Full Title Name:  Survey of Illinois Law: Liability for Animal-Inflicted Injury

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Harold W. Hannah Place of Publication:  Southern Illinois University Law Journal Publish Year:  2000 Primary Citation:  24 S. Ill. U. L.J. 693 (2000)

This article attempts to explain how Illinois law affects the liability of people who are owners or are in control of animals at the time that an injury occurs, as a consequence of that animal’s actions. The section of this article that is related to equine law discusses how there has been a growing concern of stable owners as a result of increased litigation and insurance costs with respect to equine activity injuries. Furthermore, the article mentions that the purpose of the Illinois Equine Activity Liability Act is to alleviate some risk of liability from those involved in equine activities.

 (reprinted with permission)



The purpose of this article is to explain how Illinois statutory and case law affect the liability of persons who own or are in control of animals when those animals injure persons, property, or other animals. It does not discuss liability which may arise under animal disease, animal cruelty, and animal welfare laws. Animal disease laws deal with, among other things, the liability which may be incurred through a condition of the animal rather than through its actions. Animal cruelty and animal welfare laws deal with man's liability for the treatment of animals and not for the actions of the animals. Liability stemming from keeping animals which create a nuisance is likewise not considered. This is a subject of such importance, due to the concentration of animals for feeding, breeding, and production purposes, that separate treatment is implied.

In the following divisions of this article, the relevance of any common law principles which might apply will be discussed -- along with the many statutory provisions which have been provided by the Illinois legislature. Court decisions, in which these statutory laws were involved, will be explained and appraised.



A. Liabilities Under the Dog Bite Statute

By far the greatest number of cases involving injury by animals have involved dogs. In the absence of restraining laws or ordinances, dogs have been permitted to run at large. If the owner were sued for damage caused, ordinary rules of negligence applied. An important defense in cases where the dog bit or injured persons was absence of knowledge that the dog would attack or bite. This has been referred to as the "one-bite" rule, more accurately described as the "scienter" rule. [FN1]

The scienter rule was eliminated when the legislature adopted the "dog-bite" statute. [FN2] This law as amended in 1973, provides that: "If a dog or other animal without provocation attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself, in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal, is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained." [FN3] Echoing the language of the statute, the court in Beckert v. Risberg said that the elements necessary to sustain an action under this section are: (1) proof of injury by the dog; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct; and (4) presence of the plaintiff in a place where he or she had a right to be. [FN4] Thus if the dog owner is to successfully defend an action by an injured person there must be proof of the presence of one of the three elements of defense--namely, that the plaintiff was creating a disturbance, trespassing or tormenting the dog.

An early issue arising under this statute was whether or not assumption of risk was still a defense. Illinois courts have said it may be a defense when the injured person is in control of the animal or animals. In Vanderlei v. Heideman, a horseshoer injured while shoeing a horse was unable to recover under this section of the Animal Control Act, because he had assumed the risk of such injury. [FN5] This argument would certainly apply to a veterinarian while treating a dog or to employees in a stable, kennel or livestock farm. [FN6]

However, with respect to employees and custodians, courts have recently recognized another defense for those individuals classified as "owners" under the definition in the Animal Control Act. Under the statute, an "owner" is,

any person having a right of property in a dog or other animal or who keeps or harbors a dog or other animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian, or who knowingly permits a dog or other domestic animal to remain on or about any premises occupied by him. [FN7]

It was thoughtful that "domestic" was added to "animal" to describe an owner who permits animals to remain on his or her premises. Thus, one could not be charged with ownership of a skunk, a raccoon or a groundhog that took up residence on his property.
In those cases where the courts have accepted this defense, assumption of risk would have been more appropriate. It can be argued that the purpose of this definition is to fix liability on a person when an animal under his control or in his custody injures another--it was not meant to prevent recovery by the custodian, employee or person in charge. In Eyrich v. Johnson, the plaintiff, who fed and watered a pen of boars belonging to the defendant, could not recover for injury because he was an "owner" under the Animal Control Act. [FN8] Regardless of the technicality which permits this finding, it does seem anomalous, especially when assumption of risk could have been a perfectly viable defense. This would also be in accord with pronouncements of the court that common law actions and defenses are still available under the Animal Control Act. [FN9]

B. Defenses Under the Dog Bite Statute

In addition to the common law defense of assumption of risk available in certain circumstances as discussed above, there are three statutory defenses to liability under this law. These defenses are provocation, trespass and creating a disturbance.

1. Provocation

Many of the people who are bitten or attacked by dogs are not trespassers, and they are not creating a disturbance. Hence, the dog's owner will examine the victim's actions to see if provocation can be proved. In Smith v. Pitchford, the court determined there was no provocation when the plaintiff entered a friend's property, stood still while the dog known to him approached, spoke to the dog calling it by name, and was bitten. [FN10] The court said that mere presence on the property is not provocation. [FN11] In Wade v. Rich, the court said that unintentional acts can constitute provocation within the meaning of the dog bite statute. [FN12] In contrast, however, in VonBehren v. Bradley, the court indicated that if the dog's reaction is out of proportion to the nature or extent of the provocation, there may nevertheless be liability. [FN13]

This was evident in Nelson v. Lewis, where a small child on the end of the "whip" in a "crack the whip" game was thrown against a dog. [FN14] The dog scratched and injured one of the child's eyes. [FN15] The Illinois Supreme Court denied recovery, stating there was provocation and the dog's reaction was not vicious. [FN16] In Stehl v. Dose, the plaintiff stepped inside the perimeter of a chained dog to pet it and was bitten. [FN17] The court said it was a question for the jury whether or not this amounted to provocation. [FN18] The mere presence of the plaintiff on defendant's land, the court said, is not provocation. [FN19] Some acts obviously amount to provocation - like kicking a dog or pulling its tail. [FN20] Acts of self defense against a dog do not amount to provocation; therefore, when a mail carrier tried to deter a threatening dog with anti-attack spray and was subsequently bitten, the court permitted recovery and held that there had not been provocation within the meaning of the statute. [FN21] In Robinson v. Meadows, a child's screaming brought on a vicious attack by the defendant's dog. [FN22] The defense of provocation was alleged. [FN23] The court held that in view of the savagery of the dog's attack, the child's screaming would not be regarded as provocation under the Act. [FN24]

2. Trespass

As one of the three defenses listed in the dog bite statute, trespass may prevent recovery for injury by a dog when the plaintiff enters the defendant's property without permission or when a person who has permission to be on the property, enters a portion of the property which is a "prohibited area." [FN25]  This defense was successfully applied in Frostin v. Radick, where the plaintiff entered an office without permission and was bitten by the defendant's dog. [FN26]

A salesman entering property by a path or walk used by visitors may recover for injuries received from a dog which could not be seen. [FN27] If a dog is visible or if there is a "beware of the dog" or similar warning sign, then an entrant who does not first call or contact the owner or a resident on the premises before entering would be in the position of a trespasser and unable to recover if attacked by the dog. [FN28] There may be an exception in cases such as a friend or neighbor who is accustomed to entering without calling to someone or when tradesmen and people coming to the property to do a specific job are accustomed to entering without notice (a meter reader or the postman, for example).

3. Creating a Disturbance

There appear to be no cases directly on point with regard to this defense. Since a disturbance which would excite a dog to the point of biting or attacking someone could be viewed as a provocation, it is questionable if this is, in fact, a separate defense. Although someone other than the person creating the disturbance might be attacked or bitten by an excited dog, the defense of provocation could nevertheless be used because the courts have held provocation does not have to be intentional. On the other hand, courts might interpret this principle as being a defense only in an action brought by the one creating the disturbance, thus allowing innocent bystanders who might be bitten or attacked to recover.

