary defects. The purchase agreement signed by respondents warranted the puppy against serious hereditary defects or illness until 25 months of age, but limited the damages to replacement of the puppy with another puppy. In affirming the award of damages, this court found that the contract does not specifically exclude compensation for veterinary expenses or for consequential damages; hence, it does not exclude liability by the supplier for the purchaser's veterinary expenses incurred as a result the defective dog.
|Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents)||2002 SCC 76||
The respondent applied for a patent on an invention entitled “transgenic animals”. In its patent application, the respondent seeks to protect both the process by which the "oncomice" are produced and the end product of the process, i.e. the founder mice and the offspring whose cells contain the oncogene. The process and product claims extend to all non‑human mammals. The process claims were allowed by the Patent Examiner, while the product claims were rejected. The appellant Commissioner confirmed the refusal of the product claims. The Federal Court, Trial Division, dismissed the respondent’s appeal from the appellant’s decision. At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held the appeal should be allowed. A higher life form is not patentable because it is not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act .
|Texas Attorney General Opinion No. JC-0552||2002 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. JC-0552||
Texas Attorney General Opinion clarifying a new provision in Chapter 822 of the Texas Health & Safety Code that requires all dangerous wild animals to be registered in the county in which they're located. Otherwise, possession of these animals is unlawful.
|City of Sausalito v. Brian O'Neill||2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12457 (N.D. Cal. 2002)||
In considering standing under the MMPA, the court found that the plaintiff city had only pure economic injury and had not shown that any harm would result to marine mammals protected under the MMPA.
|Ivey v. Hamlin (Unpublished)||2002 WL 1254444 (Tenn.Ct.App.)(Not reproted in S.W.3rd)||
This is an action for damages for the deliberate killing of a dog by a Deputy Sheriff that was alleging terrorizing the neighborhood. In finding for defendant-officer, the court noted that the consensus among the courts is that a vicious dog is a public nuisance and that governments and their agents have broad power to protect the public from these animals. The court thus found the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances and had a qualified immunity defense.
|Black Hawk County v. Jacobsen (Unpublished)||2002 WL 1429365 (Iowa App. 2002) (Not Reported in N.W. 2d)||
In this case, Donna Jacobsen appealed a district court order finding she had neglected fifty-six dogs in the course of her operation of a federal and state licensed kennel in Jesup. On appeal, Jacobsen contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because federal law (the Animal Welfare Act) preempts state regulations of federally licensed kennels. The court disagreed, finding the Act expressly contemplates state and local regulation of animals. Further, a plain reading of the Animal Welfare Act shows that Congress demonstrated no express or implied intent to preempt state or local government from regulating in this area.
|U.S. v. Hardman (On Rehearing En Banc)||2002 WL 1790584 (only Westlaw citation currently available)||
The Hardman and Wilgus cases are remanded for factfinding where the record was limited as to whether the government employed the least restrictive means to support its compelling interests of protecting eagles and Native American culture. On the Saenz motion for return of eagle feathers to a non-federally recognized Indian religious practitioner, the court holds that the government failed to support its assertions that opening the permit system to all adherents of Indian religions would compromise the eagle population or destroy federal trust obligations to Native American tribes/culture. For discussion of the BGEPA and religious challenges, see Detailed Discussion .
|Allanson v. Toncich||2002 WL 1897936 (Austrailia)||
Appeal uphold the judgement against the dog owner for damages, but recalculates damages upward.
|RSPCA v. Stojcevski||2002 WL 228890, 134 A Crim R 441||
Appeal against the order of the Magistrate dismissing a complaint - prevention of cruelty to animals - respondent charged with ill treating an animal in that failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate any pain suffered by the animal who had a fractured leg bone contrary to sec 13(1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985. Dismissal was upheld and court found that defendant did not understand dog was in pain and had and was going to take reasonable steps.
