Standing: Related Articles

Authorsort descending Article Name Summary
Angela Campbell Could a Chimpanzee or Bonobo Take the Stand?

Ms. Campbell analyzes the federal witness competency standards and applies them to the current scientific knowledge of chimpanzees and bonobos. Such comparisons indicate that chimpanzees and bonobos could potentially meet these standards and therefore be legally competent witnesses in certain circumstances. The federal competency standards for witnesses testifying on the stand are fairly liberal. Witnesses must be able to distinguish right from wrong, understand the concept of punishment, perceive events, and remember those events to communicate them in the future. Chimpanzees and bonobos are able to do all of these things to some degree, and therefore, arguably satisfy the federal competency standards. In some situations, this indicates that these nonhuman apes should be allowed to testify in court, subject to the federal competency and interpreter rules.

Steve Ann Chambers ANIMAL CRUELTY LEGISLATION: THE PASADO LAW AND ITS LEGACY This article was adapted from remarks from Steve Chambers at a symposium held by the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College on September 23, 1995 regarding issues affecting domestic and captive animals.
Varu Chilakamarri Taxpayer Standing: A Step Toward Animalcentric Litigation

This comment takes a novel approach in animal law jurisprudence by evaluating the taxpayer standing doctrine and how animal welfare proponents may utilize it. The doctrine can potentially be used for public interest litigation whenever a link can be found between a social harm and the use of public monies.

Elizabeth L. DeCoux In the Valley of the Dry Bones: Reuniting the Word Standing with Its Meaning in Animal Cases

This Article addresses the failure of the legal system's efforts to protect animals and suggests an effective solution: an action brought in the animal's name by a guardian ad litem. The article documents the failure of HMSA and AWA, exploring the connection between those failed statutes and the law of standing in relation to animals. It then moves beyond the law regarding standing and identifies some of the larger philosophical, ethical, and scientific issues that arise when serious consideration is given to the standing of animals, concluding that there is error in viewing them as the “other” whose interests and rights need not be considered.

Gary L. Francione Animals as Property

Animals are property, not persons. And yet, at the same time, they are treated differently than other forms of property such as cars, toasters, and crops. Professor Francione discusses the legal status of animals and argues that, given the law as it now stands, before any real gains can be made in animal rights, either theory or in practice, the legal classification of animals must change from that of good to something more closely resembling personhood.

Lauren Magnotti Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter

It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing.

Samantha Mortlock Standing on New Ground: Underenforcement of Animal Protection Laws Causes Competitive Injury to Complying Entities

This Article explores competitive injury as a basis for challenging the USDA's failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. Part I.A provides background on claims that the Acts are both underenforced. Part I.B then introduces the problem of standing in the context of animal welfare lawsuits. Part II.A analyzes Article III standing requirements as applied to a competitively injured plaintiff. Part II.B then analyzes what the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires for an injured competitor to bring suit against the USDA for failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. This Article concludes by suggesting that the HMSA provides the best vehicle for a competitive injury suit against the USDA because Congress has made abundantly clear its desire to see the HMSA fully enforced.

William A. Reppy, Jr. Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The North Carolina Experience

North Carolina law authorizes citizen standing for the enforcement of anti-cruelty laws, thus supplementing criminal prosecution by means not used in any other state. Citizens, cities, counties, and animal welfare organizations can enforce animal cruelty laws through a civil injunction. This article explores the various amendments to North Carolina’s civil enforcement legislation and the present law’s strengths and weaknesses. The Author suggests an ideal model anti-cruelty civil remedies statute.

Rowan Taylor A Step at a Time: New Zealand’s Progress Towards Hominid Rights

Mr. Taylor writes about the Great Ape Project's campaign to win fundamental rights for all hominids with New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. While the Act was a significant step in the struggle for hominids' rights, larger steps, including a Nonhuman Hominid Protection Bill, will soon follow.

Delcianna J. Winders Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates

This article explores the historic and current barriers animal law advocates face in pursuing litigation on behalf of animal interests.