Opinion
Danner, J.
*1 This appeal requires us to construe the “right to kill all animals used for food” (Pen. Code,1 § 599c) exception to the crime of animal cruelty set out in section 597, subdivision (a) (section 597(a)). We decide that section 599c's exception does not extend to the killing of another person's animal for food without the animal owner's consent.
A jury convicted defendant Anthony Mark Owen Madruga of 10 crimes related to his nighttime entry into a barn at Hollister High School and his subsequent killing of a goat and pig. The animals belonged to students at the school and had been housed in the barn as part of the school's Future Farmers of America (FFA) program.
Madruga's convictions include two counts of animal cruelty (§ 597(a)) for killing the goat and pig and two counts of misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b) (section 273a(b)) for the emotional harm inflicted on the students who owned the animals. The trial court sentenced Madruga, who had a prior strike conviction, to an aggregate prison term of 11 years six months.
On appeal, Madruga contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the exception to animal cruelty for his “right to kill all animals used for food” (§ 599c) and, in the alternative, defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. He also claims insufficient evidence supports the two child abuse convictions and the animal cruelty conviction concerning the pig.
For the reasons explained below, we reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The San Benito County District Attorney filed an information charging Madruga with two counts each of animal cruelty (§ 597(a); counts 1 [goat] & 2 [pig]), vandalism in an amount of $400 or more (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); counts 3–4), and misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a(b); counts 7 [minor victim D.B.] & 8 [minor victim D.G.]). The information also charged Madruga with second degree burglary (§ 459; count 5), unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 6), misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 9), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Id., § 11364, subd. (a); count 10). In addition, the information alleged that Madruga had suffered a prior strike conviction for first degree burglary (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and that he was armed with a weapon when he committed the animal cruelty, vandalism, and burglary offenses (counts 1–5) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information also alleged four aggravating circumstances as to counts 1 through 5 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)–(3) & (8)).
Madruga admitted the prior strike allegation.2 The jury found Madruga guilty as charged and found true the weapon allegation (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and the aggravating circumstances for sentencing. The trial court sentenced Madruga to 11 years six months.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
1. Prosecution Evidence
*2 Around 11:30 p.m. on February 5, 2024,3 surveillance cameras at an agricultural barn on the campus of Hollister High School recorded a person around and inside the barn.4 The barn housed animals for the school's FFA program.
The next morning (February 6), school staff discovered that the barn had been broken into. A deceased goat (named Stetson) was found in his enclosure. The bones of Stetson's “head had been splintered.” A pig (named Oakley) and a wheelbarrow were missing.5
Later that afternoon, near a homeless encampment located approximately one mile from Hollister High School, sheriff's deputies discovered a pig carcass hanging from a tree. The pig was missing a hindquarter. Deputies also found a wheelbarrow labeled “ ‘Hollister FFA’ ” (with reddish brown staining in it) and rubber boots (with apparent fodder on them) that were like other boots stored in the barn.
The deputies contacted Madruga at the encampment. The pig carcass was approximately 75 yards away from the area in which Madruga apparently was living; the wheelbarrow was approximately 50 yards away from that area. Within Madruga's living area, the deputies found pants, boots, and a jacket that had reddish brown stains on the sleeves, shoulder area, and back. The deputies also found glass pipes, a small plastic baggy containing methamphetamine, and a round of ammunition.
A shoeprint located on concrete at the barn shared similarities with the sole of the boots found in Madruga's living area. In addition, the tread pattern of the sneakers Madruga was wearing at the time of his arrest was consistent with latent shoeprints found near the wheelbarrow.
The deputies did not find any pig parts in Madruga's living area. The deputies recovered the charred remains of an animal's leg from a person named Samantha. The deputies also found “some evidence” that someone “could have consumed part of the pig or perhaps participated in its butchering, but [the deputies] found no evidence that the other subjects were involved in the dispatching of the pig or the thefts.” Additionally, none of the fingerprints collected and analyzed by law enforcement had any evidentiary value.
Hollister High School student D.G. testified that she owned Oakley the pig and had raised him for about one month as part of the FFA program. D.G. was immediately attracted to Oakley when she was selecting an animal for the program. D.G. testified that she had purchased Oakley for $500 approximately one month before he was killed. For the first couple of weeks after D.G. purchased Oakley, D.G. spent time “a lot of time” spoiling Oakley with powdered doughnuts and teaching him how to walk. D.G. invested approximately $1,000 into buying and raising Oakley. Before D.G. left the barn late on February 5, D.G. and others “were just chilling out with music” and “hanging out there with animals.” D.G. was “spoiling [Oakley] with doughnuts” that night.
