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Horse: Related Cases

Case Name Citation Summary
Access Now, Inc. v. Town of Jasper, Tennessee   268 F.Supp.2d 973, 26 NDLR P 107 (E.D.Tenn.,2003)  
Plaintiffs Access Now, Inc. and Pamela Kitchens, acting as parent and legal guardian on behalf of her minor daughter Tiffany brought this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant Town of Jasper, Tennessee under the ADA after the town denied her request to keep a keep miniature horse as service animal at her residence. The town's ordinance at issue provided that no person shall keep an enumerated animal within 1000 feet of any residence without a permit from the health officer. The Jasper Municipal Court held a hearing and determined that the keeping of the horse was in violation of the code and ordered it removed from the property. On appeal, this Court found that while the plaintiffs contended that the horse helped Tiffany in standing, walking, and maintaining her balance, Tiffany does not have a disability as defined by the ADA and does not have a genuine need to use the horse as a service animal. Further, the Court found that the horse was not a service animal within the meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 because the animal was not used in the capacity of a service animal and instead was a companion or pet to Tiffany. The plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
 
Alaimo v. Racetrack at Evangeline Downs, Inc.   893 So.2d 190 (3rd Cir., 2005)   A racehorse breeder  and owner brought suit against a racetrack for the loss of future winnings after a racehorse collided with a negligently maintained gate on the racetrack.  The trial court awarded plaintiff $38,000 without specifying what the award was for.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the award was not unreasonable based on the horse's racing history.  
Allen v. Pennsylvania Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals   488 F.Supp.2d 450 (M.D.Pa., 2007)   This is a § 1983 civil rights action brought by Robert Lee Allen against certain state actors arising from their search of his property, seizure of his farm animals, and prosecution of him for purported violations of Pennsylvania's cruelty-to-animals statute. The animals Allen typically acquires for his rehabilitation farm are underweight, in poor physical condition, and suffer from long-standing medical issues. After receiving a telephone complaint regarding the condition of the horses and other livestock on Allen's farm, humane officers visited Allen's property to investigate allegations. Subsequently, a warrant to seize eight horses, four goats, and two pigs was executed on a day when the officers knew Allen would be away from his farm with "twenty five assorted and unnecessary individuals."  The court held that the farmer's allegations that state and county humane societies had a custom, policy or practice of failing to train and supervise their employees stated § 1983 claims against humane societies. Further, the defendants were acting under color of state law when they searched and seized farmer's property.
 
Allendorf v. Redfearn   2011 IL App (2d) 110130 (2011)   After a farm employee was injured in an all terrain vehicle (ATV) while trying to round up a bull, he sued the farm owners under the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act. The Appellate Court held that the employee could not recover under the Act, which protects members of the general public who cannot be expected to appreciate the risk posed by an animal. Because the employee was not an innocent bystander but rather was attempting to exercise control over the bull at the time he was injured, he fell within the Act's definition of an “owner” of the bull.  
Allison v. Johnson   2001 WL 589384 (Ohio 2001)  

Appellant was injured by appellee’s horse when appellant was standing outside a horse arena waiting for the appellee.  The horse began to shuffle backwards and backed into a gate, which popped out of a bracket and struck the appellant in the face.  The trial court found and the court of appeals upheld the finding that the appellant was an “equine activity participant” because she was a spectator to the “normal daily care of an equine.” In addition, the appellee was determined to be an “equine activity sponsor” due to the fact that he was an “operator” of a stable where the equine activity occurred.  Thus, the equine immunity statute of Ohio is applicable to the appellee.

 
Amburgey v. Sauder   605 N.W.2d 84 (Mich. 1999)  

Plaintiff was bitten by a horse as she walked through a stable.  The court determined that Plaintiff was a “participant” for the purposes of the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), and thus the Defendant stables owner was insulated from liability arising out of the unanticipated, abnormal behavior of the horse.

 
American Horse Protection Ass'n v. U. S. Dept. of Interior   551 F.2d 342 (C.A.D.C. 1977)  
Appellants (American Horse Protection Association and a member of the joint advisory board created under the Act) initiated an action in the District Court against the Dept. of the Interior, alleging violations of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and other federal statutes in connection with a roundup of horses on federal lands. In January and February of 1973, there was a roundup of horses (said by appellants to be wild and free-roaming) on public lands near Howe, Idaho. The District Court for the District of Columbia, granted summary judgment for appellees, rejecting appellants' contention that the Brand Inspector lacked authority under the Act to determine ownership conclusively. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found the District Court's construction of Section 5 unacceptable. This Court did not believe that Congress intended to abdicate to state officials final determinations under Section 5 on ownership of wild free-roaming horses and burros on federal lands. Thus, the Court held that final role is reserved to the Federal Government. The judgment appealed from was reversed, and the case was remanded to the District Court.
 
American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lyng   681 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.,1988)  

This case resulted from a remand by the Court of Appeals after the USDA denied the plaintiff's application for additional rulemaking for the Horse Protection Act to expressly prohibit the use of ten ounce chains and padded shoes in the training of show horses. The use of these materials, argues plaintiff, constitutes soring (the act of deliberately injuring a horse's hooves to obtain a particular type of gait prized at certain horse shows. The object of soring is to cause a horse to suffer pain as its feet touch the ground). This Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, it directed the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to institute rulemaking procedures concerning the use of action devices on show horses. The Court further held that the existing regulations are contrary to law and that the Secretary ignored his mandate from Congress under the Horse Protection Act.