C. Application of The Dog Bite Statute To Other Animals

Two important modifications were made in the dog bite statute as it now appears in the Animal Control Act. [FN29] One modification added "or other animal." [FN30] "Or injures" was also added. [FN31] Thus, farm livestock came under the purview of the statute, and it was not necessary that they bite or attack, but only that they "injure."

It did not take plaintiff's lawyers long to latch on to this cause of action. When a farmer's horse escaped and a motorist was injured on the highway, the motorist sought damages under the statute. [FN32] In Abadie v. Royer, the Second District held that the Illinois Running at Large Act applies when animals are at large, and thus preempts provisions in the Animal Control Act. [FN33] The Animal Control Act prohibits the running at large of livestock, but provides that if they are at large "without the knowledge of such owner or keeper, when such owner or keeper can establish that he used reasonable care in restraining such animal from so running at large," there is no liability. [FN34]

A number of cases have arisen in actions brought under the statute for recovery of injury to horseback riders. In Forsyth v. Dugger, a child jumped on the back of a horse being ridden by the plaintiff. [FN35] The horse reacted by running under a tree and the plaintiff was injured. [FN36] The court held that the plaintiff could not recover under the dog bite statute because the action of the child jumping on the back of the horse amounted to provocation. [FN37]
In Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, where a rider was thrown from a rented horse, the court held that a cause of action did not exist under the dog bite statute because the plaintiff had voluntarily mounted the animal and had it under her control. [FN38]

In Meyer v. Naperville Manor, under circumstances similar to those in the previous cases, the court held that the Animal Control Act did not apply. [FN39] The court said that its purpose was to protect the public and "give innocent bystanders" a cause of action. [FN40] This case, and others which have been cited, makes it clear that if one has custody and control of an animal, then a cause of action for injury does not exist under the Animal Control Act. [FN41] Whether or not the courts say that assumption of risk may apply, their decisions reflect the result that would follow if it did.

In Vanderlei v. Heideman, the court held that a horseshoer could not recover when injured by the horse he was shoeing because, as a professional he had assumed the risk. [FN42] It can be argued that this theory should apply at least to all situations in which a person hired to render service assumed custody of the animal. [FN43] Likewise, it seems reasonable that the theory should apply in an employment situation where the employee attempts to recover under the dog bite statute. [FN44] Presumably, if the employee were covered by workers compensation, an action could not be maintained under the dog bite statute. One who has custody and control of animals (i.e., employees on livestock farms, kennel men or persons keeping animals for others), however, could not recover because, under the definition in the dog bite statute, they would be classified as "owners" and thus precluded from recovery. Assumption of risk is a better and more logical defense. If either the fiction of ownership or applicability of assumption of risk are questionable, a more appropriate approach would be an amendment to the dog bite statute which would say: "This Section shall not apply to injury caused by an animal over which the injured person has control or custody."


A. Direct Injuries

In Docherty v. Sadler, a young boy bitten by a dog he was keeping for a neighbor was denied recovery. [FN45] A similar conclusion was reached in an earlier case, Wilcoxin v. Paige, in which the plaintiff's suit was for injury caused by a dog over which she had assumed custody. [FN46]

One may be regarded as an "owner" of an animal by permitting it to remain on his or her premises. [FN47] The presence of the animal, however, must be more than temporary or occasional to so qualify the premise's owner. [FN48]

Another issue to consider is whether a landlord can be considered a "harborer" under the Animal Control Act because his tenant owns and keeps a dog on the rented premises. The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a landlord is not liable for an injury to a plaintiff by a tenant's dog. [FN49] The court held that "harboring a dog" required proof that the defendant had care, custody or control of the dog. [FN50] A similar conclusion was reached by an appellate court in Frost v. Robave Inc. [FN51] The plaintiff, a tenant of the defendant company, sued the company when he was bitten by the company owner's dog. [FN52] The owner had brought the dog with him to his office. [FN53] The court held the presence of the dog under those circumstances did not make the company a "harborer" and thus liable under the dog bite statute. [FN54]

In Severson v. Ring, the court refused to find that a homeowner who permitted the owner of a dog to tie it temporarily to a tree on her property while he mowed the lawn was an "owner" under these circumstances. [FN55] Plaintiff's child was bitten by the dog and she sued both "owners" under the Animal Control Act and under a common law count. [FN56]

B. Indirect Injuries

There are a number of cases in which the plaintiff was injured even though the dog did not bite, attack or intentionally make contact with the plaintiff. In McEvoy v. Brown, the plaintiff was injured when a puppy, left with her by the grandchildren, ran between her legs and caused her to fall. [FN57] The court said that "attacks" and "injures" are separate causes, and because the plaintiff was injured, she could recover. [FN58]

In Drell v. American National Bank & Trust Co., a child was injured when a large Airedale, which had been tied to the top of an oxygen tank, pulled the tank over causing it to fall and injure the child. [FN59] Though the case involved a third party defendant and there was some question about where liability should rest, there was recovery from the employee of the contractor who left the tank near the sidewalk. [FN60]

In King v. Ohren, the plaintiff, working in defendant's kitchen, was injured when she stepped backward to avoid the defendant's dog and spilled boiling water on herself. [FN61] In affirming the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the owner, the appellate court said the dog was a "passive force," thus relieving the owner of liability. [FN62]

In Partipilo v. Bracco, the plaintiff, a social guest, became frightened of the owner's dog and fell down a stairway, injuring herself. [FN63] The appellate court agreed with the trial court that she did not have a cause of action under the Animal Control Act because the defendants had control of the dog. [FN64] The plaintiff was frightened at unexpectedly hearing the dog growl outside the bathroom door. [FN65] There were other allegations of negligence regarding lighting and the safety of the stairs, but the court held that the defendant had breached no duty in that regard. [FN66]

In Hassell v. Wenglinski, the plaintiff, a home-care provider for the defendant, was asked to walk the defendant's dogs. [FN67] While doing so, the dogs pulled forward on their leashes and caused her to fall. [FN68] In holding for the defendant, the court relied on the definition of "owner" in the Animal Control Act, saying that the home-care provider under the circumstances was an "owner" and therefore could not recover. [FN69]


With the development of agriculture in Illinois, it is understandable that the legislature would seek to protect farm crops and the users of highways by providing that livestock owners must keep animals from straying from their own property. This law, as amended, now reads:
No person or owner of livestock shall allow livestock to run at large in the State of Illinois. All owners of livestock shall provide the necessary restraints to prevent such livestock from so running at large and shall be liable in civil action for all damages occasioned by such animals running at large; Provided that no owner or keeper of such animals shall be liable for damages in any civil suit for injury to the person or property of another caused by the running at large thereof, without the knowledge of such owner or keeper, when such owner or keeper can establish that he used reasonable care in restraining such animals from so running at large. [FN70]

As originally adopted, this law established absolute liability. The proviso added in 1931 exempts the livestock owner from liability if animals which he has used reasonable means to restrain have escaped without his knowledge. The outcome of civil actions which have been brought against livestock owners frequently hinge on the evidence regarding the reasonable and knowledge elements of a defense.

The Act defines "livestock" as bison, cattle, swine, sheep, goats, equidae or geese. [FN71] Thus, in Hamilton v. Green, the court held that this Act does not apply to ducks. [FN72] However, with ostriches and other exotic species being introduced on farms for economic purposes, there is probably a need for amending the definition. It is also noteworthy that turkeys are not included.
Though it is evident that the statute addresses animals that have strayed from their owner's premises, there is a definition in the Act which includes animals which have strayed "from confinement or restraint." [FN73] Thus, if animals escape from a truck, or from control while being driven, led or ridden, they could be considered at large.