*3 On the morning of February 6, D.G. learned that Oakley was missing from the barn. D.G. had an emotional attachment to Oakley and “was worrying about” him. D.G. testified, “I was very heartbroken and I couldn't sleep for a couple of months because I just had nightmares, and I was scared for my next pig to be the next victim.” On cross-examination, D.G. acknowledged that she knew and intended that Oakley would eventually be sold and butchered for his meat.
Hollister High School student D.B. testified that she owned Stetson the goat and had raised him for about two months as part of the FFA program. D.B. had purchased Stetson for $650. D.B. “decided that goat was what [she] best fit.” D.B. spent hours getting to know, feeding, washing, and training Stetson to walk on a halter for showing. D.B. invested approximately $1,100 dollars into buying and raising Stetson. When D.B. left the barn on February 5, Stetson was lying in his enclosure going to sleep.
On February 6, D.B saw Stetson in lying dead in “a puddle of blood.” D.B. was “really scared” by the experience and “really sad because [she] had grown a connection with” Stetson. D.B. testified that she had an attachment to Stetson even though he was being raised for auction. At the time of trial (in April 2025), the loss of Stetson still had an emotional impact on D.B.
2. Defense Evidence
A private investigator confirmed that the wheelbarrow was found by deputies approximately 50 yards from Madruga's apparent living area. The pig carcass was situated 124 yards from Madruga's living area. The investigator testified that the length of the likely route taken by a person pushing a wheelbarrow from the barn to the homeless encampment was 1.1 miles. In addition, the investigator explained that the jacket recovered by deputies in February 2024, did not fit Madruga when he tried it on in April 2025.
On cross-examination, the investigator acknowledged that the sleeves of the jacket fit Madruga's arms, and the jacket had some reddish-brown stains on the sleeves and back. The investigator further acknowledged that “[i]f the jacket was used as a smock or an apron, the size would actually radically change in terms of its orientation on Mr. Madruga.”
II. DISCUSSION
Madruga raises three claims of error. We first address, concurrently, Madruga's claims that insufficient evidence supports the animal cruelty conviction regarding Oakley the pig (count 2), the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that killing an animal used for food is an exception to animal cruelty (see § 599c), and, alternatively, Madruga's defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to request instruction on that exception.6 We then turn to Madruga's claim challenging the sufficiency of the trial evidence for his misdemeanor child abuse convictions (counts 7 & 8).
A. Sufficiency of Evidence and Instruction on Animal Cruelty Conviction Regarding Oakley the Pig (Count 2)
*4 Madruga asserts there is insufficient evidence for his animal cruelty conviction as to Oakley the pig (count 2). Madruga also claims the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify CALCRIM No. 2953 (CALCRIM 2953) to include section 599c's exception for killing an animal used for food and, alternatively, defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to request instruction on that exception.
1. Additional Background
Section 597(a) provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in ... [s]ection 599c, a person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of a crime.” As relevant to this matter, section 599c provides that section 597 must not be “construed ... to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food.”
In count 2 of the information, the district attorney alleged that Madruga committed the crime of animal cruelty, in violation of section 597(a), when he “did unlawfully, maliciously and intentionally kill an animal, to wit a pig.”
In a trial brief, Madruga's defense counsel recommended that the trial court instruct the jurors on the animal cruelty charges using “CALCRIM 1670 [sic7] – Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a)).” (Boldface omitted.) Counsel additionally stated that the instruction “[d]efines elements (malicious killing), allowing argument that killing for food (if proven) negates malice.” (Italics added.)
Despite this statement in Madruga's trial brief, when the trial court and counsel for the parties discussed the prosecutor's proposed packet of jury instructions, defense counsel did not object to or request any modification of the proposed instruction on counts 1 and 2 under CALCRIM 2953, which did not include the language related to killing an animal for food.
The trial court instructed the jurors on the animal cruelty charges using CALCRIM 2953 as follows: “The defendant is charged in [c]ount[s] 1 and 2 with [a]nimal [c]ruelty in violation of Penal Code section 597. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of [animal cruelty], the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant killed a living animal; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant acted maliciously. [¶] Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy or injure an animal.”8
In his closing argument regarding the animal cruelty counts, the prosecutor stated, inter alia: “The crime is any person who kills an animal maliciously. It is not malicious when you kill your own animal for food because that is your animal that is going to slaughter and that is clearly what it is. [¶] Malicious just means intentionally does a wrongful act. It is malicious, however, to kill intentionally someone else's animal you do not have a right to. So I don't want you to get hung up on the idea it's animal cruelty because this was about being mean to the animal. Although, I think it's absolutely clear that the death of the goat, Stetson, was completely unnecessary in this particular case and completely brutal for having its head beat[en] in for no reason. [¶] But there isn't an argument as it relates to the pig that, oh, it was going to be raised for food anyways. The reality there is that is not what's relevant. The relevance is kills, which is clear, malicious means wrongful, intentionally doing a wrongful act.”9
*5 The prosecutor added that if a person kills “an aggressive rabid dog” that attacks the person, that killing is not malicious because the person has a personal right to protect themself. In contrast, intentionally killing a dog “because it barks too much and I don't like my neighbor” is malicious.