 
American Horse Protection Asso. v. Frizzell   203 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975)   The court upheld the Secretary’s decision to remove 400 horses from certain public lands in Nevada because of the risks of overgrazing, but also asserted that the Secretary’s discretion was not so complete as to deny judicial review of his actions.  
American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus   608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979)   The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur.  While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA.  The court also held that  the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one.  
Animal Protection Institute of America v. Hodel   860 F.2d 920 (C.A.9 (Nev.),1988)   The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary could not transfer title to a private individual whom the secretary knows will commercially exploit the adopted horse. The Secretary argued that the WFRHBA placed only one requirement on the transfer of title: the private individual must humanely care for and maintain the horse for one year prior to title transfer.  The court, however, concluded that the statute commands the secretary to not only determine that the animal has been well cared for, but also that the adopter remains a qualified individual.  Given the statute’s prohibition of commercial exploitation of wild horses as well as its concern with their humane treatment, the court concluded that a private individual cannot remain a “qualified individual” if he or she intends to commercially exploit the horse after they obtain title.  
Animal Protection Institute of America, Inc. v. Hodel   671 F.Supp. 695 (D.Nev.,1987)   In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation. Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). This Court granted plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year “probationary period” expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes.  
Applbaum v. Golden Acres Farm and Ranch   333 F. Supp. 2d 31 (N.D. N.Y. 2004)   Minor child fell off of a horse while horseback riding at a resort ranch and sustained severe injuries.  Parents of the minor child brought a personal injury claim against the stable and the stable moved for summary judgment.  The trial court precluded summary judgment due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact relating the parent's assumption of the risk.  
Baker v. McIntosh   132 S.W.3d 230 (Ky. 2004)  

Visitor to horse farm brought action for negligence when he was injured by owners colt.  Held:  the owner had no duty to prevent the colt from falling against the trailer door, nor did he have a duty to warn the visitor of the potential for such an accident to occur.

 
Balen v. Peltier (NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED AS UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3).   2006 WL 163518 (Minn.App.2006)  

Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she received after being thrown from defendant’s horse. Specifically, plaintiff argued that defendant knew or should have known of the horse’s “hazardous propensities” and therefore had a duty to protect plaintiff. In finding that there existed no special relationship between the parties to impart a duty to defendant, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed.

 
Barney v. Pinkham   45 N.W. 694 (Neb. 1890)  

Plaintiff was was the owner of a certain roan mare of the value of $200; that, on or about the 21st day of April, 1888, the said mare became and was sick with some disease then unknown to plaintiff in kind and character; that, at said date last aforesaid, and long prior thereto, the defendant claimed to be, and advertised and held himself out to the public to be, a veterinary surgeon, and asked to be employed as such in the treatment of sick and diseased horses.  The court held that a veterinary surgeon, in the absence of a special contract, engages to use such reasonable skill, diligence, and attention as may be ordinarily expected of persons in that profession. He does not undertake to use the highest degree of skill, nor an extraordinary amount of diligence. In other words, the care and diligence required are such as a careful and trustworthy man would be expected to exercise.  The case was remanded for determination of further proofs.

 
Beckwith v. Weber   277 P.3d 713 (Wyo. 2012)   While on vacation at a ranch in Wyoming, plaintiff was thrown or fell from a horse that stepped in a large badger hole. Allegedly, the trail guide left the plaintiff and her husband at the scene in order to get help. Worried about potential wildlife attacks, the plaintiff and her husband walked to a nearby residence for assistance. The plaintiff later brought a negligence suit against the ranch for injuries she had sustained during the fall. At trial, the jury verdict stated the plaintiff had assumed the risk and the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to damages. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged a jury instruction and asserted the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to the ranch. The plaintiff did not prevail on either claim.  
Brown v. Crocker   139 So.2d 779 (La. 1962)   This action in tort was instituted by plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of his minor son, against the defendant to recover the value of a quarter-horse mare and a stillborn colt, and for damages occasioned by shock and mental anguish suffered by the son, as well as for services of a veterinarian and medicines used in treatment of the mare following her wounding by a shotgun blast intentionally inflicted by the defendant. The Court of Appeal in upheld an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish experienced by the child who could not stop crying about the loss of his horse and the colt that never was. As the court stated, "Under the facts and circumstances, an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish suffered by the minor would, in our opinion, do justice between the parties."  
Browning v. State   2007 WL 1805918 (Ind.App.)   The Brownings were each charged with 32 counts of animal cruelty and convicted of five counts for their failure to provide adequate nutrition and veterinary care to their horses and cattle.  As a result, Cass County seized and boarded several of their animals at a significant cost to the county.  Although only five of those horses and cattle were ultimately deemed to be the subject of the defendants' cruelty, the appellate court affirmed the order requiring the Brownings to reimburse the county for boarding and caring for the horses and cattle during the proceedings totaling approximately $14,000 in fines and costs.  
Burgess v. Taylor   44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001)  

Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive.

 
Burns v. Leap   645 S.E.2d 751 (Ga.App., 2007)  

In this Georgia case, the plaintiff-invitee was knocked into a barbed wire fence by horse that was being boarded by the property owner, suffering injuries as a result. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's order of summary judgment, finding that, under dangerous-animal statute, the property owner did not know of any vicious propensity on part of horse. Further, the invitee failed to show that horse had a vicious propensity and therefore could not prevail on premises-liability claim.

 
Carl v. Resnick   714 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1999)   In this Illinois case, plaintiff Judy Carl was riding her horse on a trail in the Cook County Forest Preserve when the horse upon which defendant was riding pinned its ears back, turned its body toward plaintiff's horse, and kicked plaintiff and her horse. One hoof struck plaintiff's leg, causing her injury.  In interpreting the state's Equine Act, the court observed that plaintiff's complaint against defendant was not barred by the Equine Act unless plaintiff's recreational riding of her own horse on a public trail was one of the limited activities sought to be encouraged by the Act.  After determining that there was no conflict between the Illinois EALA and Animal Control Act, the court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for plaintiff on Count I as to liability under the Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/16 (West 1995)).
 