Knowingly permitting animals to be at large is a Class C misdemeanor. [FN74] Each day of violation is a separate offense. [FN75] However, if escape is accidental and the owner makes the "necessary corrections" within twenty-four hours, the penalty provisions of the law shall not apply. [FN76] In McPherson v. James, the court held that since turkeys are not listed as livestock in the Act, the penalty provision does not apply when they are at large, but the owner may be liable for damage caused to the property of others. [FN77]

It is noteworthy that the courts have taken a more restricted view of "owner or keeper" than is taken by the courts under the definition in the dog bite statute. [FN78] For example, in Ward v. Ondrejka, a trucker who prodded the cattle in his truck to get them unloaded into a pasture where they had been delivered, was held not liable for the death of a motorist caused when a steer escaped and ran onto the highway. [FN79] The court held that he was not negligent in getting the cattle unloaded and that he was not an owner or keeper under the Running at Large Act. [FN80]

A similar decision was reached in Heyen v. Willis, where a landowner, who permitted the owner of cattle to pasture the animals on the landowner's farm under a leasing arrangement, was held not liable as a "keeper" of the cattle when they escaped and plaintiff, while on the highway, was killed in trying to avoid animals. [FN81] This decision raises a question about the liability of one who assumes custody and control of animals. It would reason that a person who assumes custody and control of animals would be subject to the Running at Large Act. [FN82] In Heyen, the court apparently found that the landowner had not assumed custody and control; [FN83] but one who does so--i.e., an agister--would be entitled to the protection provided by the provision in the Running at Large Act if agisted animals escaped from his premises. [FN84]

In a bankruptcy case, the creditor claimed crop damage because the debtor's cattle had come onto his property through an uncompleted division fence. [FN85] The court held that because the division fence had never been completed, the Illinois Fence Act did not apply, but the Running at Large Act did. [FN86] Damages were awarded. [FN87]

In Estes v. Maddrell, plaintiffs were injured when their car struck a bull that had escaped from a farm owned by the defendant. [FN88] The defendant had what is known as a cow-calf relationship with a farm manager who looked after the animals on the farm. [FN89] According to the evidence, the farm manager knew that the bull has escaped but the owner of the farm was not aware of this fact. [FN90] The question was whether the relationship of the two was such that the knowledge of the farm manager could be imputed to the owner. [FN91] The court decided it was a question for the jury and reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case for further hearing. [FN92]

There are variants of the relationship which existed in this case that could result in liability for an owner even though he does not know his animals have escaped. For example, under the partnership relationship, if one partner is liable, all partners can be held liable. Under livestock-share leases, where the landlord and tenant both own interest in the livestock or in a particular species of livestock on the farm, such as cattle or hogs, a question can be raised about liability depending upon the amount of involvement of the livestock-share landlord. Simply put, when two or more people share an interest of any kind in livestock and there is a suit against either of them for damage caused by the livestock, questions are raised both for the judge and the jury regarding the placement or sharing of liability.

In Nevious v. Bauer, the plaintiff struck and, as a result, was injured by a bull at large on the highway. [FN93] The plaintiff sued under the Running At Large Act. [FN94] The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. [FN95] On appeal, the court said that the plaintiff, having established the fact of injury by a bull at large, had shifted to the defendant the burden of proof regarding knowledge of the escape of the bull and whether or not reasonable means had been used to restrain it. [FN96] The court held that this burden had not been met, and reversed and remanded the case. [FN97]

In Douglas v. Dolan, a motorist who was injured after striking a horse on the highway sued both the owner of the horse and a creditor who had financed its purchase. [FN98] The trial court held that the creditor, referred to as a "transferor," did not have a property interest in the horse and was therefore not liable under the Running at Large Act. [FN99] The appellate court affirmed. [FN100] From this it would appear that the relationship of creditor-debtor, with respect to an animal running at large, would not create liability in the creditor under the Running at Large Act.

In Christenson v. Rincker, a motorist was injured by a cow at large on the highway. [FN101] The defendant asserted that he had no knowledge of the animal's escape. [FN102] The defendant argued that he had used reasonable means to restrain the animal and therefore this placed the burden on the plaintiff to counter these defenses. [FN103] The appellate court held that the burden still rested with the defendant to introduce evidence showing that these defenses were applicable, and therefore reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant. [FN104]


Though the dog bite statute eliminated the scienter rule, making it easier for a person bitten or injured by a dog to recover damages, this elimination does not provide protection from dogs which will attack without provocation. Rather, this protection is spelled out in the "Vicious and Dangerous Dogs" section of the Animal Control Act. [FN105]

The statute enumerates five ways in which a dog may be classified as "vicious." [FN106] In each case, reference is made to an "individual" dog. [FN107] This law is not breed specific. [FN108] If a dog bites or attacks a person without provocation, has a known propensity or disposition to attack persons without provocation, has a known propensity or disposition to attack persons without provocation, has a "reputation for viciousness," or has been found to be a "dangerous dog" on three separate occasions, it qualifies as a vicious dog. [FN109] A "dangerous dog is one which has not bitten or attacked persons, but when unmuzzled, unleashed, or not in the control of someone, approaches a person in "a vicious and terrifying manner." [FN110]

It is interesting that in section 15(a)(1)(i), the designation of vicious dog refers to biting or attacking "a human being or other animal ...." [FN111] In this section "other animal" could mean a game animal, a predator or "vermin," like rats - which the dog would be expected to attack. In contrast, section 15(a)(1)(ii) refers to endangering the safety of "human beings or domestic animals." [FN112] A dog is not expected to attack or injure domestic animals.

Determination that a dog is vicious may be made after investigation by the animal control administrator, animal control warden, or a law enforcement officer. [FN113] Once it is determined that a dog is vicious, it must be kept in a secure enclosure and may be taken out (if properly muzzled and on a leash) to obtain veterinary care or to comply with a court order. [FN114] The law specifies that the leash must not be longer than three feet and of at least three hundred pounds tensile strength. [FN115]

If seven days after notice the owner has not retrieved a vicious dog, it may be humanely dispatched. [FN116] Before being released to the owner, the Animal Control Administrator must determine that the owner has a sufficient enclosure, one from which the dog cannot escape. [FN117]

In Logan County Animal Warden v. Danley, the appellant's dogs attacked and killed hogs three miles from appellant's home. [FN118] The appellate court upheld a finding that the dogs were "vicious," and therefore subject to Animal Control Act provisions regarding vicious dogs:

No dog shall be deemed 'vicious' if it bites, attacks, or menaces a trespasser on the property of its owner or harms or menaces anyone who has tormented or abused it or is a professionally trained dog for law enforcement or guard duties. Vicious dogs shall not be classified in a manner that is specific as to breed. [FN119]

The provision that a dog not be determined "vicious" because it is a particular breed may have been prompted by public reaction leading to ordinances which would prohibit the ownership of dogs of a named breed such as Pit Bull or Rottweiler.


A successor to earlier Illinois laws giving sheep owners the right to protect their flocks from dogs provides that, "[a]ny owner, seeing his sheep, goats, cattle, horses, mules, swine, ratites or poultry being injured, wounded, or killed by a dog not accompanied by or not under the supervision of its owner, may pursue and kill such dog." [FN120]

The most recent amendment to the law added "ratites," recognizing that ostriches and other exotic birds have become economic species on Illinois farms. [FN121] An earlier significant amendment substituted the word "injured" for the words "pursued and chased." [FN122] Presumably, this means that although a dog may be chasing or pursuing animals, unless there is injury, there is no  justification for killing the dog. However, injury could result from pursuing or chasing if animals crowd and trample each other or are injured by a fence or other object. Also, lactating or pregnant animals may be injured simply by being chased.

The poisoning of "sheep-killing dogs" was once allowed under Illinois law if it were done "reasonably and with good intentions." That law was repealed many years ago by a statute which states that: "[n]o person may knowingly poison or cause to be poisoned any dog or other domestic animal." [FN123]

The statute expresses certain requirements which must be met to justify the killing of a dog. The dog must be: (1) injuring, wounding or killing animals named in the statute; (2) the owner of the sheep must see the dog in the act; and (3) the dog must be unaccompanied or not under the supervision of its owner. [FN124] Immediate pursuit is also implied in the statute's application. [FN125] Following a dog to its owner's premises and killing the dog while the owner is holding it on a leash does not meet the requirements of the statute. If this were to occur, there would be liability to the dog owner and the possibility of prosecution for criminal damage to property. [FN126] The mere trespass of a dog that is not molesting animals does not justify killing. [FN127]

In 1990, the common law right of action against a dog owner was bolstered by a statute which states that: "The owner or keeper of a dog is liable to a person for all damages caused by the dog pursuing, chasing, worrying, wounding, injuring or killing any sheep, goats, cattle, horses, mules, poultry or swine belonging to that person." [FN128] In Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, the court held that this section of the Animal Control Act did not give a county attorney authority to initiate civil action on behalf of an owner of hogs injured by dogs. [FN129]

In Fowler v. Cade, the owner of a dog that killed the plaintiff's sheep was held liable despite involvement of other dogs in the killing. [FN130] Citing the earlier case of Dole v. Hardinger, [FN131] the court held that if two or more dogs are involved, the owner of any one of the dogs is liable for the entire damage. [FN132]
Realizing that livestock are likely to be killed or injured by dogs when the owner is not present and that identification of a dog's owner is difficult, the legislature provided that livestock owners who suffer loss could, by following a procedure outlined in the statute, be indemnified from a County Animal Control Fund. [FN133] After discovering the loss, the owner must report it within twenty-four hours to the Animal Control Administrator. [FN134] The owner must also appear before a member of the county board. [FN135] The claims are paid once a year from the Animal Control Fund. [FN136] The amount for different species of animals is specified in the law with a provision that 50% can be added if there is proof that the animals were registered. [FN137] If there are insufficient funds, it is pro-rated. [FN138]

In view of the variation that exists among Illinois counties in establishing and carrying out an animal control program and collecting dog license fees, this provision would be of no help to an owner in a county that did not have an animal control department or any money in an animal control fund. Indemnities must be paid from such a fund; they cannot be paid from the county general fund. [FN139]
Any amount paid to an owner who has suffered loss from dogs may be diminished by amounts recovered in a suit against the dog owner. [FN140] If such a suit is not instituted, the county is subrogated to the right to sue.


The Illinois Wildlife Code contains two prohibitions that apply to dogs. [FN141] One provision states that, "[i]t is unlawful for any person to trap or hunt, or allow a dog to hunt, within or upon the land of another, or upon the waters flowing over or standing on the land of another, without first obtaining permission from the owner or tenant." [FN142] Absent this provision in the Wildlife Code, it would merely be trespassing to hunt or bring dogs to the property of another without permission. However, the Wildlife Code makes it an offense. [FN143] It is also unlawful "for any owner of a dog to knowingly or wantonly allow his or her dog to pursue, harass or kill deer." [FN144] Another section of the Code makes it unlawful "for any persons to take deer by use of dogs ...." [FN145]
There has been some misunderstanding of the provision of the Wildlife Code which states that permission must be obtained "from the owner or tenant." [FN146] This phrase has been construed to mean that either the owner or tenant can give permission; but when farm land is rented, the tenant is the only one who has the right to give permission, unless an owner has reserved such right in a written lease. [FN147] For example, an owner would have no right to let hunters come on the property he has rented to a tenant because the tenant may have livestock, crops or other property that could be injured by persons not permitted by the tenant to enter.


The Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act provides that, "[n]o person may own, capture, breed, train, or lease any animal which he or she knows or should know is intended for use in any show, exhibition, program, or other activity featuring or otherwise involving a fight between such animal and any other animal ...." [FN148] The statute also imposes a penalty on anyone who makes available any site where an animal fight may be held. [FN149] Finally, the Act makes it a crime to "attend or otherwise patronize any show, exhibition, program, or other activity featuring or otherwise involving a fight between two or more animals ...." [FN150]

In Ilinois Game Fowl Breeders Association v. Block, the Gamefowl Breeders Association sought a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of those provisions of the Humane Care for Animals Act that prohibited the sale or transportation of animals which the owner knows or has reason to believe will be used in an animal fight, as well as the sale and transportation of devices or equipment which may be so used. [FN151] The defendant, the Department of Agriculture, sought to dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiff did not have standing to seek the declaratory judgment. [FN152] The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Gamefowl Breeders Association did have standing to challenge the Act, but held that the Act is constitutional. [FN153]


A law permitting landowners to confine straying animals is complementary to the law that prohibits them from running at large. While it is helpful to have a statute that permits landowners to recover damages caused by animals straying at large, it is also helpful to have a law that permits landowners to reduce those damages by confining the animals until the owner can be found or some other disposition can be legally made. The current law in Illinois, as amended, states that: "Any horses, mules, asses, cattle, swine, sheep or goats found straying, the owner thereofbeing unknown, may be taken up as estrays in the same manner as provided for lost goods." [FN154] As a curb to those who might go out and find animals to take-up, with the objective of becoming owners, the statute provides that "[n]o person who is not a householder in the county where the estray is found, shall take up such estray, and no person shall be allowed to take up any estray except upon or about his farm or place of residence." [FN155] There is no case law interpreting the geographical extent of "about." A possible interpretation would be that it means animals near enough to an owner's premises that, unless confined, may enter and cause damage constitutes "about his farm or place of residence." The taker-up is prohibited from using an estray but may milk an estray cow. [FN156] If estrays which have been taken up die or escape, the taker-up is not liable for the loss. [FN157]

There appear to be only two cases in which the courts construed this law. In Mahler v. Holden, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law determining that the legislature had a right to provide for the protection of estray property and to impose upon the owner of that property an obligation to pay the expenses incurred by its straying. [FN158] One hundred ten years later, in Chonowski v. Sikora, an appellate court explained that the purpose of the law was to establish a procedure under which a taker-up could acquire property in estray animals. [FN159]

In view of the disappearance of livestock from Illinois farms and the concentration of animals in large operations, it is not likely that this law will be invoked often. In an earlier day, however, when virtually all farms had livestock and there was great variation in the restraining potential of fences, the law was utilized and taken seriously by township authorities. [FN160]

State law also gives townships authority to prohibit the running at large of dogs and other animals and to provide for their impoundment. [FN161] A village can convict animal owners for creating a nuisance when they permit their dogs to run at large contrary to a village ordinance. [FN162]


Illinois is not an open range state. This means that those who keep livestock have a duty to fence them in so that they will not escape and damage the persons or property of others.

There is not absolute liability for animals running at large. As discussed above, the provision in the Running at Large Act requires no liability of the owner if reasonable means were used to confine animals, and the owner did not know they were at large. [FN163] However, there is a common law adjunct to this statutory provision. If, after the owner learns animals are at large, immediate pursuit is not made and there is injury, there may still be liability.

To settle issues about the sufficiency of a fence and to spell out division fence responsibilities, the Illinois legislature enacted the Fence Act. [FN164] A pertinent section of this Act states that: 
If any horse, mule or ass, or any neat cattle, hogs, or sheep, or other domestic animals, shall break into any person's inclosure, the fence being good and sufficient, the owner of such animal or animals shall be liable, in a civil action, to make good all damages to the owner or occupier of the inclosure. This section shall not be construed to require such fence, in order to maintain an action for injuries done by animals running at large contrary to law. [FN165]

Another section of the Fence Act provides that if animals do break in or are wrongfully upon the land of an owner, the owner may take them into possession to prevent further damage and must notify the owner of the animals that he has possession of them within twenty-four hours. [FN166] If the owner is not known, notice must be posted. [FN167] If there is a division fence responsibility, each owner is required to make and maintain a "just proportion" of the fence. [FN168]

Construing these two sections of the Fence Act with the Running at Large Act, it seems accurate to say that any time one's animals enter the property of another, there are only two situations in which the owners of the animals may not be liable for damage caused to persons or property. One situation occurs when the conditions of the proviso in the Running at Large Act are met. The other is when the owner who suffers damage has not maintained his portion of a division fence.

In Dexter v. Heaghney, the court held that refusal by the defendant to repair a portion of a division fence so it would turn cattle did not give the plaintiff a right to turn his cattle out knowing they could get onto defendant's land. [FN169] The court pointed out that the Fence Act provides a remedy which the plaintiff should have used. [FN170] He should have notified the defendant to repair the fence, and if there was not compliance within a period of time stated in the statutes, could have repaired it himself and recovered the cost from the defendant. [FN171]

In a similar case, Fox v. Fearneyhough, the plaintiff turned cattle into a pasture knowing they could get on defendant's land through defendant's portion of a division fence, which was in disrepair. [FN172] Some of plaintiff's cattle were lost by foundering when they grazed on the defendant's crops. [FN173] The court held that the plaintiff could not recover. It stated that the plaintiff should have used the remedy provided in the law to get the fence rebuilt before turning cattle against it. [FN174]

In Johnson v. Sleaford, a pen of Angus feeder cattle escaped from defendant's premises through sufficient fences and spread out into the cornfields of neighboring farmers. It was months later before all of them were captured. [FN175] The defendant qualified initially in the provision of the Running at Large Act--namely, that he had used sufficient means to prevent escape and had made immediate pursuit (with much help) when their escape was discovered. [FN176] The court, nevertheless, determined that, under these circumstances, he should respond in damages to owners who had lost corn to the straying cattle. [FN177]


In this modern age, it is surprising for most people to learn that before the advent of the tractor and automobile, horses and mules were a significant cause of injury and death. This was true not only on farms, but in cities where goods and people were moved by horse power. Bulls, cows with calves, boars, and sows with piglets were and still may be sources of injury.

As noted in the earlier discussion, employees and professional persons working with animals were often denied recovery under either the common law assumption of risk defense or under the dog bite statute, because such persons fit the category of "owner" as defined in the Animal Control Act. [FN178] These holdings do not rule out a common law count of negligence.

Though the days of using horses and mules for power and transportation are for the most part long past, their use for riding and for other recreational purpose has increased. Consequently, so have law suits against those who rent animals for recreational purposes. Thus, the concern of stable owners has grown as this kind of litigation has increased, and insurance has become more costly.

The Illinois Supreme Court, in Harris v. Walker, held that a rider injured on a rented horse could not recover under the dog bite statute. [FN179] In this case, the plainitff had signed a waiver that prevented his recovery. [FN180] The Illinois legislature nevertheless felt that stable owners were entitled to some statutory protection and, in 1996, "The Equine Activity Liability Act" became effective. [FN181]

In its statement of purpose, the legislature stated there are dangers involved in equine activity, but it is economically important and should be encouraged. [FN182] This law is intended to do so "by delineating the responsibilities of those involved in equine activities." [FN183]

Equine activity includes riding and a full range of activities involving horses and other equine species. Important to those who furnish horses to others for their use or who have custody of animals at shows and other functions is the provision in the Act which states that all participants should recognize that any activity involving equines is hazardous. [FN184] Therefore, "each participant who engages in equine activity expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for loss, injury, or damage to the participant or the participant's property ...." [FN185] Riding stable owners, for example, are protected by this statement as a matter of law because participants assume the risk involved in the equine activity.

There are, however, some exceptions which could leave riding stable owners, and others having custody of equines, liable. The Act is not applicable to those engaged in the horse-racing industry and lists exceptions including injury caused by the use of faulty equipment or tack, injury to one whose ability to engage in an equine activity through failure "to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity," or injury through latent dangerous conditions on land used by the participant and owned by the supplier of the equine. [FN186]
This Act also requires that every equine professional "shall post and maintain" signs containing the following notice: "WARNING: Under the Equine Activity Liability Act, each participant who engages in an equine activity expressly assumes the risks of engaging in and legal responsibility for injury, loss, or damage to person or property resulting from the risk of equine activities." [FN187] This notice shall also appear in any written contract between the equine professional and a patron. [FN188]

Section 47/15, which states that participants recognize the hazard and assume the risk, does not say this assumption of risk is contingent upon the posting of the required warning. It does state that the participant should read warning signs at the stable or other facility. [FN189] In view of this uncertainty, it would be prudent for the equine professional to post the warning expressed in the Act.
The law also states that this warning shall appear in written contracts between the equine professional and the client or user. [FN190] This would in effect be giving validity to a waiver of liability, thus making unnecessary a determination of whether or not the waiver is enforceable.


At common law there was never a "one-bite" theory as a defense to liability for injury by a wild animal. One who kept such animals was presumed to know that if given an opportunity, the animals would injure persons or other animals. Obviously, some wild animals are more dangerous and threatening than others. Recognizing this, the Illinois legislature in 1969 (amended in 1986) enacted the "Illinois Dangerous Animals Act." [FN191] Dangerous animals are defined as "lion, tiger, leopard, ocelot, jaguar, cheetah, margay, mountain lion, lynx, bobcat, jaguarundi, bear, hyena, wolf or coyote, or any poisonous or life-threatening reptile." [FN192] The Act applies to owners and those who have custody or control over these wild animals. [FN193]

Persons cannot have a property right in such animals, and they are prohibited from keeping, maintaining or having possession of such. [FN194] But there are some exceptions as the rule does not apply to "a properly maintained zoological park, federally licensed exhibits, circus, scientific or educational institutions, research laboratory, veterinary hospital or animal refuge in an escape-proof enclosure." [FN195] The fact that a person has "attempted to domesticate the dangerous animal" is no defense. [FN196]
The Illinois Supreme Court has had some difficulty in interpreting this section of the Act due to the addition of "life-threatening" in the definition of reptiles one is prohibited from owning. In People v. Fabing, the defendants maintained that the wording of the statute was unconstitutionally vague. [FN197] The Illinois Supreme Court did not agree. It recognized that this addition to the Act was necessary because there are non-poisonous reptiles capable of injuring or killing persons. [FN198]

The court had no difficulty in determining that two fifteen-foot Burmese pythons owned by the defendant could injure or kill a person. [FN199] But a question was raised about a seven-foot boa constrictor. [FN200] This concerned the court because boa constrictors as a species can be life- threatening, but an individual snake seven-feet-long is not so regarded. [FN201] The State argued that the Department of Agriculture, in enforcing provisions of the Animal Control Act, had promulgated regulations stating that a six-foot boa constrictor was life-threatening. [FN202] The court held that this regulation of the Department of Agriculture did not apply to the Dangerous Animal Act. [FN203]

As stated earlier, under the Animal Control Act, [FN204] the determination of a dog as vicious or dangerous cannot be breed specific; but in this case the Illinois Supreme Court held that "life-threateneing" reptiles can be species specific. [FN205] Yet, it agreed that if a member of the species is too small to be life-threatening, then there should be no prohibition against its ownership. [FN206] This departure from "species specific" apparently applies only to size and ability but not to temperament, as the court said it was not an acceptable defense to show that the reptile capable of injuring a person had a docile temperament. [FN207]

The court also recognized that alligators are life-threatening but it didn't say anything about the size of the alligator. [FN208] Perhaps, there is a difference between biting and constricting. The court agreed, however, that with respect to alligators, the Dangerous Animals Act is not unconstitutionally vague. [FN209] But apparently the court did not believe that the law was unconstitutionally vague in a determination of when a constricting snake would become life-threatening - when the reptile reached some length between seven and fifteen feet. [FN210] Although wildlife people are not afraid of baby alligators, the court did not hold that maturity of an animal had anything to do with their being defined as "life threatening." [FN211]


Though at common law, one who kept a wild animal was strictly liable if it injured persons or property, and as Illinois law prohibits persons from keeping named species of dangerous and life-threatening animals, the Illinois legislature as early as 1877 recognized the right of one to domesticate and keep wild animals. The Domesticated Wild Animals Act states,

All birds and animals ferae naturae or naturally wild, including furbearing animals not native to this State, when raised or in domestication, or kept in enclosures and reduced to possession, are hereby declared to be objects of ownership and absolute title, the same as cattle and other property, and shall receive the same protection of law, and in the same way and to the same extent shall be the subject of trespass or theft, as other personal property. [FN212]

In Ulery v. Jones, the plaintiff sued for the loss of a domesticated buffalo which had been shot and killed by the defendant after it escaped from the plaintiff's property and entered the defendant's pasture. [FN213] The defendant justified the killing by arguing that the buffalo was a wild animal, it engaged in threatening behavior, and that he feared it. [FN214] Others testified that they also feared the buffalo. [FN215] The court disagreed. The evidence showed the buffalo was thoroughly domesticated, was not dangerous, that bulls of domestic breeds behaved similarly, and that "so far as the animal being wild, ferocious and dangerous, the fears of the witnesses are the father to the thought." [FN216]

Another section of the Domesticated Wild Animal Act applies specifically to the breeders of fur-bearing animals. It states that:
When fox, rabbit, mink, chinchilla, marten, fisher, muskrat, karakul, and other furbearing animals are raised in captivity for breeding or other useful purposes (a) such animals shall be deemed domestic animals; (b) such animals and the products thereof shall be deemed agricultural products; and (c) the breeding, raising, producing, and marketing of such animals or their products by the producer thereof, shall be deemed an agricultural pursuit. [FN217]

This Act also provides that it shall not interfere with the provisions of The Wildlife Code which states that all wildlife is the property of the state and may be held or reduced to possession only under the law and regulations provided under the Code. [FN218]


Some species of wild animals in Illinois can cause severe property damage. Others can cause injury to persons or domestic animals, and some are capable of both. Herds of deer can damage crops, gardens and young trees and pose a threat to the safety of highway users. Geese can consume crops. Starlings can spread animal disease. Rabbits can invade gardens. Groundhogs can invade gardens, feed on crops and make dangerous tunnels and runs. Coyotes can prey on sheep and calves. Can an injured person do anything to prevent damage without violating protective laws? Is the state, which after all has by law the property in these animals, liable for damage they cause? This is of special significance in view of government programs to reintroduce certain species (e.g., elk).

The state's concession to the right of one to protect property from the depredations of wild animals is contained in a section of the Wildlife Code pertaining to the authority to kill wild game responsible for property loss." [FN219] It states that "[u]pon written permission from the Department [of Natural Resources], owners and tenants of lands may remove or destroy any wild bird or wild animal other than a game bird or migratory game bird when such wild bird or wild mammal is known to be destroying property upon his or her land." [FN220] The exemption of game birds is probably not significant since most wildlife damage is caused by other species. However, geese are migratory water fowl, which are also exempted, and geese do cause crop damage.

The law applies to any kind of property damage, but specifically mentioned is damage to "dams, levees, and ditches." [FN221] After being informed, the Department makes an investigation and if it finds that there is damage as claimed, they will issue "a permit to control such damage." [FN222] The permit is good for ninety day s and specifies the methods to be used in removing or destroying the animals and the disposition to be made of them. [FN223] The director of the Department may impose such other restrictions as are deemed necessary under the circumstances. [FN224] If possible, the specimens destroyed are to be given to a public or state scientific education or zoological institution. [FN225] A report to the department is required and must be made within ten days after the expiration of the permit. [FN226]

What is the possibility of compensation by the State for damage caused by wild animals? After all, these animals are by law the property of the State, so it might be argued that there should be liability. This, however, is not the view taken by our courts. The common law view was that overall, wildlife is a benefit to the people of the State, both economically and esthetically.

If compensation is someday provided by the State, it will probably be for damage caused by introduced or reintroduced species. Thus, it may be argued that when the State intervenes to see that certain species of wildlife are propagated and damage to private property occurs, actions which claim that this amounts to a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under the Constitution of the State of Illinois may be filed. Courts will have to determine the validity of the action based on its particular circumstances.

While no one is likely to complain about the propagation and release of pheasants and quail, different feelings exist about an over-population of deer and the possible introduction of large animals such as elk, moose, wolves or bear. In some states, reimbursement has been provided for property damage caused by certain introduced or reintroduced species. To the writer's knowledge, no such program exists in Illinois. Therefore, other than the State's attempt to control, and permission by the State to destroy, protected animals damaging private property, the only current remedy available is a possibility of a suit against the State based on the taking clauses in the United States and Illinois Constitutions, or possibly a claim of negligent management by the State. Claims have been made in some other states that the government was responsible because it did not exercise sufficient control over the wildlife. This is especially true of introduced species brought in and managed by the State. [FN227]


There are significant developments in Illinois law that affect the liability of a person for damage caused by animals. This was evidenced when the dog bite statute removed scienter as a defense to liability when one's dog attacks another. The statute was also modified to include "injures" along with "attacks." Thus an owner may be liable for injury caused by an animal, though the animal did not attack or intend to injure a person.

Additionally, when the statute was modified to include "other animals," the courts had to determine if injury by a farm animal brought the same liability as injury by a dog. Illinois courts have differentiated between dogs and farm animals by recognizing three defenses. The first defense is found in the provision of the Running at Large Act which states that an owner is not liable for damage caused by an animal which escapes, providing reasonable means were used to confine them and there is no knowledge that they have escaped.
The second defense is assumption of the risk. This defense is recognized through options of the Equine Liability Act under which users of rented horses are presumed to assume the risk of injury, providing the owner meets certain requirements expressed in the law. A third defense is found in the Animal Control Act which denies recovery by one who has custody or control over an animal by defining that person as an "owner" under the Animal Control Act.
The laws have also been formulated to permit livestock owners who have suffered loss from dogs to recover from the Animal Control Fund, as well as a statute strengthening the common law right to sue a dog owner for damage caused to one's animals.

Court decisions have also allowed for full recovery against any dog owner when more than one dog attacks and injures an animal if it can be determined that that owner's dog was involved. One is also liable when animals escape through a division fence and damage crops or property of an adjoining owner unless it is determined that the animals escaped through the adjoining owner's portion of the fence and that that portion was in disrepair.

With the increase in dog bites, provisions have been placed in the Animal Control Act which require an owner to securely confine on his or her own premises a dog determined (by law) to be vicious. If a person is injured by an animal, there is liability to trespassers or non-paying recreational users only for willful and wanton conduct or gross negligence. An amendment to Illinois law provides that a duty of reasonable care is owed both to invitees and licensees.

It would be more realistic, and would clarify the law, if the Animal Control Act were amended to provide that one injured by an animal over which he or she has custody or control or who "harbors" animals is precluded from recovery for injury caused by that animal, because they assume the risk of injury. To say, as one appellate court has, that an employee looking after animals cannot recover for injury under the dog bite statute because he or she is an "owner," is an anomaly when that same injured person could be covered by workers compensation if the farm owner so elected. If such a person is covered by workers compensation, then presumably recovery could not be had in any civil suit, including one under the dog bite statute.


[FNa1]. Professor of Agricultural Law and Veterinary Medical Law, Emeritus, University of Illinois; Adjunct Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University. B.S. 1932, University of Illinois; J.D. 1935, University of Illinois.

[FN1]. Klatz v. Pfeffer, 333 Ill. 90, 94-95, 164 N.E. 224, 226 (1928).

[FN2]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 1998).

[FN3]. Id.

[FN4]. 33 Ill. 2d 44, 46, 210 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1965).

[FN5]. 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 160, 403 N.E.2d 756, 757 (2d Dist. 1980).

[FN6]. Additionally, the court did not allow recovery for an employee who was trampled while herding cattle. Malott v. Hart, 167 Ill. App. 3d 209, 211, 521 N.E.2d 137, 138 (3d Dist. 1988).

[FN7]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.16 (West 1998).

[FN8]. 279 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1071, 665 N.E.2d 878, 880 (3d Dist. 1996).

[FN9]. Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill. App. 2d 408, 411, 222 N.E.2d 530, 531 (2d Dist. 1966).

[FN10]. 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 154, 579 N.E.2d 24, 26 (5th Dist. 1991).

[FN11]. Id.

[FN12]. 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589, 618 N.E.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Dist. 1993).

[FN13]. 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 451, 640 N.E.2d 664, 668 (4th Dist. 1994).

[FN14]. 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 130-31, 344 N.E.2d 268, 270 (5th Dist. 1976).

[FN15]. Id.

[FN16]. Id. at 134, 344 N.E.2d at 272.

[FN17]. 83 Ill. App. 3d 440, 403 N.E.2d 1301 (3d Dist. 1980).

[FN18]. Id. at 443, 403 N.E.2d at 1303.

[FN19]. Id.

[FN20]. Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill. App. 2d 64, 67, 231 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1st Dist. 1967).

[FN21]. Steichman v. Hurst, 2 Ill. App. 3d 415, 419, 275 N.E.2d 679, 681 (2d Dist. 1971).

[FN22]. 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 709, 561 N.E.2d 111, 113 (5th Dist. 1990).

[FN23]. Id. at 710, 561 N.E.2d at 113-14.

[FN24]. Id. at 713, 561 N.E.2d at 116. In other words, it was out of proportion to the nature or extent of the provocation. See, e.g., VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 466, 640 N.E.2d 644 (4th Dist. 1994).

[FN25]. Frostin v. Radick, 78 Ill. App. 3d 352, 355, 397 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1st Dist. 1979).

[FN26]. Id.

[FN27]. Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill. App. 2d 387, 390, 259 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1st Dist. 1970).

[FN28]. Id. at 389, 259 N.E.2d at 407.

[FN29]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 1998).

[FN30]. See P.A. 78-795, eff. Oct. 1, 1973.

[FN31]. Id.

[FN32]. McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 860, 378 N.E.2d 614, 615 (2d Dist. 1978).

[FN33]. 215 Ill. App. 3d 444, 449, 574 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (2d Dist. 1991).

[FN34]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (West 1998).

[FN35]. 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 364, 523 N.E.2d 704, 705 (4th Dist. 1988).

[FN36]. Id.

[FN37]. Id.

[FN38]. 239 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1020, 607 N.E.2d 280, 282 (3d Dist. 1993). Under similar circumstances, the court held that a cause of action did not exist under the dog bite statute. See Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4th Dist. 1992).

[FN39]. 262 Ill. App. 3d 141, 150, 634 N.E.2d 411, 417 (2d Dist. 1994).

[FN40]. Id. at 148, 634 N.E.2d at 415.

[FN41]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 1998).

[FN42]. 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 163, 403 N.E.2d 756, 759 (2d Dist. 1980).

[FN43]. For example, a horseshoer, veterinarian, kennel operator, or groomer.

[FN44]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13 (West 1998).

[FN45]. 293 Ill. App. 3d 892, 689 N.E.2d 332 (4th Dist. 1997).

[FN46]. 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3d Dist. 1988).

[FN47]. Id. at 543, 528 N.E.2d at 1106.

[FN48]. Goennenwein v. Rassof, 296 Ill. App. 3d 650, 695 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist. 1998).

[FN49]. Steinberg v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1st Dist. 1985).

[FN50]. Id. at 507, 487 N.E.2d at 1068.

[FN51]. 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 694 N.E.2d 581 (1st Dist. 1998).

[FN52]. Id. at 530, 694 N.E.2d at 582.

[FN53]. Id.

[FN54]. Id. at 536-37, 694 N.E.2d at 587.

[FN55]. 244 Ill. App. 3d 453, 615 N.E.2d 183 (3d Dist. 1993).

[FN56]. Id.

[FN57]. 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3d Dist. 1958).

[FN58]. Id.

[FN59]. 57 Ill. App. 2d 129, 207 N.E.2d 101 (1st Dist. 1965).

[FN60]. Id. at 136, 207 N.E.2d at 104.

[FN61]. 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1990).

[FN62]. Id. at 1101, 556 N.E.2d at 757-58.

[FN63]. 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1st Dist. 1991).

[FN64]. Id. at 816-17, 570 N.E.2d at 685-86.

[FN65]. Id. at 814-15, 570 N.E.2d at 684.

[FN66]. Id. at 816, 570 N.E.2d at 685.

[FN67]. 243 Ill. App. 3d 398, 612 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1993).

[FN68]. Id. at 399, 612 N.E.2d at 65.

[FN69]. Id. at 400, 402, 612 N.E.2d at 65.

[FN70]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (West 1998).

[FN71]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1.1 (West 1998).

[FN72]. 44 Ill. App. 3d 987, 990, 358 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (2d Dist. 1976).

[FN73]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1.1 (West 1998).

[FN74]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/3.1 (West 1998).

[FN75]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/3.1 (West 1998).

[FN76]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1.2 (West 1998).

[FN77]. 69 Ill. App. 337 (3d Dist. 1897).

[FN78]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 1998).

[FN79]. 5 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 284 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1972).

[FN80]. Id. at 1072, 284 N.E.2d at 473.

[FN81]. 94 Ill. App. 2d 290, 236 N.E.2d 580 (4th Dist. 1968). For a thorough and somewhat chilling discussion of the liability and possible criminal prosecution that may befall a livestock owner, see Roger A. McEowen, Trespassing Livestock and Murder Convictions: Could a Deficient Fence Lead to a Prison Term for a Livestock Owner?, AGRIC. LAW UPDATE, Aug., 1999 at 4.

[FN82]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1.2 (West 1998).

[FN83]. 94 Ill. App. 2d at 29, 236 N.E.2d at 583.

[FN84]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1.2 (West 1998).

[FN85]. In re Anderson and Kenyon Partnership, 165 Bankr. 243 (C.D. Ill. 1994).

[FN86]. Id. at 245.

[FN87]. Id. at 246.

[FN88]. 208 Ill. App. 3d 813, 566 N.E.2d 916 (3d Dist. 1991).

[FN89]. Id. at 815, 566 N.E.2d at 917.

[FN90]. Id. at 816, 566 N.E.2d at 918.

[FN91]. Id. at 815, 566 N.E.2d at 917-18.

[FN92]. Id. at 818, 566 N.E.2d at 919.

[FN93]. 281 Ill. App. 3d 911, 667 N.E.2d 1074 (3d Dist. 1996).

[FN94]. Id. at 912, 667 N.E.2d at 1075.

[FN95]. Id. at 913, 667 N.E.2d at 1076.

[FN96]. Id. at 916, 667 N.E.2d at 1078.

[FN97]. Id. at 917, 667 N.E.2d at 1078.

[FN98]. 286 Ill. App. 3d 181, 675 N.E.2d 1012 (2d Dist. 1997).

[FN99]. Id. at 188, 675 N.E.2d at 1017.

[FN100]. Id.

[FN101]. 288 Ill. App. 3d 185, 680 N.E.2d 460, 461 (3d Dist. 1997).

[FN102]. Id. at 187-88, 680 N.E.2d at 462.

[FN103]. Id.

[FN104]. Id.

[FN105]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15 (West 1998).

[FN106]. Id.

[FN107]. Id.

[FN108]. Id.

[FN109]. Id.

[FN110]. Id.

[FN111]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15(a)(1)(i) (West 1998).

[FN112]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15(a)(1)(ii) (West 1998).

[FN113]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15 (a)(5) (West 1998).

[FN114]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15(b) (West 1998).

[FN115]. Id.

[FN116]. Id.

[FN117]. Id.

[FN118]. 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 202, 569 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (4th Dist. 1991).

[FN119]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15(a)(1)(v) (West 1998).

[FN120]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18 (West 1998).

[FN121]. Amended by P.A. 88-600, §5, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

[FN122]. Amended by P.A. 78-1166, §1, eff. Aug. 27, 1974.

[FN123]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/6 (West 1998).

[FN124]. People v. Pope, 66 Ill. App. 3d 303, 306, 383 N.E.2d 278, 280 (4th Dist. 1978).

[FN125]. Id. at 305-06, 383 N.E.2d at 279-80.

[FN126]. Id.

[FN127]. Anderson v. Smith, 7 Ill. App. 354, 356 (2d Dist. 1880).

[FN128]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18.1 (West 1998). This section was amended by adding "ratites" in 1994.

[FN129]. 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 203, 569 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (4th Dist. 1991).

[FN130]. 214 Ill. App. 153, 156 (3d Dist. 1920).

[FN131]. 204 Ill. App. 640, 644 (3d Dist. 1917).

[FN132]. 214 Ill. App. 153, 156 (3d Dist. 1918).

[FN133]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19 (West 1998).

[FN134]. Id.

[FN135]. Id.

[FN136]. Id.

[FN137]. Id.

[FN138]. Id.

[FN139]. Id.

[FN140]. Id.

[FN141]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33 (West 1998).

[FN142]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(t) (West 1998).

[FN143]. Id.

[FN144]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(w) (West 1998).

[FN145]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.26(c) (West 1998).

[FN146]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(t) (West 1998).

[FN147]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33 (West 1998).

[FN148]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.01(a) (West 1998).

[FN149]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.01(b) (West 1998).

[FN150]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.01(g) (West 1998).

[FN151]. 75 Ill. 2d 443, 448-49, 389 N.E.2d 529, 530-31 (1979).

[FN152]. Id. at 450, 389 N.E.2d at 531.

[FN153]. Id. at 453-54, 389 N.E.2d at 532-33.

[FN154]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/1 (West 1998).

[FN155]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/2 (West 1998).

[FN156]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/3 (West 1998).

[FN157]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/20 (West 1998).

[FN158]. 20 Ill. 363, 364 (1858).

[FN159]. 93 Ill. App. 2d 53, 59, 234 N.E.2d 831, 834 (3d Dist. 1989).

[FN160]. The author has two pages from the "Estray Record" of Field Township, Jefferson County, Illinois, maintained by the town clerk between the years 1870 and 1876. There were columns for the name of the taker-up, the date when taken, the value of the animals, the names of the appraiser, a description of the animal, and cost involved.

[FN161]. 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/30-95 (West 1998).

[FN162]. See e.g., Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 61 Ill. App. 3d 315, 377 N.E.2d 1208 (1st Dist. 1978).

[FN163]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (West 1998).

[FN164]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 (West 1998).

[FN165]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/20 (West 1998).

[FN166]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/21 (West 1998).

[FN167]. Id.

[FN168]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/3 (West 1998).

[FN169]. 47 Ill. App. 205, 207 (1893).

[FN170]. Id. at 206.

[FN171]. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/3, 130/6 (West 1998).

[FN172]. 85 Ill. App. 2d 371, 374, 228 N.E.2d 737, 738 (4th Dist. 1967).

[FN173]. Id. at 373, 228 N.E.2d at 738.

[FN174]. Id.

[FN175]. 39 Ill. App. 2d 228, 233, 188 N.E.2d 230, 232-33 (2d Dist. 1963).

[FN176]. Id. at 235, 188 N.E.2d at 233.

[FN177]. Id.

[FN178]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.16 (West 1998).

[FN179]. 119 Ill. 2d 542, 547-48, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1988).

[FN180]. Id. at 545, 519 N.E.2d at 918.

[FN181]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 (West 1998).

[FN182]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/5 (West 1998).

[FN183]. Id.

[FN184]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West 1998).

[FN185]. Id.

[FN186]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20 (West 1998).

[FN187]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West 1998).

[FN188]. Id.

[FN189]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West 1998).

[FN190]. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West 1998).

[FN191]. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 585/0.1 (West 1998).

[FN192]. Id.

[FN193]. Id.

[FN194]. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 585/1 (West 1998).

[FN195]. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 585/1 (West 1998).

[FN196]. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 585/2 (West 1998).

[FN197]. 143 Ill. 2d 48, 52, 570 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1991).

[FN198]. Id. at 53, 570 N.E.2d at 331.

[FN199]. Id. at 55, 570 N.E.2d at 333.

[FN200]. Id. at 58, 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN201]. Id.

[FN202]. Id.

[FN203]. Id.

[FN204]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West 1998).

[FN205]. 243 Ill. 2d at 58, 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN206]. Id.

[FN207]. Id. at 56, 570 N.E.2d at 333.

[FN208]. Id., 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN209]. Id. at 58, 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN210]. Id. at 57-58, 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN211]. Id. at 59, 570 N.E.2d at 334.

[FN212]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/1 (West 1998).

[FN213]. 81 Ill. 403 (1876).

[FN214]. Id. at 404.

[FN215]. Id.

[FN216]. Id. at 407.

[FN217]. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2 (West 1998).

[FN218]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1.1 (West 1998).

[FN219]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.37 (West 1998).

[FN220]. Id.

[FN221]. Id.

[FN222]. Id.

[FN223]. Id.

[FN224]. Id.

[FN225]. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.37 (West 1998).

[FN226]. Id.

[FN227]. See generally, Jeffrey E. Thompson, Damage Caused by Reintroduced Wildlife: Should the Government be Held Accountable? 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1183 (1992).

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