Relatedly, when addressing the burglary charge (count 5), the prosecutor argued that Madruga entered the barn “with either the intent to steal an animal or the intent to commit animal cruelty, killing someone else's animal.” The prosecutor added that the surveillance footage showed that Madruga was inside the barn for about 15 minutes, and Madruga placed the pig and an axe in the wheelbarrow. The prosecutor asserted that “[t]he best inference is that [Madruga] intended to steal the goat initially but then decided to go to the pig as he heard other animals.”
Madruga's defense counsel explained to the jurors in closing argument that Madruga “is denying his involvement in this case.” Defense counsel challenged the strength of the People's proof and the adequacy of the police investigation. Defense counsel stated Madruga “completely denies his involvement. So we don't know who did this. It's a circumstantial case that they are trying to piece together, a lot of random facts that they believe conclude that they point to Mr. Madruga.” Counsel added that law enforcement had not done any investigation of other people (such as the women who possessed the charred leg) and “certainly Mr. Madruga didn't have” any pig parts. Defense counsel added: “Whoever did this, again, not Mr. Madruga, but whoever did this, this was a random act to go in and take an animal probably for food and maybe take it back down to the river for the other homeless folks down there to enjoy. We don't know. That's a lot of speculation.”
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘In construing a statute, our fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (People v. Killian (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 191, 205, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 13 (Killian); see People v. Morgan (2026) 19 Cal.5th 132, 143, 341 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, 583 P.3d 1235 (Morgan).) “ ‘When reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, our task is limited. We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime.” [Citation.] We make this determination using the statutory language [citation], because “the plain language of our statute must control as to the acts which constitute the crime.” [Citations.] We apply de novo review to the meaning of statutory language.’ ” (Killian, at p. 205, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 13; see Morgan, at p. 143, 341 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, 583 P.3d 1235.)
Regarding jury instructions, “ ‘[t]he trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense.’ [Citation.] ‘ “In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.” [Citation.] That duty extends to instructions on the defendant's theory of the case, “including instructions ‘as to defenses “ ‘that the defendant is relying on ..., or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[O]nce a trial court undertakes to instruct on a legal point, it must do so correctly.’ ” (People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 660, 324 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (Howard).)
*6 “Nevertheless, ‘[a] trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal.’ ” (Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 660, 324 Cal.Rptr.3d 848.)
“We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they completely and correctly state the law. [Citations.] ‘ “In considering a claim of instructional error we must first ascertain what the relevant law provides, and then determine what meaning the instruction given conveys.” ’ ” (Killian, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 206, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 13.)
3. History and Construction of Sections 597a and 599c
“In California, the Legislature has recognized since 1872 that animals are special, sentient beings, because unlike other forms of property, animals feel pain, suffer and die.” (Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384, 392, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 921.) “As enacted in 1872, section 597 read: ‘Every person who maliciously kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who maliciously and cruelly beats, tortures, or injures any animal, whether belonging to himself or another, is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ ” (People v. Chung (2010) 195 Cal.App.4th 721, 728, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 253.)
In the first decade of the 1900s, the Legislature twice amended section 597. (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 1; Stats. 1909, ch. 661, § 1; see People v. Dunn (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 418, 420–421, 114 Cal.Rptr. 164 (Dunn).)
As amended in 1905, section 597 read: “Every person who maliciously kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, drink or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills any animal, or causes or procures any animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, drink or shelter, or to be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the same, or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails to provide the same with proper food, drink, shelter or protection from the weather, or who cruelly drives, rides or otherwise uses the same when unfit for labor, is for every such offense, guilty of a misdemeanor.”10 (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 1.)
Additionally, in 1905, the Legislature added section 599c to the Penal Code, providing: “No part of this title[11] shall be construed as interfering with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws,’ or any laws for or against the destruction of certain birds, nor must this title be construed as interfering with the right to destroy any venomous reptile, or any animal known as dangerous to life, limb, or property, or to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food, or with properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of this state.” (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 2, italics added.)