Carter v. Louisiana State University   520 S.O.2d 383 (La. 1988).   Plaintiff horse owner sought review by writ of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, State of Louisiana, which held in favor of defendants, a veterinarian and his insurer, in the owner's action for veterinary malpractice that had arisen from the amputation of a horse's tail. The court held defendants were not exculpated from liability under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2794 and La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2316, 2320, where the horse had his tail wrapped too tightly resulting in avascular necrosis from loss of blood supply, gangrene, and amputation. The court held in favor of the owner, reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court (including $34,000 in damages).  
Cavel Intern., Inc. v. Madigan   500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007)   The issue on appeal was whether Illinois' prohibition of horsemeat for human consumption was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  The court held that the statute was neither preempted nor in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause  
Clyncke v. Waneka   157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007)  

In this Colorado case, an inexperienced horse rider who was injured in fall from horse during a horse roundup, brought an action under the Colorado Equine Activities Statute against the owners of riding stable. The lower court, after a jury trial, entered a judgment for the stable owners. On appeal at the Supreme Court, the Court found that the Equine Statute places a two-pronged duty on sponsors; a sponsor is liable when he or she fails to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant's ability to engage in the equine activity or a participant's ability to manage a particular horse. Here, a new trial was in order because the result may have been different if court had properly instructed the jury regarding the exception from civil liability for the sponsor.

 
Cole v. Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc.   614 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 2000)  

Plaintiff, a licensed horse exercise rider sued the operator of a horse racing facility after he had been injured when he was thrown off a horse that he had been exercising, when the horse became spooked by a kite on the Defendant’s premises.  The court determined that the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA) did not offer protection of immunity to the Defendant because the exercising was found to be an activity in preparation for a horse race and the EALA does not apply to “horse race meetings.”  However, the Plaintiff had previously signed a release, which covered “all risks of any injury that the undersigned may sustain while on the premises,” therefore, the Defendant was released from liability of negligence.

 
Colorado Wild Horse and Burro Coalition, Inc. v. Salazar   639 F.Supp.2d 87 (D.D.C.,2009)   In this action, the plaintiffs (associations organized to protect wild horses and one equine veterinarian) challenged the decision of the BLM to remove all the wild horses from the West Douglas Herd Area in Colorado. Plaintiffs argued that the BLM's decision violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. Defendants countered that BLM's decision was a reasonable exercise of BLM's discretion and was thus entitled to Chevron deference. This Court held that BLM's decision to remove the West Douglas Herd exceeded the scope of authority that Congress delegated to it in the Wild Horse Act.  
Courbat v. Dahana Ranch, Inc.   141 P.3d 427 (Hawai'i, 2006)  

The cases concerns personal injuries sustained by one of the plaintiffs (Lisa) while she and her husband were on a horseback riding tour on the Dahana Ranch on the Big Island of Hawai'i. Prior to taking the ride, they signed waivers. The Courbats do not dispute that they both signed the Ranch's waiver form; rather, they assert that the Ranch's practice of booking ride reservations through an activity company, receiving payment prior to the arrival of the guest, and then, upon the guest's arrival at the Ranch, requiring the guest to sign a liability waiver as a precondition to horseback riding is an unfair and deceptive business practice. The question whether a waiver requirement would be materially important in booking a horseback tour remains one for the trier of fact. Because a genuine issue of material fact, resolvable only by the trier of fact, remains in dispute, the grant of summary judgment on the claim was erroneous the court held.

 
Cross v. State   646 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App. 1982).   "Necessary food" in the animal cruelty statute means food sufficient in both quantity and quality to sustain the animal in question.  
Davert v. Larson   209 Cal.Rptr. 445 (1985)  

On April 6, 1982, plaintiffs sued defendant Thomas Larson and others owned by defendant and others as tenants in common, for damages for negligence after plaintiffs' automobile collided with a horse.  On October 21, 1983, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment finding he owed no duty of care to plaintiffs as a landowner because his 1/2500th interest in the property was small and he exercised no control over the management of the property.  The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that tenants in common of real property who delegate the control and management of the property to a separate legal entity should not be immunized from liability to third parties in the case of common area torts.  The Court found that it was clear that considerations of public policy require that any departure from the common law rule of liability of individual owners of property in common cannot operate to the substantial detriment of third parties. 

 
David v. Lose   218 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio 1966)  
Syllabus by the Court
1. In order to establish a prima facie case against a bailee in an action sounding in contract, a bailor need prove only (1) the contract of bailment, (2) delivery of the bailed property to the bailee and (3) failure of the bailee to redeliver the bailed property undamaged at the termination of the bailment.
2. In an action by a bailor against a bailee based upon a breach of the contract of bailment, where the bailor proves delivery of the bailed property and the failure of the bailee to redeliver upon legal demand therefor, a prima facie case of want of due care is thereby established, and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the bailee to to explain his failure to redeliver. (Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658, followed.)
 
Dicesare v. Stout   1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796   The plaintiff was convicted under an Oklahoma anti-cruelty statute after officer seized his malnourished and neglected horses.  Later, plaintiff brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C 1983 claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.  The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim after it determined that a horse corral near a home was not protected by the Fourth Amendment where the area was used for pastureland and the fence enclosing the area did not and was not intended to prevent the public from viewing the area.       
DICKERSON v. BRITTINGHAM.   86 A. 106 (Del.Super. 1913)   In this Delaware case, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse, alleged to have been caused by the negligent driving by the defendant of his team. This resulted in a head-on collision, which caused the death of the horse days after. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that if the jury believed from the evidence presented that the defendant was driving without ordinary care, the verdict should stand for the plaintiff.  
Dillon v. Greenbriar Digging Service   919 So.2d 172 (Miss. 2005)   In this Mississippi case, a horse owner brought negligence action against digging service when one of his horses was found dead near a trench dug by the service; the service refused to compensate owner for the value of his horse. The lower court found in favor of the digging service. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court, finding that the digging service used reasonable care in digging and filling of horse owner's trench.  
Dodge v. Durdin   187 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-Hous. (1 Dist.), 2005)    Employee brought a negligence action against employer for injuries suffered when administering medicine to an untamed horse.  District Court granted summary judgment stating that the plaintiff was considered a "participant" under the Equine Act.  Plaintiff appealed.  Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case stating that the Equine Act did not apply because the Act covered consumers, not employees.   
Donald HENDRICK and Concerned Citizens for True Horse Protection, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (“USDA”), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“Aphis”), Defendants.   Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2900526 (W.D.Ky.)  