|Williams v. McMahan||2002 WL 242538 (Wa. 2002)||
The plaintiff sued for damages as a result of the wrongful spaying of her purebred dog, which she intended to breed. The court found that damages should be measured by the fair market value of the dog.
|People v. McCree||2002 WL 276134 (Cal. 2002)||
Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of eight counts of possession and training of a
fighting dog and two counts of causing a dogfight
for gain. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that: (1) prosecutor's cross-examination of defense witness was proper; (2) prosecutor's closing arguments were proper; and (3) evidence supported the convictions.
|Animal Rights Front, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Com'n of Town of Glastonbury||2002 WL 31761999 (Conn.Super.)||
The plaintiff, Animal Rights Front, Inc., an environmental intervenor, appeals from a final decision of the defendant that gave subdivision and special permit approval to an application by defendant Rejean Jacques d/b/a Rejean Realty, Inc. The basic issue of the plaintiff's appeal relates to preservation of the Eastern Timber Rattlesnake, an endangered species common to the Diamond Lake section of Glastonbury, and its migration across the development project, which would inherently lead to mortality. On appeal, defendants questioned plaintiff's standing because they contended that rattlesnakes do not fall under the category of "natural resources." Relying on a companion case, the court noted that endangered species are inherently deemed natural resources. However in dismissing plaintiff's appeal, the court found that the defendant made changes that provided for the protection of the rattlesnake and the commission reasonably relied upon these assertions by the defendant to support its conclusions so it was not required to consider alternatives to the proposed development.
|Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground||2002 WL 31789336 (Wash.App. Div. 2)||
In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits. Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs. The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship. In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state. ( Note : publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ).
|Daniele v Weissenberger||2002 WL 31813949,136 A Crim R 390||
Court uphold conviction for failure to provide food and water for horses. Even thought not the owner, he was the responsible party. Sentence of $3,000 fine and suspended 3 month was not excessive.
|State v. Shook (Unpublished)||2002 WL 31894726||
Defendant Shook (a non-tribal member) shot and killed a whitetail buck on private property within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation. Under Wildlife and Parks Commission hunting regulations, big game hunting privileges on Indian Reservations are limited to tribal members only, thereby closing the hunting season to non-tribal members. On appeal, Shook contended that the regulation was a violation of equal protection because it discriminated based on race. The court disagreed, finding the classification was political rather than racial because it was established through treaty with the federal government and recognized the unique federal obligation toward Indians. Thus, the court found the regulation was an "entirely rational" means to preserve wildlife populations for hunting by Indians.
|Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee v. Lloyd||2002 WL 31928523, 134 A Crim R 441||
Appeal of agency determination of veterinarian malpractice for failure to detect ring worms in a cat. Long case with full discussion of process of administrative hearing and the standards by which to decide if an action is malpractice.
|Wright v. Fish and Game Commission (unpublished)||2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8091||
The California Court of Appeal upheld the state's Fish and Game Commission’s ferret ban against an equal protection challenge from a ferret owner. The owner argued that the ban discriminated between ferret owners and owners of other companion animals. However, the court found a rational relation between the ban and concerns about wildlife and human health (from attacks and from rabies).