*7 The Legislature has not altered section 599c since its enactment in 1905. In the 1950s, our Supreme Court observed that “the basic purpose of section 599c is to limit the effect of the provisions prohibiting cruelty to animals rather than to regulate the disposition of impounded animals.”12 (Simpson, supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 278, 253 P.2d 464.)
In 1972, the Legislature reorganized section 597 to include two subdivisions, (a) and (b). (See Stats. 1972, ch. 779, § 1; People v. Farley (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9–10, 109 Cal.Rptr. 59; Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 420, 114 Cal.Rptr. 164.) As enacted in 1972, section 597(a) provided in relevant part: “Every person who maliciously maims, wounds, tortures, or mutilates a living animal which is the property of another, or maliciously kills an animal which is the property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1972, ch. 779, § 1.)
In 1984, the Legislature added three more subdivisions to section 597—namely, subdivisions (c) through (e)—and amended subdivision (a) to, inter alia, include an exception for new subdivision (c), which applies to the malicious and intentional maiming, mutilation, or torture of endangered or threatened species and other protected animals. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1215, § 8; see People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 27, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 (Baniqued).) As amended in 1984, section 597(a) provided in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously maims, wounds, tortures, or mutilates a living animal which is the property of another, or maliciously kills an animal which is the property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1984, ch. 1215, § 8.)
In 1986, the Legislature amended section 597(a) again, principally to add the word “intentionally” to the subdivision.13 (Stats. 1986, ch. 846, § 1.)
In 1987, the Legislature amended section 597(a) to expand the application of the statute beyond animals that are “the property of another,” to further cover circumstances in which the harmed animal is owned by the person who performs the prohibited act.14 (See Stats. 1987, ch. 814, § 1.)
In 1988, the Legislature amended section 597(a) again. As relevant here, the Legislature added section 599c into section 597(a)'s initial “[e]xcept as” clause. The Legislature also deleted all language regarding ownership of the animal. (See Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4 [eff. Jan. 1, 1989].) As amended in 1988, section 597(a) read in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this section or [s]ection 599c, every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4, italics added.)
*8 In addition, the Legislature declared the following about its 1988 amendments to section 597: “It is the express intent of the Legislature that the amendments to [s]ection 597 ... made by this act shall not (a) interfere with the existing rights to self-defense and use of force when it is reasonably believed that an animal poses an immediate threat or danger to a person or (b) interfere with any of the laws contained in the Fish and Game Code or the Food and Agricultural Code.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 1522, § 6.)
The current version of section 597(a) is substantially similar to the 1988 version and provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this section or [s]ection 599c, a person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of a crime.”15 (Stats. 2023, ch. 546, § 2 [eff. Jan. 1, 2024].)
Case law establishes that section 597(a) “is a general intent statute.” (People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1190, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 391.) “General criminal intent [ ] requires no further mental state beyond willing commission of the act proscribed by law.” (People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1215, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409 (Sargent); see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 621, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 [explaining that the defendant must intend the wrongful act but is not required to have intended the result].) In the context of section 597, maliciously is defined as “a wish to vex, annoy, or injure” an animal, or “an intent to do a wrongful act.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4); see Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 421, 114 Cal.Rptr. 164 [observing that the focus of the 1972 version of section 597 was on cruelty to animals rather than “malice toward the animal's owner”].)
4. Arguments on Appeal
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Madruga contends “if the pig was killed for food, the conduct falls within the section 599c exception and does not constitute a ‘wrongful act’ under the animal cruelty statute.” He further contends that he “did not kill the pig with malice since killing an animal for food is an exception to the animal cruelty statute.” He claims the evidence shows he removed the pig from the barn, took it to the homeless encampment, and killed it. He also claims that “the presence of a charred leg supports the inference that the pig was killed for food.” He argues: “Because section 599c exempts the killing of animals for food, even in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence does not establish that [he] committed a wrongful act and did not [sic] maliciously kill the pig within the meaning of section 597, subdivision (a).”
Relatedly, Madruga contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the instruction on count 2 to include section 599c's exception for killing an animal for food because that “exception directly bears on an element of animal cruelty: the intent of the person killing the animal.” Madruga further asserts that the court's failure to modify the animal cruelty instruction to include the section 599c exception was prejudicial under the Chapman harmless error standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705), as well as the less stringent Watson standard for state law error (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243). Alternatively, Madruga claims the record establishes ineffective assistance of counsel based on his defense counsel's failure to request an instruction under the section 599c exception.
*9 The Attorney General responds, inter alia, that section 599c is legally inapplicable because Madruga “manifestly did not have [ ] a right [to kill for food] an animal that was not his, taking [Madruga] outside the plain language of the statute.”