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of “soring” (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define “sore” and “scar” beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the “scar rule”). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact.

 
DOYLE v DEPUTY SHERIFF'S   758 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y.Sup. 2003)  

In this New York case, a minor child was injured when he was kicked by defendant's horse while defendant was in the process of the setting up a petting zoo at a picnic. The court was posed with the question of whether limited circumstances exist to support a negligence claim where a person is injured by a domestic animal and there is no proof of the animal's vicious propensities (the pony in this case never kicked anyone or showed any vicious propensities). The court answered the question in the affirmative. Here, defendant is subject to the enhanced duty of horse owners to young children. There were triable issues of fact as to defendant's negligence in the manner in which the horses were unloaded while in the presence of children that precluded summary judgment for defendant.

 
Drinkhouse v. Van Ness   260 P. 869 (1935)   Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover value of a horse that was wrongfully taken from them. The Court held that evidence was admissible to establish the value of the horse at the time of the wrongful taking to fix the damages amount. The peculiar value of the horse as a sire was established by evidence as to the horse’s racing history and to its progeny’s character and racing ability. Owners were entitled to recover damages for the reasonable value of the horse’s use during the period they were wrongfully deprived of it.  
Duncan v. State   975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012)   A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues.  The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  
Dunham v. Kootenai County   690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Idaho, 2010)   This matter involves the Defendant Kootenai County's motion for summary judgment this federal civil rights case filed by Dunham. The facts underlying the case stem from 2008, when county animal control officers went to Dunham's residence to investigate complaints of possible animal cruelty. During their investigation, Defendants entered Dunham's property to ascertain the condition of the horses residing there in a round-pen. Despite the conditions of the horses which necessitated their removal and relocation to an equine rescue facility, Dunham was ultimately charged and found not guilty of charges of animal cruelty. Dunham claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her property and seized her horses without a warrant. Defendants counter that the search was constitutional based on the open fields doctrine, and that the seizure was constitutional based on the plain view doctrine. Based on the open fields doctrine, the Court concluded that Dunham did not have an expectation of privacy in the searched area.  
Durocher v. Rochester Equine Clinic   629 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1993)   Plaintiff horse owner appealed from the orders of the Merrimack County Superior Court (New Hampshire), which dismissed his action for veterinarian malpractice for failure to designate an expert medical witness to prove that the owner's horse was permanently injured, and that defendant veterinarians' negligence caused such injury. On appeal, the court agreed that no medical expert testimony was necessary to determine whether a veterinarian was negligent in operating on the wrong animal. However, the court held that expert testimony was necessary to assist jurors in this case on the issues of causation and injury, and generally as to the standards of veterinary care.  
Eddleman v. U.S.   729 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mont.,1989)   An action was brought against the BLM under the Federal Tort Claims Act claiming that the government was negligent in failing to inform the adopters that they would not be eligible to receive title if they intended to sell the horses to slaughter. The court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, characterizing the issue as one sounding in contract, based upon the PMCA, and one that therefore should be brought before the U.S. Claims Court.    
Ellertson v. Dansie   576 P.2d 867 (Utah, 1978)  

In this Utah case, plaintiff sued the defendants for personal injuries he sustained in attempting to untangle the defendants' horse from a chain that he alleges the defendants negligently tied it to a post in their yard.  The Supreme Court held that plaintiff who, at defendant's request, entered upon defendants' land to help free horse which had become entangled in chain because of defendant's alleged negligence in tying the horse to the post, could not recover for his injuries since it was his knowing and voluntary conduct in going into a "plain-to-be-seen" danger.  The dissent found that defendants did owe a duty to plaintiff to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the manner in which they tied the horse.  The dissent found this case more analogous to those under a "rescue doctrine," where recovery is not barred based on the doctrine of assumption of risk or intervening cause. 

 
Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry   476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007)   The issue on appeal was whether Texas' prohibition of horsemeat for human consumption was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  The court held that the statute was not preempted or in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.   
Erie County Society ex rel. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Hoskins   91 A.D.3d 1354 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2012)   In this action, plaintiff animal society appeals from an order to return 40 horses to defendant after they were seized pursuant to a warrant. The issue of whether the Court has the authority to order return of animals to the original owner was raised for the first time on appeal. Despite the  procedural impropriety, the Court found plaintiff's contention without merit. The Court held that the return of the horses is based on principles of due process, not statutory authority.  
Eslin v. County of Suffolk   795 N.Y.S. 2d 349 (2005)  

A woman was horseback riding at a ranch in New York and was injured when she fell off the horse. The woman had signed a Horse Rental Agreement and Liability Release Form before the accident.  The court determined that the rider assumed the risk of injury and the lower court's decision to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment was reversed. 

 
Fackler v. Genetzky   595 N.W.2d 884 (Neb., 1999)  

Plaintiffs sued defendant for the death of their racehorses resulting from alleged veterinary malpractice.  The court held that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether veterinarian's actions comported with professional standard of care in treating racehorses precluded summary judgment.  However, the owners were not entitled to recover damages for their emotional distress as result of veterinarian's alleged negligent destruction of horses.  Nebraska law has generally regarded animals as personal property and emotional damages cannot be had for the negligent destruction of personal property.

