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A Review of Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart by Dr. Marc Bekoff Michael Tobias 9 Animal L. 323 (2003)

This article contains a review of the book, Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart by Dr. Marc Bekoff.

A SHORT HISTORY OF (MOSTLY) WESTERN ANIMAL LAW: PART I Thomas G. Kelch 19 Animal L. 23 (2012) This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. While economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In the recent modern period, we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes, animal protection, motivating animal law. In our present historical period there is a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Article, however, that so far only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from a premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.
A SHORT HISTORY OF (MOSTLY) WESTERN ANIMAL LAW: PART II Thomas G. Kelch 19 Animal L. 347 (2013) This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. In Part I of this Article, it was discovered that while economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In this Part II of the Article, it is found that in the recent modern historical period we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes—animal protection—motivating animal law. In our present historical period, this Part II of the Article uncovers a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal-welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward the use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Part II of the Article, however, that only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal-protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from the premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.
A SLAVE BY ANY OTHER NAME IS STILL A SLAVE: THE TILIKUM CASE AND APPLICATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS Jeffrey S. Kerr, Martina Bernstein, Amanda Schwoerke, Matthew D. Strugar, Jared S. Goodman 19 Animal L. 221 (2013) On its face, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the conditions and practices of slavery and involuntary servitude wherever they may exist in this country—irrespective of the victim’s race, creed, sex, or species. In 2011, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, on behalf of five wild-captured orcas, sued SeaWorld for enslaving the orcas in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The case presented, for the first time, the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections can extend to nonhuman animals. This Article examines the lawsuit’s factual, theoretical, and strategic underpinnings, and argues that the district court’s opinion ultimately dismissing the suit failed to address the critical issues that animated this case of first impression: Who “counts” as a legal person for the purposes of law? Is it time to recognize nonhuman animals as legal persons, based on progressing scientific and normative views? What principles underlie the Thirteenth Amendment? When and how does the application of the Constitution expand? Can the meaning of the Constitution evolve to encompass the interests of nonhuman animals? Drawing on the United States Supreme Court’s long history of evolving constitutional interpretation, this Article presents four theories of constitutional change, under which the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” are expansive enough to include nonhuman animals. Despite the district court’s decision, the case can be properly viewed as the first step toward the legal recognition that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the rights of nonhuman animals to be free from bondage.
A Step at a Time: New Zealand’s Progress Towards Hominid Rights Rowan Taylor 7 Animal L. 35 (2001)

Mr. Taylor writes about the Great Ape Project's campaign to win fundamental rights for all hominids with New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. While the Act was a significant step in the struggle for hominids' rights, larger steps, including a Nonhuman Hominid Protection Bill, will soon follow.

An Analysis of Favre’s Theory on the Legal Status of Animals: Towards a Reconsideration of the “Person-Property Dichotomy” Akimune Yoshida AA1161370X In modern legal systems, only persons (including natural persons and legal persons) can have legal rights; property cannot. This perspective is known as the “Person-Property Dichotomy". Although animals are categorized as personal property, their legal treatment has changed from that of other forms of property, and in many jurisdictions, anti-cruelty laws have been enacted to punish owners of animals who abuse animals in their care. This unique legal status of animals leads us towards a reconsideration of the “Person-Property Dichotomy”. The Japanese Government is currently in the process of amending the Act on Welfare and Management of Animals. In Japan, there has been a dearth of academic debate to date about the legal status of animals, and it is helpful to see how other jurisdictions have discussed this topic. This paper focuses on David S. Favre’s theory as it has not been studied as deeply in Japan as its importance and societal needs merit. In order to keep animals within the concept of property and recognize their legal rights, Favre proposed an innovative concept, “living property”. His theory is based on the principle of trusts, which divide title into equitable and legal title, and acknowledges equitable self-ownership by animals. Whereas domestic animals possess equitable title and some legal rights, owners have only legal title. Such animals with equitable title thus become living property. When owners infringe domestic animals’ legal rights, such animals can sue their owners with the help of other humans as guardians. This paper introduces Favre’s theory on the legal status of animals from his own highly original perspective and analyzes it critically with a view to clarifying its implications for Japanese law.
An Argument for the Basic Legal Rights of Farmed Animals Steven M. Wise 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 133 (2008) As legal things, nonhuman animals lack all legal rights and remain entirely the object of the rights held by us legal persons—that is, the beings with rights. Most legal protections for nonhuman animals remain indirect (mostly anti-cruelty statutes), enforceable only by public prosecutors. Even the Endangered Species Act requires a human plaintiff to have standing sufficient under Article III of the United States Constitution. It has become clear that no meaningful percentage of nonhuman animals will ever be treated well or fairly until they attain some minimum degree of legal personhood—that is, until they achieve some minimum level of fundamental legal rights. In his article, Steven M. Wise argues for the fundamental rights of nonhuman animals by relying upon bedrock principles of Western law: liberty and equality.
AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR ANIMAL WELFARE David Favre 18 Animal L. 237 (2012)