In his reply brief, Madruga reiterates his argument that “[s]ection 597 requires that malice be directed at the animal itself, not at the animal's owner” (citing Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 420–421, 114 Cal.Rptr. 164), and if the pig were killed for food, section 599c precludes a finding of malice.
5. Analysis
When construing a statute, “ ‘we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 617, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 389 P.3d 848.) We begin our evaluation of Madruga's claims with a brief review of the evolution of the statutory scheme.
When the Legislature enacted section 599c in 1905, the version of section 597 concurrently enacted prohibited the malicious killing, maiming, or wounding of an animal that is “the property of another.” (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 1.) The 1905 version of section 597 also prohibited other acts that applied to “any animal” (i.e., “cruelly beat[ing], mutilat[ing], or cruelly kill[ing] any animal”) (ibid.) and certain acts of cruelty, abuse, and mistreatment perpetrated by a person “having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise.” (Ibid.) Through these statutes, the Legislature broadly protected animals from cruelty and maltreatment both when the animal was not the property of the perpetrator and when the animal was owned or rightfully possessed by the perpetrator.
Similarly, in 1988, when the Legislature added section 599c to the exception language in section 597(a), it simultaneously removed all mention of ownership (or lack thereof) over the harmed animal. (Compare Stats. 1987, ch. 814, § 1 with Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4.) In addition, the Legislature expressly stated an intent not to “interfere with the existing rights to self-defense and use of force” against an animal that poses an immediate threat or danger to a person or “with any of the laws contained in the Fish and Game Code or the Food and Agricultural Code.”16 (Stats. 1988, ch. 1522, § 6.) With these changes, the Legislature broadly protected animals for cruelty irrespective of ownership, while concurrently ensuring that persons would not be held criminally liable for certain acts that the Legislature otherwise deemed proper.
*10 Turning to the portion of section 599c currently in effect and at issue in this matter, the exception is explicitly tethered to “the right to kill.” (See § 599c [“No part of this title shall be construed ... to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food.” (Italics added.)].) As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a “right,” is, inter alia: “1. That which is proper under law, morality, or ethics,” “2. Something that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle,” and “3. A power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law.” (Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1581, cols. 1–2.) By using the phrase “the right to kill,” the Legislature has described a claim to kill that is deemed just and proper.
From a property rights perspective, it is a “fundamental principle[ ] of the common law” (Wright v. Solomon (1861) 19 Cal. 64, 69) that “no man's right to his property can be divested without his consent.” (Ibid.) Likewise, “it is beyond dispute that an individual has the right to have his personal property free from interference.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1375, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 71 P.3d 296 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also id. at pp. 1350–1351, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 71 P.3d 296.)
Thus, a person acts wrongfully if he or she damages the property of another or interferes substantially with another person's possession of their property, including animals. (See Garcia v. Gunn (1897) 119 Cal. 315, 321, 51 P. 684 [explaining that the “right of control over and possession of all [wild goats on leased land], with the right of selection, would be invaded if a stranger could come in and slay goats at will”]; Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 549–552, 176 P.2d 1 [discussing the torts of conversion and trespass to personal property]; Kimes v. Grosser (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1558, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 [holding that a pet owner can recover the costs of pet care attributable to injury caused by another]; People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 896, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 [“[T]he fact that section 594 [(prohibiting vandalism)] has its basis in a century-old statute dealing with malicious injury to another's property suggests that such destruction of another's property is fundamentally and presumptively wrong.” (Italics added.)]; see also § 384h [prohibiting the willful or negligent killing, maiming, or wounding of “an animal, the property of another,” “while hunting upon the [e]nclosed lands of another”].)
As detailed ante, section 599c includes additional limitations. These aspects of the statute likewise suggest that the Legislature intended section 599c's restrictions on the laws against animal cruelty to apply only in circumstances that are otherwise considered proper or just. For example, section 599c prohibits interference with the policy judgments made with respect to game animals (as stated in our state's game laws), the destruction of venomous reptiles and animals that are dangerous to persons or property, and certain “properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations.”17 (§ 599c.)
If the Legislature had intended, as Madruga implicitly argues, for section 599c to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food irrespective of the ownership of the animal, it could easily have done so. A carveout intended to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food regardless of any legitimate interest or consent might, for example, have provided that no part of the title shall be construed “to interfere with any killing of animals used for food.” The tethering of the exception to the “right to kill” strongly suggests a narrower ambit than that urged by Madruga.