 
Fallini v. Hodel   783 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986)   The Wild and Free-Roaming Horse Act does not require that wild horses be prevented from straying onto private land, only that they be removed if they do stray onto private land.    
Florice v. Brown   679 So.2d 501 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96)   In this Louisiana case, an inexperienced rider was thrown from a horse and sued the horse's owner for negligence and strict liability. After the lower court dismissed the claim, the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, this court held that the horse did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the rider such as to warrant imposing strict liability on the owner. The court noted that not every risk of injury posed by an animal represents an unreasonable risk. Here, the evidence established that the horse had a gentle disposition and the movement that caused the plaintiff to be thrown was not unusual or aggressive behavior but rather was simply "horse-like behavior."  
Folsom v. Barnett   306 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1957)  

Defendant-veterinarian sought appeal of a judgment against him for malpractice resulting from the injury to plaintiff’s thoroughbred colt that resulted in its destruction. The Court of Appeals held that an examination of the record revealed that sufficient evidence was produced to put in issue the question of whether appellant used such skill and attention as may ordinarily be expected of careful and skillful persons in his profession. Thus, the issue was correctly submitted to a jury.

 
Friedli v. Kerr   2001 WL 177184 (Tenn. 2001)  

This case involves two passengers who were injured when the horse-drawn carriage that they were riding in turned over after the horse was startled and the driver lost control of the horse.  The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the defendant’s carriage business was not immune from liability to its passengers under Tennessee’s equine liability statute.  There were three reasons for this decision:  1) the defendant is not an “equine activity sponsor,” 2) his business is not an “equine activity,” and 3) the plaintiffs were not “participants” engaging in an “equine activity” when they were injured.

 
FRITTS v. NEW YORK & N. E. R. CO.   62 Conn. 503, 26 A. 347 (1893)  

Plaintiff's action results from defendant's alleged negligence in blowing the train whistle in a excessive manner such that it cause plaintiff's horses to run away with the plaintiff's carriage. There was judgment for plaintiff in a less sum than he thought he was entitled to, and both parties appeal. In reversing the lower court's decision, this court found that the lessened market value of the horses in consequence of the runaway was a proximate and legitimate element of damage.

 
Frye v. County of Butte   221 Cal.App.4th 1051 (2013), 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 928 (2013)   After several administrative, trial court, and appeals hearings, the California court of appeals upheld a county’s decision to seize the plaintiffs’ horses for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 597.1(f).  Notably, the appeals court failed to extend the law of the case, which generally provides that a prior appellate court ruling on the law governs further proceedings in the case, to prior trial court rulings. The appeals court also held that the trial court’s "Statement of Decision" resolved all issues set before it, despite certain remedies remaining unresolved and the court’s oversight of the plaintiffs' constitutionality complaint, and was therefore an appealable judgment. The appeals court also found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend the appeals deadline with its document titled "Judgment."  
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management   460 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006)   The Bureau of Land Management has responsibility for managing the numbers of horses and burros under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The Bureau issued a memorandum detailing how it was going to remove excess horses and burros from public land, and acted on that memorandum by removing some horses from public lands.  Several non-profit groups sued, and the court found that it could not judge the memo because the Bureau had not made any final agency action and because the memo was only to be in force for a temporary time. Additionally, because the Bureau was simply acting according to its mandate under the Act, the court found for the Bureau.  
Gabriel v. Lovewell   164 S.W.3d 835 (Texas, 2005)  

A Texas horse owner brought action against horse farm for negligence and breach of implied warranty in connection with the death of a horse in care of horse farm. On appeal of a decision in favor of the horse owner, the Court of Appeals held that by asking veterinarian if veterinarian told the horse owner that the horse died because it was not brought to veterinary clinic soon enough, the horse farm opened the door, and thus, the previously-rejected hearsay testimony regarding horse owner's conversation with veterinarian was admissible for limited purpose of impeaching veterinarian's testimony. Thus, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

 
Geary v. Sullivan County Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc.   815 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y., 2006)  

In this New York case, plaintiffs surrendered their maltreated horse to defendant Sullivan County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. on March 4, 2005. Shortly thereafter, they commenced this action seeking return of the horse and damages, including punitive damages. Defendants' answer failed to respond to all paragraphs of the 38-paragraph complaint, which included six causes of action, prompting plaintiffs to move for summary judgment on the ground that defendants admitted "all" essential and material facts. At oral argument before this Court, plaintiffs' counsel consented to defendants filing an amended answer. The court found that since this amended pleading will presumably contain denials to all contested allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs' request for summary judgment on the procedural ground that defendants' failed to deny certain facts must fail. Moreover, as correctly noted by Supreme Court, conflicting evidence precludes summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor.

 
Gibson v. Donahue   722 N.E.2d 646(2002)  

Plaintiff was injured when she was thrown from her horse while she was riding her horse in a city field.  Plaintiff sued Defendant for her injuries because she was thrown from her horse after the horse was startled by the Defendant’s dogs, which were chasing the horse.  The Defendant claimed that she was immune from liability under Ohio’s Equine Activity Liability Act.  However, in this case of first impression, the court found that the EALA did not apply to Defendant because Plaintiff was not engaged in an “equine activity” at the time of the injury and the statute is not meant to apply to all third parties involved in an accident in which an equine was present.

