Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Symposium: Confronting Barriers To The Courtroom For Animal Advocates - Animal Advocacy And Causes of Action | Carter Dillard, David Favre, Eric Glitzenstein, Mariann Sullivan, and Sonia Waisman | 13 Animal Law 87 (2006) |
In the third panel of the NYU Symposium, distinguished animal law professionals discuss various causes of action which may be used on behalf of animals in the courtroom. Panelists talk about traditional forms of standing, make suggestions for innovation using existing laws, and discuss visions of how they would like to see the law develop as it pertains to standing for animals. |
| Two Major Flaws of the Animal Rights Movement | Geordie Duckler | 14 Animal Law 179 (2007) |
Separate from its vulnerability to criticism by those politically opposed, a call for legal rights for animals is without justification on the very two pillars on which such a claim presumes to found itself—the precepts of law and of science. The claim’s inherent weaknesses are revealed in the use of terms that are inapplicable given both the way that legal rules work as a practical matter and the current level of our scientific knowledge about animals themselves. This article confronts these two core defects of the animal rights paradigm and seeks to shed the light of law, science, and reason on what seems to be an unreasonable, nonscientific, and yet ill-critiqued phenomenon. |
| On Redefining the Boundaries of Animal Ownership: Burdens and Benefits of Evidencing Animals' Personalities | Geordie Duckler | 10 Animal L. 63 (2004) | What is it about the law’s archaic perception of animals that makes it falter on the brink of constructing a modern concept of animal ownership? Were animals as personalty appreciated in their fundamental distinctions from other personal properties, the law might be able to fashion a more sophisticated set of legal responsibilities for, and rewards of, such ownership. Progress toward achieving that refinement requires the law to embrace a set of related concepts: that animals can and do have personalities, as well as that evidence rules allow those personalities to be manifested through testimony in civil actions concerning an animal’s intent. As evidence doctrines on character and propensity expand and contract to address boundaries for these concepts, a fuller potential for property law may be effectively promoted as a result. Burdens (such as the new tort of negligent confinement) and benefits (such as a more reasoned acceptance of animal expression) await. |
| EQUITY AS A PARADIGM FOR SUSTAINABILITY: EVOLVING THE PROCESS TOWARD INTERSPECIES EQUITY | Gwendellyn Io Earnshaw | 5 Animal L. 113 (1999) | The concept of sustainability has evolved through a wide variety of definitions. Traditionally, sustainability was seen as a system of management which would allow humans to perpetually exploit the world's natural resources; that is, to manage resources so they would never be depleted. More recently, however, writers have argued the traditional concept of sustainability has failed because a truly sustainable system recognizes all resources and stakeholders for their inherent value. Equity is thus the essential ethic of a sustainable system. This article adopts this modern view of sustainability and identifies interspecies equity-the consideration of nonhuman animals based upon their inherent self-interests-as the embodiment and ultimate test of a truly sustainable system. By identifying the negative impacts of suppressing interspecies equity and citing examples of how to incorporate the sustainable ideal of interspecies equity, this article points the way toward a truly equity-based ethic of sustainability. |
| LIBERATING ANIMAL LAW: BREAKING FREE FROM HUMAN-USE TYPOLOGIES | Jessica Eisen | 17 Animal L. 59 (2010) |
Animal protection laws have traditionally categorized animals according to the manner in which humans use them. Animals have been categorized as companion animals, animals used in medical testing, animals raised for slaughter, and wildlife, and the protection afforded to animals has been ostensibly commensurate to their use categorization. This Article focuses on two alternative strategies that provide legal protection for animals without relying on human use as their primary mode of categorization. First, the Article looks at protecting animals as a single category, in particular through the use of constitutional provisions. The Article then looks at a species-based model that seeks to extend some traditional “human rights” to Great Apes. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the species-based model provides a more effective alternative to the use-based model, since it provides an alternate means of categorization that shifts focus to the needs and capacities of animals. While generalized protection at the constitutional level may be rhetorically effective, it does not offer an alternative form of legal category that would allow for precision in legal rule-making. |
| "World Leader" - At What Price? A Look at Lagging American Animal Protection Laws | Stephanie J. Engelsman | 22 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 329 (Fall, 2005) |
This paper will begin in showing that the United States has done virtually nothing to ensure that all creatures are free from unnecessary pain and suffering. This paper will then explore what other developed countries have done towards protecting nonhuman animals in the same amount of time. This paper in no way suggests that any of the countries to be discussed have solved the problem of animal exploitation; however it does suggest that many of those countries have at least begun to make a legitimate and concerted effort towards protecting animals from human greed. |
| SOME THOUGHTS ON ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION | David Favre | 2 Animal L. 161 (1996) (pdf version) | This article was adapted from remarks from David Favre at a symposium held by the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College on September 23, 1995 regarding issues affecting domestic and captive animals. |
| Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals | David Favre | 50 Duke Law Jour. 473 (2000) |
This Article proposes a new use of existing property law concepts to change the juristic personhood status of animals. Presently, animals are classified as personal property, which gives them no status or standing in the legal system for the protection or promotion of their interests. Professor Favre suggests that it is possible and appropriate to divide living property into its legal and equitable components, and then to transfer the equitable title of an animal from the legal title holder to the animal herself. This would create a new, limited form of self-ownership in an animal, an equitably self-owned animal. |
| Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System | David Favre | 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1021 (2010) |
This Article develops the proposition that non-human animals can possess and exercise legal rights. This proposal is supported by the fact that our legal system already accommodates a number of animal interests within the criminal anti-cruelty laws and civil trust laws. To make a more coherent package of all animal-related public policy issues, it is useful to acknowledge the existence of a fourth category of property, living property. Once separated out from other property, a new area of jurisprudence will evolve, providing legal rights for at least some animals. This Article establishes why animals should receive consideration within the legal system, which animals should be focused upon, what some of the legal rights might be, and how the traditional rules of property law will be modified to accommodate the presence of this new category of property. |
| The Gathering Momentum | David Favre | 1 Journal of Animal Law 1 (2005) |
This article provides introductory remarks to the Journal of Animal Law by Professor David Favre. |