*11 Moreover, we do not perceive any inconsistency between section 597(a)'s requirement that malice be directed toward the animal killed (see Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 420, 114 Cal.Rptr. 164) and the limitation of section 599c's food exception to animal owners or those who act with the owner's consent. Section 597(a) and 599c balance differing and potentially competing interests between the protection afforded animals and certain conduct toward animals otherwise considered proper. By focusing the requisite malice on the animal rather than the owner, section 597(a) broadly protects animals themselves. An understanding of section 599c's exception tied to ownership and consent balances the protection of animals from malicious killing against an animal owner's appropriate use of the animal for food.
Considering the phrase “right to kill all animals used for food” in the context of the statutory scheme and given the protection historically afforded personal property, including animals, we agree with the Attorney General that section 559c's bar against “ ‘interfer[ing] with the right to kill all animals used for food’ ” does not extend to any animal a person may choose to eat. To decide the issues in this appeal, we need not decide the full scope of a person's “right to kill” animals for food. Whatever the outer bounds of that right, we conclude it does not extend to animals owned by another, where the owner has not consented to the killing of the animal.
We decide section 599c does not apply as a matter of law to Madruga's conduct, because it is undisputed he did not own the pig or have permission to kill it. Given this conclusion, we reject Madruga's appellate claim of insufficient evidence on count 2. That claim lacks merit because it turns on Madruga's contention that he “did not kill the pig with malice since killing an animal for food is an exception to the animal cruelty statute.” As we have explained, there is no exception to section 597(a) for the killing of an animal used for food when the defendant did not own the animal or have the owner's consent to kill it.
Moreover, to the extent that Madruga's claim contends the evidence is otherwise insufficient to support his conviction on count 2, we are not persuaded. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Madruga killed Oakley in the barn using an axe and that the killing of Oakley occurred in a manner akin to the brutal killing of Stetson. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Madruga guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of animal cruelty as charged in count 2.
Additionally, because section 559c's bar against interfering with the right to kill all animals used for food is legally inapplicable under the instant circumstances, we reject Madruga's claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance of counsel on count 2. Madruga's claims are premised on the applicability of section 599c's bar to his conviction under section 597(a). Because the premise of Madruga's claims is inapt, Madruga fails to demonstrate any instructional error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Child Abuse Convictions (Counts 7 & 8)
Madruga also contends insufficient evidence supports his misdemeanor child abuse convictions (counts 7 & 8). We turn now to that question.
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 944, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 422 P.3d 973; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.)
*12 “In applying this test, we ... presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105 (Zamudio).) “ ‘We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury's verdict.” (Ibid.) “However, ‘[a] reasonable inference ... “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ... A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than ... a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179.)
“The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] We ‘must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, a reviewing court's conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment's reversal.” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 357–358, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105.) We decide questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Morgan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 143, 341 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, 583 P.3d 1235.)
2. Analysis
Section 273a(b) “provides: ‘Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, [1] willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or [2] inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or [3] having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or [4] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ ” (People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 453–454, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334 (Burton), quoting § 273a(b); see also Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1215, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409.)
“Section 273a encompasses a wide variety of situations and includes both direct and indirect conduct.” (Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 454, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334; see also Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1215–1216, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409; In re L.K. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, citing People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511 (Valdez).) “When the harm to a child is directly inflicted, the requisite mental state for the section 273a offense is general criminal intent. [Citations.] When that harm is indirectly inflicted, the requisite mental state is criminal negligence. [Citations.] Criminal negligence is aggravated, culpable, gross or reckless conduct that is such a departure from that of the ordinarily prudent or careful person under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life. [Citation.] A defendant may be deemed to be criminally negligent if a reasonable person in his position would have been aware of the risk.” (Burton, at p. 454, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334; see also People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 874, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 732.)
“The term ‘willfully’ in the section 273a context of indirect conduct implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to; an act or omission amounting to criminal negligence can, in limited contexts, constitute a willful violation of the law.” (Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 455, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, citing Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 787–788, 790, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511.)
*13 The term “unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” means “pain or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.” (CALCRIM No. 823.) One court has observed that “the meaning of section 273a ... is not difficult to find. We do not think that the word ‘unjustifiable,’ as used in the section, is synonymous with ‘unjust.’ It is the antonym of ‘justifiable,’ rather than the antonym of ‘just.’ ” (People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App.Supp. 771, 778, 300 P. 801 (Curtiss).) The court explained, “By the use of the word ‘unjustifiable,’ the Legislature intended to make use of the antonym of ‘justifiable,’ and to designate as criminal the infliction of physical pain or mental suffering upon a child, which could not be defended, or vindicated, or which was not exculpable, excusable or authorizable, under the circumstances. The standard thus set up is not abstract. It is concrete. The concept by which it shall be determined whether the punishment is or is not unjustifiable is a fluid one—like the concept by which the action of the ‘reasonable man’ serves as a criterion in determining the violations of duty which amount to negligence.” (Id. at p. 779, 300 P. 801, italics omitted.)