|Wiederhold v. Derench||2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1795||A dog owner had purchased a Newfoundland dog from a breeder and signed a contract that stated she would return the dog to the breeder if she could no longer care for it. After the dog attacked another dog, the owner had the obligation to return the dog to the breeder. A third party, the owner’s friend attempted to help the owner and contacted the breeder to notify her about the owner's intention to return the dog. The breeder was busy on that particular day. She was with another dog delivering another litter of puppies and could not come to pick up the owner's dog. The owner then sold the dog to the defendant, a dog breeder and co-chair of the Newfoundland Club of New England Rescue. The rescue worker had prepared a bill of sale, which the owner signed, and the rescue worker then handed the owner $100 to help with expenses. The trial court held that the transfer to the rescue worker was not a bona fide sale. The rescue worker took possession of the dog in her capacity as a member of the rescue organization and not as a bona fide buyer. The court also found that the original breeder had not given up her contract rights to the dog. The breeder was handling an emergency delivery of puppies with a different dog, which made it reasonable that she could not pick up the owner's dog that day. The defendant rescue worker knew the breeder had not relinquished her contractual ownership right to the dog and so the court held that the plaintiff was the sole owner and entitled to sole possession.|
|State v. Cloutier||2003 ME 7 (Sup.Ct. Maine Jan. 21, 2003)||
Defendant appealed from his conviction for "driving deer" under Maine statute § 7458(10) (among other convictions), contending that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected defendant's argument, finding the version at issue here plainly tells people that if they participate in a group hunt and they organize or plan the hunt so that several people move in a coordinated fashion toward other members of the hunting party who by predesign are standing or moving toward the first group, in a planned effort to flush out the deer, they are hunting illegally. With regard to the entrapment defense for the illegal transporting of deer, the Court found that although another hunter may have created the opportunity for Cloutier to commit the illegal transportation violation, "more is required for the entrapment defense than providing the opportunity to commit the crime."
|Mack v. State of Texas (unpublished)||2003 WL 23015101 (Not Reported in S.W.3d)||
The Texas Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's decision that failure to adequately provide for cattle such that they suffered from malnourishment constituted animal cruelty offense under Texas law. The court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that malnourished cow was one of the many domesticated living creatures on defendant's ranch, and was therefore an “animal” under the state law.
|State v. Shook||2003 WL 347575||
This is the Montana Supreme Court's denial of appellant Shook's petition for rehearing in State v. Shook, 313 Mont. 347 (2002).
|Holcomb v. Colonial Associates, L.L.C.||2004 WL 1416659, 2004 WL 1416659 (N.C.) (Only Westlaw cite available)||
This North Carolina case involves the issue of whether a landlord can be held liable for negligence when his tenant's dogs injure a third party where a landlord has agreed by contract to remove "undesirable" dogs. Under the terms of the lease, the tenant, Olson, could keep one Rottweiler dog on the property. It was also stipulated that the landlord could require removal of any "undesirable" pets with 48-hour's notice. The dogs in the instant action attacked a contractor who was making an estimate on some of the rental homes, and, according to testimony, had committed two prior attacks. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred, in that the plaintiff was not required to show Colonial was an owner or keeper of the dogs in order to show Colonial was negligent; that requirement is limited only to strict liability actions. As a result, the court found Colonial failed to use ordinary care by failing to require the defendant Olson to restrain his Rottweiler dogs, or remove them from the premises when the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, from the dogs' past conduct, that they were likely, if not restrained, to do an act from which a reasonable person could foresee. Of particular importance to the court, was the lease provision, which the court felt contractually obligated the landlord to retain control over defendant's dogs.
|Earth Island Institute v. Evans||2004 WL 1774221 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No reporter citation)||
The Secretary of Commerce made a final finding that the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins using purse seine nets did not have a significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin stock in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. Several organizations challenged that finding under the Administrative Procedures Act, and the matter came before this Court along with simultaneous motions for summary judgment from both the plaintiff and defendant. The Court concluded that Plaintiff's met their burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment, and the finding of the Secretary is set aside.
|Auburn Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Employment and Housing Com'n||2004 WL 1888284 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.)||
In this California case, the Elebiaris sought permission from their condominium association to keep a small dog as a companion (both suffered from severe depression and found that taking care of a dog alleviated their symptoms and enabled them to function more productively). T he association refused their request, leading the Elebiaris to file a claim with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the FEHC), which found in favor of the Elebiaris. After the Superior Court granted the condominium's petition, the FEHC and residents appealed. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in overturning the FEHC decision where the FEHC's finding that a companion dog constituted a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's disability was supported by substantial evidence.
|People v. Schneider||2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.)||
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions.