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Animal Welfare Act: Related Cases

Case Name Citation Summary
1 IN RE: JAMES W. HICKEY, D/B/A S&S FARMS, AND S.S. FARMS, INC.   47 Agric. Dec. 840 (1988)   Licensed dealer found guilty of numerous violations of Act involving care and housing of dogs and cats, failure to allow inspection of records, and failure to keep and maintain adequate records as to acquisition and disposition of animals, is properly penalized with 25-year suspension of license, civil penalty of $40,000, and cease and desist order.  
907 Whitehead Street, Inc. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture   701 F.3d 1345 (C.A.11 (Fla.))   The appellant in this case, the Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum in Key West, Florida ("Museum"), appeals the lower court's determination that it is an animal exhibitor for purposes of the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Appellant contends that while admission is charged for the Museum, it does not exhibit the Hemingway cats to the public for compensation; thus, the cats are not distributed through interstate commerce. The court, however, found that since the AWA itself is ambiguous on the question of whether "distribution" includes the fixed-site commercial display of animals, the USDA's broader interpretation of "distribution" and "exhibitor" are entitled to legal deference. While the court sympathized with the museum's frustrations, it affirmed the district court's findings of law and held that Museum is an AWA animal exhibitor subject to USDA regulation  
ALDF v. Glickman   204 F.3d 229(2000)  

Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers.  The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act

 
ALDF v. Glickman   154 F.3d 426 (1998)   Animal welfare group and individual plaintiffs brought action against, inter alia, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging its regulations concerning treatment of nonhuman primates on grounds that they violated USDA's statutory mandate under Animal Welfare Act (AWA).  
Alternative Research & Dev. Found. v. Veneman   262 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2001)  

An animal rights foundation sought to have the definition of “animal” amended, so that birds, mice and rats used for research would not be excluded.  USDA agreed to consider the animal rights foundation petition to have the definition amended, and agreed to do so in reasonable amount of time.  The National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR), a biomedical research group that used birds, mice and rats in its research, attempted to intervene and prevent USDA from considering the petition.  However, NABR was prohibited from doing so because there was no showing that preventing intervention would result in its interests not being violated.

 
Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman   101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000)   In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan, defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA.  
American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus   317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003)   The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution.  The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits.  
American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus   --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 3101818 (D.D.C.)  

In this case, the court considered the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration. On August 23, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment to defendant as to elephants subject to a captive-bred wildlife (“CBW”) permit and denied summary judgment as to elephants for which defendant claimed a “pre-Act” exemption. Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the “pre-Act” elephants and plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the CBW permit elephants. Defendant’s motion was granted in part as to the standing of plaintiff, Tom Rider. The court held that Rider’s standing is now limited to those six elephants to which he became “emotionally attached.” Notably, the court ended its opinion with a “hint to the wise” that the court will not tolerate any further filings inconsistent with FRCP.

 
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman   490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007)   Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA").  The district court granted USDA's motion to dismiss, to which the ALDF timely appealed. Over a vigorous dissent, an appeals court panel reversed the district court's decision. After a sua sponte call, however, a majority of active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Yet, before the rehearing occurred, the parties had reached a settlement and had agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice provided that the panel's opinion and judgment were vacated. The majority of the en banc panel agreed to vacate the panel's opinion and judgment with prejudice, but Judge Thomas filed the dissenting opinion.  
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman   469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir.(Cal.), 2006)  

Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Plaintiffs challenge the decision not to adopt the Draft Policy under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") as arbitrary and capricious. The district court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' suit because it determined that the USDA's decision did not constitute reviewable final agency action. This court disagreed, finding that at least one of the plaintiffs has standing under Article III of the Constitution. Further, the court concluded that the district court has authority under the APA to review the USDA's decision not to adopt the Draft Policy. Opinion Vacated on Rehearing en Banc by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir., 2007).

 
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy   23 F.3d 496 (C.A.D.C.,1994)  
In this case, animal welfare groups and two individuals challenged the regulation promulgated by Department of Agriculture that failed to include birds, rats, and mice as “animals” within meaning of Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (FLAWA). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and subsequently granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs could not demonstrate both constitutional standing to sue and statutory right to judicial review under the APA. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss.
 
Commonwealth v. Bishop   67 Mass.App.Ct. 1116 (2006)   David Bishop was convicted of animal cruelty and failing to provide a sanitary environment for his five dogs. He was ordered to pay over $60,000 in order to provide for the medical expenses that his dogs needed after they were taken away from him. While defendant argued that the amount of restitution was excessive, the court found that each of the five dogs had medical bills in excess of $10,000. Defendant was sentenced to three months in a house of corrections, and ten years probation.  
Commonwealth v. Reynolds   76 A.2d 1088 (Pa., 2005)   A woman's four serval cats, two fennic foxes, three ringtailed lemurs, three kinkajous, and one wallaby were all seized pursuant to a search warrant.  The trial court granted the woman's motion for return of her property in part and denied in part, specifically allowing for the return of the kinkajous and lemurs.  The Court of Appeals remanded to determine whether the woman's possession of the animals was in violation of the federal AWA or state Game Code.     
Cox v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture   925 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1991)  

USDA had suspended a kennel owner’s license for 90 days and imposed a fine on the owner for violating AWA regulations.  These violations included delivering dogs for transportation in commerce, that were under eight weeks old, failing to hold dogs for at least five days after acquiring them, and refusing APHIS inspections.  Owner claimed that such sanctions were excessive.  However, the court found that there was willful violation of the AWA, since inspections were refused.  Also, ignorance is not considered a defense, and although the owners claimed they did not know the age of the eight-week old puppies, they could have found out.  Thus, the sanction was appropriate.

 
Daul v. Meckus   897 F. Supp 606 (D.C. 1995)  

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has brought this Bivens action seeking to hold government agents liable in their individual capacities for alleged constitutional violations under the AWA. Plaintiff lost his Class A license of a dealer under the AWA, due to failure to submit the required license fee and annual report.  The court held that, even construing plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, Mr. Daul appears merely to allege without proof that each of these defendants exceeded the scope of his authority.  Thus, plaintiff's conclusory allegations failed to show that any defendant violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right.  The named defendants from the USDA were also granted both absolute and qualified immunity in the decision.

 
Dehart v. Town of Austin   39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994)   The breeder was in the business of buying, breeding, raising, and selling of exotic and wild animals. The town passed an ordinance making it unlawful to keep certain wild animals, and the breeder filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance.  On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the town because: (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the Animal Welfare Act; (2) the ordinance was not an impermissible attempt to regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the town did not deprive him of his property interest in his federal and state licenses without due process.  
Diercks v. Wisconsin   2006 WL 3761333 (E.D. Wis. 2006)   An owner of a greyhound kennel was suspected of giving her dogs illegal steroids because an informant told the government agency this was happening. The particular steroid used was impossible to detect using urine samples, so the government agency, without a warrant, installed covert video cameras in the kennel and that way determined that the owner was injecting her dogs. The owner claimed this violated her Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights, and the court agreed; however, the agency actors were not liable because the state of the law on this issue was not clear and it was reasonable for them to think they could legally install the video surveillance system.  
Donald HENDRICK and Concerned Citizens for True Horse Protection, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (“USDA”), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“Aphis”), Defendants.   Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2900526 (W.D.Ky.)  

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of “soring” (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define “sore” and “scar” beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the “scar rule”). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact.

 
Doris Day Animal League v. Veneman   315 F.3d 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003)   Animal rights group brought action challenging validity of regulation exempting breeders who sell dogs from their residences from licensure under Animal Welfare Act. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that regulation was invalid, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that regulation was reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent.  
E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENT   50 Agric. Dec. 14 (1991)  

Lee and Becky Cox, owners of Pixy Pals Kennel, petitioned for review of a decision of the Department of Agriculture suspending their license for ninety days, imposing a $12,000 civil fine, and ordering the Coxes to cease and desist from specified violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Coxes claim that (1) the suspension violated s 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because there was insufficient evidence to support the Department's finding that their violations of the Animal Welfare Act were willful; (2) they were unconstitutionally penalized for exercising their first amendment rights; and (3) the sanctions imposed on them were excessive. In affirming the USDA decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the definition of "willfulness" was not called into question; rather the Department had presented substantial evidence to demonstrate willfulness. Further, since petitioners' first amendment claim concerned the Department's "motivations," the court held that proof of motivation is a question of fact rather than law, not subject to de novo review. The sanction imposed by the Department, although severe, was not excessive given the size of petitioners' business and the severity of the violations.

 
Haviland v. Butz   543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976)  

This case addresses whether the Secretary of Agriculture intended to include “animal acts” under the AWA. Animal acts are any performance of animals where such animals are trained to perform some behavior or action or are part of a show, performance, or exhibition. Defendant presented an animal act with dogs and ponies to paying audiences and occasionally appeared on commercial television. Defendant asserted that he did not “exhibit” animals simply by showing dogs and ponies and argued that the Secretary unconstitutionally added “animal acts” to the AWA. The court held that the inclusion of “animal acts” was authorized as“[t]he words ‘includes’ and ‘such as’ [in the AWA] point convincingly to the conclusion that the listing of types of exhibitions in the statutory text was intended to be but partial and illustrative.”

 
Hemingway Home and Museum v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture   2006 WL 3747343 (S.D. Fla.)   The plaintiff lived in Hemmingway's old property, a museum, with 53 polydactyl cats (cats having more than the usual number of toes). The United States Department of Agriculture investigated and said that the plaintiff needed to get an exhibitor's license to show the cats, but that was not possible unless the cats were enclosed. Plaintiff sued the government in order to avoid the $200 per cat per day fines assessed, but the court held that the government has sovereign immunity from being sued.  
Hendricks v. Barlow   656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995)  

Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property.  The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law.  However, on appeal, this Court found that federal  (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances.  The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption  by state and federal law should not have been found.  Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted.

 
Hoctor v. Dept of Agriculture   82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)  

A dealer raised exotic animals (mainly big cats), and USDA ordered that the dangerous ones be fenced, with fencing being a minimum of eight-feet high.  However, the animal housing standard only required that the fencing be sturdy enough to prevent the animals from escaping.  The eight-foot rule established by USDA was considered arbitrary, and it did not have to be followed.   

 
Humane Society of U.S. v. U.S. Postal Service   609 F.Supp.2d 85 (D.D.C.,2009)   The question in this case centers on whether a response from the United States Postal Service (USPS) to the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) qualifies as a "final agency action" for purposes of judicial reviewability under the APA. At issue is the HSUS's petition to the USPS to declare a monthly periodical entitled The Feathered Warriror unmailable under the AWA. While the USPS has been broadly exempted from judicial review under the APA, there are exceptions, which include “proceedings concerning the mailability of matter." While the term "proceedings" is largely undefined in the Act, the Court held that it would not limit the term to the post hoc meaning ascribed by the USPS that limits it to only "formal" proceedings. Despite finding that the actions taken by the USPS were indeed judicially reviewable, the court remanded the matter because, after the Humane Society initiated this lawsuit, Congress amended § 2156 of the Animal Welfare Act again, further defining issue of nonmailable animal fighting material.  
In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo   785 F.Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio, 1991)   This case involves a challenge by several organizations to the proposed move of Timmy, a lowland gorilla, from the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo to the Bronx Zoo in New York for the purposes of mating Timmy with female gorillas at the Bronx Zoo. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 25, 1991, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, and moved for a temporary restraining order.  The District Court held that the claim was preempted under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ESA.  Further, the court held that plaintiffs had no private cause of action under the AWA.   
In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health   527 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C., 2007)  

This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. This Order was Superseded by In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health, 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008).

 
IN RE MARSHALL RESEARCH ANIMALS, INC.   39 Agric. Dec. 359 (1980)   In this order, the court held that Respondent shall cease and desist from transporting live animals in primary enclosures which are not sufficiently large to insure that each animal contained therein has sufficient space to turn about freely in a standing position using normal body movement, to stand and sit erect, and to lie in a natural position, which spatial requirements are contained in the regulations issued pursuant to the Act. (9 CFR 3.12(c)).  
IN RE: ALEX PASTERNAK   52 Agric. Dec. 180 (1993)  

The court concluded that respondent had committed more than thirty violations of the AWA for his abuse of his exhibition animals (mainly leopards).  Among the violations were a failure to maintain required records, failure to provide veterinary care, failure to comply with standards affecting all aspects of cat care, and physically abusing animals. As a result, respondent's license was suspended, a civil penalty was imposed and an order was issued directing respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act. Although respondent sought the protection of the bankruptcy code, the automatic stay of proceedings provided by bankruptcy law does not prevent the Department from obtaining corrective action to preserve animal welfare.

 
In re: BIG BEAR FARM, INC., ANDREW BURR, AND CAROL BURR   55 Agric. Dec. 107 (1996)   Only requirement of 7 USCS § 2149(a), which authorizes suspension or revocation of license of exhibitor if exhibitor has violated or is violating any provision of Animal Welfare Act (7 USCS §§ 2131 et seq.) or any regulation or standard promulgated by Secretary under Act, is that at least one of violations be willful; existence of additional violations not shown to be willful does nothing to take away Secretary's authority to suspend or revoke exhibitor's license.  
IN RE: CECIL BROWNING, DELORES BROWNING AND DARREN BROWNING, d/b/a ALLIGATORLAND SAFARI ZOO, INC.   52 Agric. Dec. 129 (1993)  

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. s 2131 et seq.), and the regulations and standards issued thereunder (9 C.F.R. s 1.1 et seq.). On November 20, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Edwin S. Bernstein (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing a civil penalty of $2,000, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, and thereafter until they are in full compliance with the Act, regulations and standards, because Respondents failed to keep their primary enclosures sanitary and in suitable condition, failed to maintain complete records, failed to keep food and watering receptacles clean, failed to handle wastes properly, failed to provide adequate veterinarian care, and failed to utilize sufficient personnel to maintain proper husbandry practices. (Respondents were licensed exhibitors of captive wildlife, including deer, non-human primates, and bears, among other animals.) The court also found the sanctions were not too severe, considering the willfullness of the violations.

 
IN RE: CRAIG LESSER AND MARILYN LESSER   52 Agric. Dec. 155 (1993)  

Respondents, Craig and Marilyn Lesser, were respectively, president and vice-president of LSR Industries, a Wisconsin corporation that was in the business of breeding and selling rabbits to research institutions, and licensed dealers under the Animal Welfare Act. The ALJ issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing civil penalties of $9,250, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, after respondents interfered with APHIS inspections of their facilities and failed to maintain their facilities in accordance with the standards involving housing, sanitation, cleaning, ventilation, storage of food and bedding, and lighting. However, the Judicial Officer increased the civil penalties of $9,250 assessed by the ALJ by $500, because of sanitation and waste violations, for which the ALJ assessed no civil penalties. Since Respondents did not raise any issue before the ALJ as to whether warrantless inspections are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they cannot raise the issue on appeal. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by warrantless inspections under this regulatory statute.

 
In re: DAVID M. ZIMMERMAN   57 Agric. Dec. 1038 (1998)   Ongoing pattern of violations establishes "history of previous violations" for purposes of 7 USCS § 2149(b), and it is appropriate to view evidence as establishing prior violations in determining appropriate level of civil penalty.  
In re: DAVID M. ZIMMERMAN   56 Agric. Dec. 433 (1997)   Purpose of sanctions is to deter respondent, as well as others, from committing same or similar violations.  
In re: DELTA AIR LINES, INC.   53 Agric. Dec. 1076 (1994)   The Judicial Officer affirmed the Decision by Chief Judge Palmer (Chief ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $140,000, with $60,000 held in abeyance for 1 year, for transporting 108 dogs and cats in a cargo space that was without sufficient air, causing the death of 32 dogs. The Order also directs Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act, regulations and standards, and, in particular, to cease and desist from failing to ensure that dogs and cats have a supply of air sufficient for normal breathing.  On appeal, the court held that when regulated entity fails to comply with Act, regulations or standards, there is separate violation for each animal consequently harmed or placed in danger.  
IN RE: DONALD STUMBO, D/B/A STUMBO FARMS   43 Agric. Dec. 1079 (U.S.D.A.)  

Imposition of $4,000 civil penalty was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b) where respondent committed numerous, serious violations of Animal Welfare Act, respondent handled large number of animals, and violations continued after respondent was advised in writing of violations and given opportunity to correct them.

 
IN RE: E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL   50 Agric. Dec. 1662 (1991)   On March 14, 1990, the civil penalty and suspension provisions of the order issued in this case on January 29, 1990, 49 Agric.Dec. 115, were stayed pending the outcome of proceedings for judicial review.  This order is issued lifting the stay.  The civil penalty of $12,000 assessed against the respondents shall be paid no later than the 90th day after service of this order.  
IN RE: E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL   49 Agric. Dec. 115 (1990)  

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. ss 2131- 2156). On April 20, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Edwin S. Bernstein (ALJ) issued an initial Decision and Order suspending respondents' license for 90 days, and thereafter until respondents demonstrate compliance with the Act and regulations, assessing a civil penalty of $12,000, and directing respondents to cease and desist from failing to retain possession and control of all dogs until they are at least 8 weeks of age and have been weaned, failing to hold dogs for not less than 5 business days after acquisition, failing to keep and maintain proper records, and failing to allow inspection of respondents' facility and records. Dealers and other regulated persons are required to grant access to their records during ordinary business hours, without any advance notice from Department.

 
IN RE: ERVIN STEBANE   47 Agric. Dec. 1264 (1988)   Licensed dealer who engaged in recurring pattern of trivial noncompliance with housekeeping requirements, failed to provide records on two occasions and failed to permit inspection on one occasion, is properly sanctioned with 20-day license suspension, $1500 civil penalty, and cease and desist order.  
In re: JACK D. STOWERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUGAR CREEK KENNELS   56 Agric. Dec. 279 (1996)   Willfulness is not required for cease and desist orders or for monetary fines; it is only required for license revocation if agency has not given respondent written notice of violations and opportunity to come into compliance with regulations. (Chief Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer imposed a civil penalty of $15,000.00, issued a cease and desist order, and revoked Respondent's license after finding that Respondent: failed to allow department officials to inspect its facility; failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the acquisition, disposition, and identification of dogs; failed to properly identify dogs; failed to hold dogs for the required period of time; offered dogs for transportation in enclosures that did not conform to structural strength and space requirements; failed to construct and maintain primary enclosures for dogs that protect the dogs from injury; failed to deliver health certificates for dogs transported interstate; failed to provide adequate veterinary care; and obtained random source dogs from individuals who had not bred and raised the dogs on their own premises.)  
IN RE: JAMES AND JULIA STUEKERJUERGEN, D/B/A CORNER VIEW KENNELS.   44 Agric. Dec. 186 (1985)   Dog broker shipping dogs under 8 weeks old was assessed civil penalty of $7,000 and license as dealer under Animal Welfare Act was suspended for 35 days, since broker was one of largest dog brokers in state, 8-week minimum age requirement was based on finding that ability of dogs to function in adult environment was adversely affected if shipped under that age, violations were serious and flagrant in view of large number of puppies shipped on 10 different occasions during 2-month period, and broker had violated Act and standards on prior occasion resulting in 12 day license suspension.  
In re: JAMES E. STEPHENS AND WATER WHEEL EXOTICS, INC.   58 Agric. Dec. 149 (1999)   Ongoing pattern of violations establishes "history of previous violations" for purposes of 7 USCS § 2149(b).  
In re: JAMES J. EVERHART   56 Agric. Dec. 1400 (1997)   Respondent's inability to pay civil penalty is not consideration in determining civil penalties assessed under Animal Welfare Act.  
In re: JAMES JOSEPH HICKEY, JR., d/b/a S & H SUPPLY CO., AND JERRY R. BRANTON   53 Agric. Dec. 1087 (1994)   Respondents' failure to file timely answer, or deny allegations of complaint, constituted admission of complaint allegations and waiver of hearing, irrespective of respondents' contention that they were justified in not filing answer because ALJ did not rule on respondents' motions to sever, strike and make more definite and certain, since Department's rules of practice do not alter time for filing answer when such motions are filed.  
In re: JAMES MICHAEL LaTORRES   57 Agric. Dec. 53 (1997)   Respondent who, after being duly notified, fails to appear at hearing for good cause, is deemed to have admitted any facts presented at hearing and all material allegations of fact contained in Animal Welfare Act complaint.  
IN RE: JEROME A. JOHNSON AND LAURA JOHNSON   51 Agric. Dec. 209 (1992)   Ability to pay civil penalty is not to be considered in determining penalty under Animal Welfare Act.  
In re: JUDIE HANSEN   57 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1998)   Recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of statute are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of regulated industry; however, recommendation of administrative officials as to sanction is not controlling, and in appropriate circumstances, sanction imposed may be considerably less, or different, than that recommended by administrative officials.  
In re: JULIAN J. TONEY AND ANITA L. TONEY   54 Agric. Dec. 923 (1995)   Civil penalty of $200,000.00 (largest civil penalty ever imposed under Act) was appropriate, where degree of willfulness and flagrancy of respondents' violations was astonishing, and even after hearing was pending on initial complaint, respondents continued to violate Act.  
In re: MARILYN SHEPHERD   57 Agric. Dec. 242 (1998)   Recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of Animal Welfare Act are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of regulated industry; however, recommendation of administrative officials as to sanction is not controlling, and in appropriate circumstances, sanction imposed may be considerably less, or different, than that recommended by administrative officials.  
In re: MARJORIE WALKER, d/b/a LINN CREEK KENNEL   2006 WL 2439003 (U.S.D.A.)   Judicial Officer affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Marjorie Walker, d/b/a Linn Creek Kennel, violated the regulations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Judicial Officer stated that the Animal Welfare Act provides factors that must be considered when deciding the amount of civil penalty, and that the ability to pay the penalty is not a factor. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist from violating the regulations and standards, pay a $14,300 civil penalty, and the license was revoked .  
IN RE: MARLIN U. ZARTMAN D/B/A GILBERTSVILLE SALES STABLES.   44 Agric. Dec. 174 (1985)   Secretary is authorized to promulgate standards applicable to operator of auction sale as to care, treatment, housing, feeding, watering, and sanitation of animals, since literal language of 7 USCS § 2142 and its legislative history gives Secretary broad authority to impose on auction operator standards of humane handling of all animals subject to Animal Welfare Act, and although construing word "handling" in § 2143 broad enough to include those areas would nullify significance and effect of additional terms, contemporaneous construction of Act by administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of ensuring humane care and treatment of animals indicates Secretary has authority to impose such standards on auction operators.  
IN RE: MARY BRADSHAW   50 Agric. Dec. 499 (1991)  

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. s 2131 et seq.), and the regulations issued thereunder (9 C.F.R. s 1.1 et seq.). On January 29, 1991, Administrative Law Judge James W. Hunt (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing a civil penalty of $10,000, and directing respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act, regulations and standards, and, in particular, to cease and desist from engaging in any activity for which a license is required without holding a valid license. The court held that a suspension order may be issued where violation occurred while respondent was not licensed.

 
IN RE: MICHEAL McCALL AND KATHY McCALL   52 Agric. Dec. 986 (1993)   This opinion held that the USDA may impose sanctions even if respondent dealer is not licensed. Respondents were operators of kennel facilities in Washington, Kansas, and in nearby Reynolds, Nebraska. In 1991 and 1992, Respondents each applied for dealer's licenses under the Act and both were denied. The Judicial Officer affirmed that part of the Order by Judge Bernstein (ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $7,500, and ordering Respondents to cease and desist from engaging in any activity for which a license is required without being licensed, and failing to maintain their facilities in accordance with the regulations and standards involving housing, shelter, veterinary care, records, sanitation, cleaning, food, and water. However, the Judicial Officer increased from 1 year to 10 years the period in which Respondents are disqualified from becoming licensed under the Act and regulations.  
In re: OTTO BEROSINI.   54 Agric. Dec. 886 (1995)   Congress has authority under Commerce Clause (Art I, § 8, cl 3) to give Department of Agriculture authority to regulate interstate activities within purview of Animal Welfare Act (7 USCS §§ 2131 et seq.), including activities of animal exhibitors.  
In re: PATRICK D. HOCTOR   54 Agric. Dec. 114 (1995)  

Sanction in each case is to be determined by examining nature of violations in relation to remedial purposes of regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant circumstances, giving appropriate weight to recommendations of administrative officials having responsibility for achieving congressional purpose.

 
IN RE: PET PARADISE, INC.   51 Agric. Dec. 1047 (1992)   Where complaint advised respondent of exact matters at issue, there is no basis for dismissing any allegations of complaint merely because they failed to specify subsections of regulations or standards involved in some of alleged violations. Formalities of court pleading are not applicable in administrative proceedings. Findings of fact need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A violation is willful if the person intentionally does an act which is prohibited or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements.  
In re: PETER A. LANG, d/b/a SAFARI WEST   57 Agric. Dec. 91 (1998)   Proof of willfulness is not prerequisite to concluding that respondent violated Animal Welfare Act or assessing civil penalty or issuing cease and desist order.  
In re: RONALD DeBRUIN   54 Agric. Dec. 876 (1995)   Respondent's failure to file timely answer or deny allegations of complaint constitutes admission of allegations in complaint and waiver of hearing.  
IN RE: RONNIE FAIRCLOTH AND JR's AUTO & PARTS, INC.   52 Agric. Dec. 171 (1993)   Individual who owned auto parts company, and who kept exotic animals on premises (allegedly as pets), was exhibitor for purposes of Act, even though economic benefit to him from exhibiting animals to public was de minimis, because individual's activities were in commerce.  
IN RE: ROSIA LEE ENNES   45 Agric. Dec. 540 (1986)   Civil penalty of $1,000 against unlicensed dealer was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b), and greater penalty could have been requested where although moderate size of kennel suggested modest penalty, selling hundreds of dogs without license over 40-month period was grave violation of Animal Welfare Act, violations were not committed in good faith since dogs were knowingly and intentionally sold without license after receiving 4 warnings, and even though dealer thought mistakenly that Department would not prosecute her for such violations and there was no history of previous violations, the hundreds of violations proven were sufficient to warrant severe sanction.  
IN RE: S.S. FARMS LINN COUNTY, INC., JAMES W. HICKEY, MARIE HICKEY, JAMES JOSEPH HICKEY AND SHANNON HANSEN   50 Agric. Dec. 476 (1991)   Reliance is to be no longer placed on "severe" sanction policy set forth in prior decisions; rather, sanction in each case will be determined by examining nature of violations in relation to remedial purposes of regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant circumstances, always giving appropriate weight to recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose.  
In re: SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN   56 Agric. Dec. 1419 (1997)   Proof of respondent's willful violations of Animal Welfare Act and regulations and standards is not necessary for revocation or suspension of respondent's license where respondent received notice in writing of facts or conduct that might warrant suspension or revocation of his license, and respondent had opportunity to achieve compliance with requirements of Act and regulations and standards.  
IN RE: SEMA, INC.   49 Agric. Dec. 176 (1990)   Inspectors have considerable discretion in selecting their methods of inspection and way in which they document their observations, and photographic documentation obtained during normal business hours in reasonable manner that does not disrupt ongoing research must be construed as within boundaries of such discretion; interference with inspectors' reasonable efforts to take photographs to enhance inspection violates § 2146(a).  
IN RE: STEVEN M. SAMEK AND TRINA JOANN SAMEK   57 Agric. Dec. 185 (1998)   Respondent who is unable to afford attorney has no right to have counsel provided by government in disciplinary administrative proceedings conducted under Animal Welfare Act.  
IN RE: TERRY LEE HARRISON AND PAMELA SUE HARRISON, RESPONDENTS   51 Agric. Dec. 234 (1992)   Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements.  
In re: VOLPE VITO, INC., d/b/a FOUR BEARS WATER PARK AND RECREATION AREA   56 Agric. Dec. 166 (1997)   While corrections are to be encouraged and may be taken into account when determining sanction to be imposed, even immediate correction of violation does not operate to eliminate fact that violation occurred and does not provide basis for dismissal of alleged violation.  
In re: WILLIAM JOSEPH VERGIS   55 Agric. Dec. 148 (1996)   Except as provided in 9 CFR § 2.11, neither Animal Welfare Act (7 USCS §§ 2131 et seq.) nor regulations issued under Act specifically provide for order prohibiting person who is unlicensed from obtaining license; nevertheless, Act provides that Secretary has general authority to promulgate such "orders," as well as such rules and regulations, as may be necessary to effectuate purposes of Act (7 USCS § 2151), which means that Secretary does have power to order that unlicensed person who violates Act, or regulations or standards under Act, be barred from licensure.  
IN RE: ZOOLOGICAL CONSORTIUM OF MARYLAND, INC., AND RICHARD HAHN.   47 Agric. Dec. 1276 (1988)   Exhibitor who engaged in recurring pattern of noncompliance with standards governing structural strength, food storage, ventilation, maintenance of facilities and enclosures, cleaning, housekeeping and interior building surfaces, but who made good faith effort to achieve compliance, is properly sanctioned with $1000 civil penalty, 20-day suspension, and cease and desist order.  
IRVIN WILSON and PET PARADISE, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE   54 Agric. Dec. 111 (1995)    
Jurewicz v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture   891 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C, 2012)   Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the United States Humane Society requested that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) disclose a certain Animal Welfare Act form. Arguing that two FOIA exemptions prevented the USDA from releasing certain information on this form (the number of dogs that they buy and sell each year and their annual revenue from dog sales), three Missouri dog breeders and dealers sought to prevent this information’s disclosure. After finding that the public interests in disclosing the information outweighed the privacy concerns for the breeders, the district court granted the USDA's and the U.S. Humane Society's motion for summary judgment.    
 
Kerr v. Kimmell   740 F.Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1990)  

The operator of a dog kennel brought an that alleged the Kansas Animal Dealers Act violated the Constitution. The District Court held that the Kansas Animal Dealers Act did not violate commerce clause and was, in fact, a valid exercise of the state's traditional police power.

 
Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr.   322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11)  

Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules.

 
LEE ROACH AND ROACH LABORATORIES, INC.   51 Agric. Dec. 252 (1992)   Company which produces antiserum for medical diagnostic tests by injecting rabbits and other live animals with antigens and then extracting their blood is research facility within meaning of Act.  
Lesser v. Epsy   34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994)   Owner had a rabbitry, and the rabbits were sold for scientific research.  Inspection of the rabbitry without a warrant occurred, and Owner claimed that his constitutional rights were violated.  Search without a warrant was appropriate because any deficiencies could have been easily concealed if notice of a search was provided to the Owner.   
Longhi v. APHIS   165 F3d 1057 (6th Cir. 1999)   APHIS was unsuccessful in asserting that an applicant who is part of one license as a partnership can not apply for another as a corporation.  
Luethans v. Washington University   838 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992)    
Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agr.   134 F.3d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1998)  

A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions.

 
Moore v. Garner   2005 WL 1022088 (E.D.Tex.)  

Complaints were made against a plaintiff-couple about the poor conditions for over 100 dogs and other animals that were living in on the couple’s farm. The couple who owned the farm failed to do anything about it and the animals were seized.  Plaintiffs brought claims against sixty defendants (mainly Van Zandt County, Texas officials) for conspiracy and violations of the Hobbs Act, Animal Welfare Act, Animal Enterprise Protection Act, RICO, the Texas Constitution and other federal statutes.  The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and the District Court affirmed. 

 
Ouderkirk v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc.   2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.))  

The plaintiffs in this case own a chinchilla ranch in mid-Michigan. They filed a complaint alleging that PETA lied to them to gain access to their farm, took video footage of their farm operation, and then published an exposé on PETA's website that put the plaintiffs in an unfavorable false light. The court ultimately granted defendant-PETA's motion for summary judgment on all the issues. The court observed that the Ouderkirks gave permission for the taping in an email that makes no reference to any restriction on that consent. Further, the primary use made of the plaintiffs' likenesses by the defendant was to advocate against the chinchilla trade; thus, PETA had a right under the First Amendment to disseminate the information containing the plaintiffs' likenesses.

 
Padilla v. Stringer   395 F.Supp. 495    
Pearson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture   Slip Copy, 2011 WL 559083 (C.A.6,2011)  

Petitioner seeks review of the decision and order of the Secretary of the USDA, terminating his license to own and exhibit wild animals (82 lions, tigers, and bears), issuing a cease and desist order, and imposing civil sanctions in the amount of $93,975 in violation of the AWA. In 2006, inspection showed 280 incidents of non-compliance. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first held that there was no abuse of discretion in failing to grant the continuance after a fire at Petitioner's home because he is unable to resulting establish prejudice. Further, the Court discounted Petitioner's challenge that the revocation of his license was not supported where the court found the evidence "substantial, perhaps overwhelming." 

 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture   --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 6571845 (D.D.C. 2013)   The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) brought a suit against the USDA for failing to enforce the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) against bird abusers and for not promulgating regulations specific to the mistreatment of avians. While the district court found PETA had standing, it granted the USDA’s motion to dismiss because the AWA's enforcement provision strongly suggested that its implementation was committed to agency discretion by law and because section 2143 of the AWA did not require the USDA to issue avian-specific animal-welfare standards.  
Robinson v. U.S.   718 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1983)  

Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that a cease and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future.

 
Sacco v. Tate   175 Misc.2d 901 (N.Y. 1998)   Plaintiffs commenced the instant action to recover veterinary expenses incurred by reason of the fact that the dog sold to them by defendant was not healthy. The court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to avail themselves of the remedies afforded by article 35-D of the General Business Law by reason of their failure to comply with the requirements set forth in section 753 thereof (to wit, they did not produce the dog for examination by a licensed veterinarian designated by the dealer, nor did they furnish the dealer with a certification of unfitness of the dog within three days after their receipt thereof). The court, however, noted that the article does not limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law, so the award by the court was affirmed (albeit on a different basis).  
SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE   57 Agric. Dec. 869 (1998)   Agency's choice of sanction is not to be overturned unless it is unwarranted by law, unjustified by facts, or represents abuse of discretion; sanction is not rendered invalid in particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases.  
Slavin v. United States   2005 WL 742707 (8th Cir. 2005)   An Arkansas woman who raises gamefowl brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act which prohibits the interstate transportation of birds for the purposes of fighting.  The trial court dismissed the woman's claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed holding the statute is not vague.  
Slavin v. US   403 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2005)  

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act after it created a regulation that prohibited the interstate or foreign commerce transport of birds that would be used in fighting ventures.  She argued that the regulators did not consider whether fighting ventures were legal in the state where the birds were being transported to.  However, the regulation was considered constitutional since under terms of section 2156(b), only the foreign and interstate transport of the birds was prohibited. 

 
U.S. ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West   602 F.3d 949 (9th Cir., 2010)   The plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals and Patricia Haight brought suit against the defendants under the False Claims Act.  In 1997, defendant Michael Berens, Ph.D., submitted a grant application to the NIH in which he sought federal funding for a project to develop a canine model to study glioma, a form of human brain cancer, and attempted to create a process for implanting gliomas in the brains of beagles. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the challenged grant application statements were objectively false.   
U.S. v. Felts (unpublished)   Slip Copy, 2012 WL 124390 (N.D.Iowa)   Defendant kennel operator was found to violate the AWA on multiple occasions when inspected by APHIS representatives. From 2005 to 2009, defendant repeatedly failed inspections where APHIS found that he provided inadequate veterinary care, did not maintain complete records on the dogs, and did not properly maintain the housing facilities for the dogs. The Administrator of APHIS filed and served on Defendant an administrative complaint for violations. Defendant never filed an answer, and so a Default Decision and Order was entered against Defendant. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part because Defendant failed to file an answer to the administrative complaint, and so was deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint.  
U.S. v. Lawson   677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir., 2012)  

Defendants appealed their conviction of violating, and conspiring to violate, the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, but held, in part, that the AWA is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and that the provision of different elements of the crime in jurisdictions permitting animal fighting does not violate equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

 
United States v. Kum   309 F.Supp.2d 1084 (E.D. Wis. 2004)   Defendant convicted for conspiracy to smuggle endangered wildlife into the United States.  Government moved for upward departure from sentencing range.  Held:  Court would not depart upward to reflect cruel treatment of animals (other holdings generally unrelated).  
VOLPE VITO, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE   58 Agric. Dec. 85 (1999)   Judicial officer is not required to accept ALJ's findings of fact, even when those findings are based on credibility determinations, and judicial officer is authorized to substitute his or her judgment for that of ALJ.  
White v. U.S.   601 F.3d 545 (C.A.6 (Ohio), 2010)   The Plaintiff-Appellants are citizens (show bird breeders, feed store owners, and game bird judges) who allege that the AWA amendments to § 2156 concerning animal fighting ventures have caused them various individual and collective injuries. The plaintiffs-appellants allege that these provisions are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute a bill of attainder; violate the principles of federalism contained in, inter alia, the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution; and unduly impinge on the plaintiffs-appellants' First Amendment right of association, constitutional right to travel, and Fifth Amendment right to due process for deprivations of property and liberty. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit held that while economic injuries may constitute an injury-in-fact for the purposes of Article III standing, the plaintiffs' alleged economic injuries due to restrictions on cockfighting are not traceable only to the AWA. Additionally, because the AWA does not impose any penalties without a judicial trial, it is not a bill of attainder. The decision of the district court was affirmed.  
Winkler v. Colorado Dept. of Health   564 P.2d 107 (Colo. 1977)  

In 1974, the Colorado Department of Health adopted certain regulations, the conceded effect of which is to prohibit importation of pets for resale from states whose licensing laws and regulations for commercial pet dealers are not as stringent as those of Colorado. The regulations exempt from this prohibition persons who import pets not for resale and exclusively for breeding purposes or for personal use. After the regulations were upheld by the Denver district court, the plaintiffs, who are commercial pet importers, brought this appeal. The court found these arguments to be unpersuasive and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

 

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