The trial court instructed the jurors on counts 7 and 8 using CALCRIM No. 823 as follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant was criminally negligent when he caused or permitted the child to suffer. [¶] Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. [¶] A child is any person under the age of 18 years. [¶] Unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances. [¶] Criminal [n]egligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when: [¶] 1. He acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation; [¶] 2. The person's acts amount to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of his acts; [¶] AND [¶] 3. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would naturally and probably result in harm to others.”
Madruga claims there is insufficient evidence for two of the requisite elements for conviction under section 273a(b), namely, unjustifiable mental suffering and criminal negligence. Regarding the unjustifiable mental suffering element for D.B. (count 7) and D.G. (count 8), Madruga contends the students' emotional reactions and nightmares were “not excessive under the circumstances.” He also notes that each student testified to an understanding that her animal would ultimately be slaughtered.
We are not persuaded that the evidence is insufficient to prove the unjustifiable mental suffering element. The term “mental suffering” means “[a] highly unpleasant mental reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another person's conduct; emotional pain and suffering.” (Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) pp. 596, col. 2 & 1182, col. 1 [defining mental suffering by reference to the definition of emotional distress].) As detailed ante (see pt. I.B.1.), D.G testified that she was emotionally attached to Oakley, worried when she learned that he was missing from the barn, “very heartbroken,” unable to sleep soundly for “a couple of months” because of nightmares, and “scared” that her next pig might suffer the same fate. D.B, likewise, testified that she saw Stetson in a pool of blood and was “really scared” and “really sad” because she had an attachment to Stetson. D.B. also cried during her testimony.
Each student's testimony provides substantial evidence of “mental suffering.” The evidence shows the anguish, grief, and fright caused by the premature and traumatic death of the animals the students had left secured in a barn the night before the killings. Further, the students' mental suffering was “unjustifiable” because that suffering was not reasonably necessary and was excessive under the circumstances. There is no justifiable reason for an adult to place a minor student in the position of experiencing worry, sadness, fear, or nightmares due to an attack on a farm animal the student had kept safe and sound in a barn on a school campus. In other words, the mental suffering that resulted from Madruga breaking into the locked barn at Hollister High School and killing an animal under a student's care cannot “be defended[ ] or vindicated” and is “not exculpable, excusable or authorizable.” (Curtiss, supra, 116 Cal.App.Supp. at p. 779, 300 P. 801.)
*14 Contrary to Madruga's suggestion, the students' mental suffering need not amount to “lasting psychological harm” or cause a “significant change in the students' mental health.” Under the terms of the statute, any amount of mental suffering will suffice provided it is “unjustifiable.” As explained, the unjustifiable nature of the students' mental suffering was proved here by Madruga's intrusion into the locked barn and intentional attack on the animals with an axe, which caused mental suffering that “could not, either as to necessity or degree, be justified as reasonable, under the circumstances, to a jury of reasonable persons.” (Curtiss, supra, 116 Cal.App.Supp. at p. 779, 300 P. 801; see also Cline v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 943, 949, 185 Cal.Rptr. 787.) For these reasons, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to prove the unjustifiable mental suffering element of section 273a(b).
Regarding the criminal negligence element, Madruga contends: “Even assuming [Madruga] knew the barn was located on school grounds, a reasonable person would not necessarily foresee that killing a farm animal or stealing livestock, outside the presence of any minors, would cause a child to suffer unjustifiable mental suffering.” We disagree.
We conclude the trial evidence sufficiently supports the jury's finding of criminal negligence. The locked barn was located on school grounds and contained at least one item labeled “ ‘Hollister FFA’ ” (i.e., the stolen wheelbarrow). A reasonable person entering a high school campus and breaking into a locked barn would have recognized that minor students were involved in caring for or, at least, connected to the animals inside. A reasonable person also would have been aware of the risk that the minors would suffer unjustifiable mental suffering when they later learned that their animals were violently killed by an intruder who forcibly entered the barn overnight.
Moreover, Madruga does not cite any precedent expressly requiring that the minor be present at the time of the defendant's actions to find the defendant acted with criminal negligence in causing or permitting the minor to suffer unjustifiable mental suffering. Although presence may be a relevant factor in deciding whether a defendant was criminally negligent, we perceive no basis to conclude that section 273a(b)—which applies “under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death”—requires the child's presence.
Madruga's intrusion and attack on Oakley and Stetson involved aggravated and reckless conduct that departed from that of an ordinarily careful person and disregarded the unjustifiable mental suffering that a reasonable person would know would naturally and probably result from the intrusion, killing, and theft. The evidence satisfied the criminal negligence standard. (See Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 783, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511; see also Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 453–456, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Greenwood, P. J.
Adams, J.
All Citations
--- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2026 WL 2873804
Footnotes
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 After Madruga's admission, the district attorney orally amended count 6 (possession of ammunition by a felon) to allege the admitted conviction as the underlying prior conviction supporting that count. At trial, the parties stipulated that Madruga had previously been convicted of a felony for the purpose of count 6.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2024.
4 Hollister High School serves students from grades 7 through 12. Approximately 99 percent of the students are under the age of 18.
5 Surveillance footage depicts the intruder carrying an axe and later pushing a wheelbarrow containing the axe and an apparently dead pig through and away from the barn. Additionally, a photograph depicting the interior of the barn appears to show red stains on the floor and plywood outside of the pigs' enclosures. No surveillance footage of the actual killing of the pig or goat was introduced into evidence at trial.
6 Although the conclusion sections of Madruga's opening brief and reply brief ask this court to reverse both count 1 (concerning the killing of the goat named Stetson) and count 2 (concerning the killing of Oakley the pig), the arguments stated in Madruga's claims challenge only his conviction on count 2. Thus, we do not consider count 1 when addressing Madruga's claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instruction on animal cruelty under section 597, and the effectiveness of defense counsel.
7 CALCRIM does not contain an instruction numbered 1670. The model instruction for animal cruelty is CALCRIM 2953.
8 The bench notes to CALCRIM 2953 state that “[t]he court will need to modify this instruction if Penal Code section 599(c) [sic] applies.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2026), Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2953, p. 1987; accord Use Note to CALJIC No. 14.96 (2026–1 ed.) p. 1032 [“If there is an issue raised concerning ... section 599c, special instruction will have to be devised. Unless an issue is raised concerning ... section [599c], delete the bracketed word ‘unlawful’ ” from the pattern instruction.].)
9 Madruga's defense counsel did not object to this portion of the prosecutor's argument, and Madruga makes no argument in this appeal that his defense counsel's failure to object to the argument amounts to prejudicial IAC.
10 The only change effected by the 1909 amendment to section 597 was the deletion of the word “cruelly” from the prior statute's final prohibitory phrase (i.e., “or who cruelly drives, rides or otherwise uses the same when unfit for labor”). (Stats. 1909, ch. 661, § 1.)
11 Section 599c appears in title 14 of part 1 of the Penal Code (which currently comprises §§ 594–625c). The statutes within title 14 that pertain to animals are found at sections 596 through 600.8. Relatedly, section 595 provides: “The specification of the [a]cts enumerated in the following sections of this [c]hapter is not intended to restrict or qualify the interpretation of the preceding section.” Section 595 was enacted in 1872, when the section preceding section 595 was section 594 (vandalism).
12 The Supreme Court made this observation in the context of deciding whether a city ordinance of Los Angeles, which provided that the city would surrender unclaimed impounded animals to certain institutions for medical research, conflicted with certain state laws. (Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 271, 275–279, 253 P.2d 464 (Simpson).)
13 As amended in 1986, section 597(a) read in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal which is the property of another, or maliciously and intentionally[ ] kills an animal which is the property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 846, § 1, italics added.)
14 As amended in 1987, section 597(a) provided in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal which is the property of the person or which is the property of another, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal which is the property of the person or which is the property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 814, § 1, italics added.)
15 As used in section 597(a), the “word ‘animal’ includes every dumb creature” (§ 599b), and “in its broadest sense, the phrase ‘dumb creatures’ describes all animals except human beings. The use of the adjective ‘every’ in the definition indicates that a broad meaning was intended.” (Baniqued, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 21, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 835.)
16 As relevant here, the Food and Agriculture Code provides that certain livestock (including swine and goats) “shall be slaughtered by either of the following prescribed methods: [¶] (1) The animal shall be rendered insensible to pain by a captive bolt, gunshot, electrical or chemical means, or any other means that is rapid and effective before being cut, shackled, hoisted, thrown, or cast, with the exception of poultry which may be shackled. [¶] (2) The animal shall be handled, prepared for slaughter, and slaughtered in accordance with ritual requirements of the Jewish or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument.” (Id., § 19501, subd. (b).)
17 At common law, a person had a right “to defend his domestic animals against the attacks of dogs, or to kill such dogs when the circumstances warrant the belief that his property is in peril.” (Sabin v. Smith (1915) 26 Cal.App. 676, 678, 147 P. 1180; see also Food & Agr. Code, § 31102 [stating certain conditions involving livestock or poultry that permit the killing of a dog].)