Currently there is no international agreement that ensures the welfare and protection of animals. Nor is there any international standard that regulates and defines the acceptable treatment of animals. This lack of international consensus leads to the current disparate treatment of animals around the world, echoing the need for an international framework addressing the issue. This Article discusses a proposed umbrella treaty, the International Convention for the Protection of Animals (ICPA). This umbrella treaty would enable animal welfare issues to gain international recognition and protection by setting the general guidelines and polices regarding the treatment and use of animals. This Article argues that this is the best way to successfully pursue international protection by reconciling the conflicting goals of making a treaty enticing to as many countries as possible, without eliminating enforcement mechanisms. This Article also suggests four companion protocols that would further delineate specific animal welfare standards and requirements. With the present economic climate, it may be difficult to convince countries to pass such a treaty. However, the ICPA could make it possible to begin the process of enacting groundbreaking international animal protection.

ANIMAL CONSORTIUM David S. Favre and Thomas Dickinson 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 893 (2017) This article will show that sufficient relational interest can exist between a human and companion animal and that this interest is widely accepted in our culture; therefore, financial recovery for the disruption of this relationship is a fair burden to place upon actors in today's world. This proposal does not seek to give any legal rights to companion animals; instead, this is a proposal to allow the law to acknowledge the depth and reality of the bond between humans and animals that exists in millions of families across the country. First, this article sets out the existing categories of damage for recovery when a defendant's tortious actions result in the death of a companion animal. Integral to this discussion is the reality that companion animals are considered property. Courts most often are unwilling to extend financial recovery to include the emotional loss of the owner of an animal. Second, this article will examine the history of the concept of consortium to show how the legal system has come to accept that the compensable harm is not limited to economic consequences, nor is it limited to husband and wife relationships. Third, this article will present information to support the position that companion animals are emotionally and psychologically important to the human members of many families. Fourth, this article will show that animals have already jumped out of the property box in a number of fact patterns, and therefore, it is appropriate to raise their status in this context as well. Fifth, this article will consider the application of the concept of animal consortium in detail as an extension of the common law cause of action. Finally, acknowledging some of the difficulties that courts may have in implementing this proposal, a legislative draft is proposed to accomplish the recovery sought by this article.
ANIMAL CUSTODY DISPUTES: A GROWING CRACK IN THE “LEGAL THINGHOOD” OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS Barbara Newell 6 Animal L. 179 (2000) Despite the traditional view of animals as mere chattels, courts are increasingly viewing animals as more than "things," recognizing the intrinsic value of animal companions. With the help of organizations such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund, case law, local ordinances, and popular attitudes are changing, reflecting the understanding that animals have the capacity to live full mental and emotional lives. This essay tracks these changes, arguing that the time has come to recognize a different legal status for companion animals.

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