 
Granger v. Folk   931 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App. 1996).   The State allows for two methods of protecting animals from cruelty: through criminal prosecution under the Penal Code or through civil remedy under the Health & Safety Code.  
Gromer v. Matchett   --- S.W.3d ----, 2010 WL 3467727 (Mo.App. S.D.)   In this Missouri case, the defendant-farmer appeals an award of $12,250 to plaintiff-motorist, whose vehicle was struck by another vehicle after a horse coming from defendant's farm collided with the first vehicle. Defendant asserts that the Stock Law (Section 270.010) was inappropriately applied to him where he did not own the livestock (the horse) in question. Since plaintiff relied on the language of the Stock Law, which unambiguously refers only to "owners," in submitting her verdict directing instruction that allowed her to recover damages without proof of Defendant's negligence, the case must be reversed and remanded. This cause was Ordered Transferred to Mo.S.Ct. November 16, 2010.  
Haberman v. United States   26 Cl. Ct. 1405 (1992)   The U.S. Claims Court upheld its jurisdiction over an action brought by individuals who had their Private Maintenance and Care Agreements (PMCA) revoked by the Bureau of Land Management and their adopted wild horses repossessed when the agency learned that the individuals intended to sell the horses to slaughter once they obtained full legal title to them under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act.  The court found that the PMCA agreement constituted a contract between the government and the adopter, and thus that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Though the court noted that individual adopters would have to overcome the suggestion that they violated the terms of the PMCA by intending to sell the horses to slaughter.    
Habitat for Horses v. Salazar   745 F.Supp.2d 438 (S.D.N.Y., 2010)   Prior to October 2010, the North Piceance Herd Area served as a home to approximately 60 wild horses. The horses, however, were removed by the BLM, giving rise to this litigation. Plaintiffs assert that the BLM’s decision to remove the wild horses violates the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, NEPA, the Information Quality Act, and the FLPMA. The District Court concluded that, while Plaintiffs did establish irreparable harm, they were not likely to succeed on the merits.  
Hatahley v. United States   351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745 (1956)  

In the case of Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), a group of Navajo Indians living in Utah sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act, to recover the confiscation and destruction of horses and burros that were kept as pets and uniquely valued to the owners. The federal agents confiscated these animals and then sold them to a glue factory. The petitioners vehemently argued that these horses had unique and sentimental value to them, and served as a means of income to yield crops. Although the government agents argued that they were authorized to engage in this taking pursuant to the Utah Abandoned Horse Slaughter Act, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court awarded the petitioners a judgment of $100,000 based on the fair market value, consequential damages for deprivation of use, and “mental pain and suffering” of the petitioners. The decision was reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to assess damages with sufficient particularity.

 
Hoffa v. Bimes   954 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Super.,2008)   This case arises from the treatment of plaintiff's horse by the defendant-veterinarian. This appeal arises from plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting a compulsory non-suit in favor of defendant finding that the Veterinary Immunity Act bars claims against veterinarians except those based upon gross negligence. This court agreed with the lower court that defendant was confronted with an emergency medical condition such as to fall under the protections of the Act. Further, this court held that the trial court committed no error in concluding that plaintiff's consent was not required before the veterinarian performed the abdominal tap because that procedure was rendered under an 'emergency situation.'  
Humane Society of U.S. v. Johanns   Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1120404 (D.D.C.)   In this case, plaintiffs alleged that by creating a fee-for-service ante-mortem horse slaughter inspection system without first conducting any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), has violated NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) implementing regulations, abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). At the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, horses were slaughtered at three different foreign-owned facilities in the United States to provide horse meat for human consumption abroad and for use in zoos and research facilities domestically. The instant case pertains to the web of legislation and regulations pertaining to the inspection of such horses prior to slaughter. Based on the Court's finding of a NEPA violation, the Court declared the Interim Final Rule to be in violation of the APA and NEPA, vacated the Interim Final Rule, permanently enjoined the FSIS from implementing the Interim Final Rule, and dismissed this case. This present action is defendant-intervenor Cavel International, Inc's Emergency Motion for a Stay of the Court's March 28, 2007 Order. The Court notes that as of the Court's March 28, 2007 Order, Cavel was the only facility still in operation processing horsemeat for human consumption. The Court finds that a stay of its March 28, 2007 Order would not be in the public interest, and particularly in light of Cavel's failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and adequately demonstrate irreparable injury, the Court finds that a balancing of the factors enumerated above supports denying Cavel's request for a stay.   
In Defense of Animals v. Salazar   675 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C., 2009)   In this case, the Plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals, Craig C. Downer, and Terri Farley, attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction that would stop the defendants, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and representatives of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management (“the Bureau”), from implementing a plan to capture or gather approximately 2,700 wild horses located in western Nevada (“gather plan”).  The plaintiffs contended that the gather plan had to be set aside pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., because the Bureau did not have the statutory authority to carry out the gather plan, and because the plan did not comply with the terms of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horse Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq.  The Court denied the Plaintiffs request for an injunction.   
In Defense of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Interior   648 F.3d 1012 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2011)   Plaintiff animal non-profits filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction to stop the government from rounding up, destroying, and auctioning off wild horses and burros in the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's actions violated the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. However, the initial phase of the plan sought to be enjoined (the roundup) had taken place. The court held that the interlocutory appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction was moot because the roundup had already taken place.  
In re Tavalario   --- A.2d ----, 2006 WL 1735225 (N.J.Super.A.D.)   This appeal presents a challenge by Anthony Tavalario to the manner in which the State Agricultural Development Committee (SADC) determines whether keeping horses on property constitutes a "commercial" agricultural operation that exempts the property from local zoning and other land use restrictions as the result of the preemptive force of the Right to Farm Act, N.J.S.A. 4:1C-1 to -10.4. The SADC found that Tavalario's use of the land did not qualify for protection under the Act, because he could not demonstrate that, as of July 3, 1998, his operation produced "agricultural or horticultural products worth $2,500 or more annually" as required by the definitional section of the Act. Tavalario contends on appeal that the SADC erred because it failed to consider as income in 1998 uncollected stud fees, the imputed value of a horse sold as a broodmare in 2002 for $8,000 and another horse sold in 2003 for $5,400, and race winnings of an undisclosed amount allegedly awarded at an unspecified time after 1998. The court found no grounds for reversal of the SADC's interpretation of the production requirements of the definition of "commercial farm" found in N.J.S.A. 4:1C-3 or its application to Tavalario's case.  
Jenkins v. State   262 P.3d 552 (Wyo.,2011)   Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Defendant appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to a reversal, because he failed to demonstrate that his counsel failed to render reasonably competent assistance that prejudiced him to such an extent that he was deprived of a fair trial. The Court held that it was not ineffective assistance to 1) fail to object to testimony regarding defendant's arrest and incarceration, and 2) fail to object to defendant's brother testifying while wearing a striped prison suit.  
JONES v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO.   13 S.W. 416 (Ark.1890)  

This involved an action by R. D. Jones against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, claiming $2,000 damages,--$1,000 for the value of a colt killed by defendant's train, and $1,000 damages for not posting notice of the killing as required by the statute. The court looked at areas in the market outside of the locality since local information on the colt’s market value was not available. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment due to a lack in plaintiff's proofs at trial.

 
Kangas v. Perry   620 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 2000)  

Plaintiff, a passenger of a horse-drawn sled sued the owner of the property on which the accident occurred, as well as the owner of the horses and the sled for the injuries she suffered when thrown from the sled.  The Court of Appeals found that the equine immunity statute provided protection for the owner of the horse against tort liability.  The plain language of the statute provides that immunity from civil liability is available to all persons, “including an equine activity sponsor or equine professional…”; thus, protection is not limited only to those who are sponsors or professionals, rather they are examples of types of people to whom the statute applies.

 
Kankey v. State   2013 Ark. App. 68, Not Reported in S.W.3d (Ark.App.,2013)  

A district court found the appellant’s animals had been lawfully seized, and then divested appellant of ownership of the animals and vested custody to the American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). The appellant filed an appeal in the civil division of the circuit court, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal as untimely and not properly perfected. Upon another appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found it had no jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the case.

 
Kinara v. Jamaica Bay Riding Academy, Inc.   783 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y., 2004)   Plaintiff was kicked by a horse ridden by her friend while trail riding.  Plaintiff sued the Defendant who owned the horse and trail Plaintiff was riding on.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding Plaintiff assumed the risk.  
King v. CJM Country Stables   315 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D. Hawaii, 2004)   Horseback rider was bitten during a trail ride and brought suit in personal injury.  After removal to Federal Court, the Court held that Hawaii's recreational activity liability statute was applicable and that summary judgment was not appropriate.  Motion for summary judgment denied.  
Kleppe v. New Mexico   426 U.S. 529 (1976)   The state of New Mexico challenged the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act after they were ordered by the U.S. government to recover several wild horses they had rounded up from public lands within their state and sold at auction in violation of the WFRHBA.  The Supreme Court upheld the Act, finding it to be a valid exercise of federal power under the Article IV Property Clause of, which gave Congress the power to protect wildlife on state lands, state law notwithstanding.   
Klobnak v. Wildwood Hills, Inc.   688 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2004)   Plaintiffs brought suit against a ranch after their car struck two of the ranch's horses on the highway.  The trial court dismissed holding no duty of care was breached by the ranch because Iowa no longer had a statute prohibiting animals from roaming.  The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed reasoning that a duty of ordinary care still exists.  
Kush v. Wentworth   790 N.E.2d 912 (Ill.App. 2003)  

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for violation of the Animal Control Act and alleged negligence due to the broken leg that the Plaintiff suffered after she was kicked by Defendant’s horse while trying to pass the horse on a group ride.  At the time of the accident, the defendant was neither an “equine activity sponsor” nor an “equine professional” according to the Act.  The issue was whether the Act applied only to those two groups of people, and the court held that the Act does not preclude negligence liability for persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals.

 
Lacy v. U.S.   2008 WL 2178099 (6th Cir.)   The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration. Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known. While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of  the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness.  
Ladnier v. Hester   98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012)   Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.
 
Ladnier v. Hester   98 So.3d 1074 (Miss.App., 2011)   Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part, and 3) motorist produced no circumstantial evidence that would imply negligence, such as a dilapidated fence. This judgment was Reversed by Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012).  
Ladnier v. Norwood   781 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986).   Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial.  
LaPlace v. Briere   962 A.2d 1139 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2009)  
In this New Jersey case, a horse owner brought an action against the person who exercised his horse while the horse was being boarded at the defendant's stable. While the stable employee was "lunging" the horse, the horse reared up, collapsed on his side with blood pouring from his nostrils, and then died. On appeal of summary judgment for the defendant, the court held that the person who exercised horse could not be liable under the tort of conversion as she did not exercise such control and dominion over the horse that she seriously interfered with plaintiff's ownership rights in the horse. While the court found that a bailment relationship existed, the plaintiff failed to come forward with any additional evidence that established the horse was negligently exercised or that the exercise itself was a proximate cause of its death. The grant of summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed.
 
Lessman v. Rhodes   721 N.E.2d 178(1999)  

Plaintiff, a participant in a horse show, was injured when a stallion bucked and kicked him; he sued the show’s sponsor, and the stallion’s rider and owner alleging negligent and willful and wanton misconduct, by failing to conduct background checks into the horses and by failing to separate the stallions participating in the show, inter alia.  The Equine Activity Liability Act, which was established to shield those persons who participate in equine activities from liability, provides an exception to the general rule by permitting liability for equine activity sponsors that commit “an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury.”  In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that showed that the defendants behaved in a reckless or intentional manner, therefore the summary judgment in favor of the defendant entered by the trial court was founded to be proper.

 
Lindauer v. LDB Drainlaying, Inc.   555 P.2d 197 (Colo.App. 1976)  
In this Colorado case, the owners of a thoroughbred racehorse brought a negligence action to recover for injuries to his horse against the corporation that  installed underground pipe on property leased by plaintiffs. The lower court entered judgment on a verdict awarding damages to plaintiffs. On appeal, this court held that the evidence of negligence and contributory negligence was sufficient for jury where defendant physically left an unfinished project for two months where the horse was injured. Defendant still owed a duty of care that it would have owed as contractor. However, plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for care and feeding of injured horse.
 
Macho v. Mahowald   374 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.App.,1985)   In this Minnesota case, a rider brought an action for personal injuries suffered after the defendant-owner's horse bolted while the rider was mounting the horse. The lower court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the owner. The rider appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence showing that the horse had previously bolted was sufficient to create an issue for the jury as to whether the horse had a propensity to be dangerous. Further, with regard to whether the owner was negligent in allowing the rider to mount without properly adjusting the saddle equipment, the court found that the jury could have properly found both parties were negligent in failing to adjust the stirrups.  
Matter of Ricco v Corbisiero   565 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1991)   Petitioner harness race-horse driver was suspended by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, Harness Racing Division for 15 days for failing to drive his horse to the finish. The driver argued that whipping the horse had not improved his performance. Considering that the horse had equaled his best time, and had lost by only two feet, and that it would have been a violation of the New York anti-cruelty law (Agriculture and Markets Law ( § 353) to overdrive the horse, the court overturned the suspension.  
McClendon v. Story County Sheriff's Office   403 F.3d 510 (8th Cir. 2005)  

A farmer was neglecting her horses and the entire herd confiscated by animal control officers.  The farmer brought a section 1983 claim against the animal control officers for acting outside of the scope of their warrant by removing more than just the sick horses.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in part, holding the animal control officers were entitled to qualified immunity and seizure of all the horses was not unreasonable or outside the scope of the warrant. 

 
McDermott v. Carie, LLC   329 Mont. 295 (Mt. 2005)   Plaintiff, after signing waiver of liability release, severed his finger while untying the horse from a fence. Though the waiver was illegal, defendants were allowed to enter a redacted release into evidence to show that the plaintiff was aware that equine activities were inherently dangerous. Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the document and that because plaintiff had failed to object to the release during trial and voir dire, he waived his right to appeal.  
McGraw v. R and R Investments, Ltd.   877 So.2d 886 (Fl. 2004)   Plaintiff was injured when she was thrown from defendant's horse.  The Circuit Court granted summary judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed.  The District Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of first impression, the defendant's failure to provide the statutorily required notice warning of its non-liability for injuries resulting from an inherent risks of equine activities disqualified the defendant from statutory immunity from civil liability for the injuries.  Reversed and remanded.  
Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals   Slip Copy, 2012 WL 4932046 (E.D. Penn.)  

After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts.

 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel   799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986)   Horses protected by the Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act are not instruments of the federal government, and therefore incursions by wild horses onto private land do not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking requiring just compensation.    
Murrell v. Hooter   892 So.2d 680 (5th Cir., 2004)   A champion jumping horse was struck and killed by a van after escaping through an open gate.  The horse owner sued the property owners for negligence and the trial court granted defendants' summary judgment.  The Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding the defendants were not entitled to immunity under the Equine Immunity Statute.  
Nationwide Horse Carriers, Inc. v. Johnston   519 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.,1974)   A pregnant mare was injured during transport and lost her foal. The owner sued carrier for damages. The Court of Civil Appeals held that horse owner was not entitled to recover damages for loss of mare’s unborn foal; that award for mare's diminished ability to produce healthy foals was excessive in light of fact that she subsequently produced a foal that survived; and that horse owner was not entitled to attorney fees since the horse was considered freight.  
Nigro v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc.   93 A.D.3d 647 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2012)   An experienced exercise rider sued the owner of a race track seeking damages for personal injury after the horse she was riding fell on her while crossing a gravel-strewn asphalt road. The Supreme Court held that the rider assumed the risk that the horse might fall by choosing to cross the road despite being aware of the danger. The doctrine of “primary assumption of the risk” applied, and the owner of the premises was not at fault.  
Pagel v. Yates   471 N.E.2d 946 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,1984)   Horse owner sued breeder for negligence and conversion after breeder returned the wrong mare. On issue of damages, Appellate Court held that evidence was insufficient to support the jury award because 1) evidence of value of mare’s offspring four years after conversion was irrelevant and prejudicial; 2) trial court's instruction to jury allowed recovery for the horse's unborn offspring as well as fair market value of horse in foal, which permitted a double recovery; and 3) owner could not recover his expenses after he learned of switch and made no effort to resolve the problem because he had duty to avoid further loss.  
Parker v. Parker   195 P.3d 428 (Or.App.,2008)   Plaintiff and his 12 year-old quarter horse were visiting defendant at defendant's property when defendant's dog rushed at the horse causing it to run into a steel fence. The horse suffered severe head trauma, which necessitated its later euthanization. Plaintiff filed suit for damages asserting liability under common law negligence and O.R.S. 609.140(1) - the statute that allows an owner to recover double damages where livestock is injured due to being injured, chased, or killed by another person's dog. The appellate court agreed with plaintiff that O.R.S. 609.140(1) creates an statutory cause of action independent from negligence. Further, the court found that plaintiff fell within the class of persons the statute aims to protect because the legislature did not intend to limit the statute's application to property owned by the livestock's owner.  
People v Arcidicono   360 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1974)   The defendant was properly convicted of cruelty when a horse in his custody and care had to be destroyed due to malnutrition. The defendant was in charge of feeding the gelding, and was aware of his loss of weight. He knew the diet was inadequate but failed to provide more food. The defendant was guilty of violating Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for failing to provide proper sustenance to the horse.   
People v. Arcidicono   75 Misc. 2d 294 ((N.Y.Dist.Ct. 1973)   The court held the bailee of a horse liable for failing to provide necessary sustenance to the horse, even though the owner of the horses had refused to pay for the necessary feed.   
People v. Henderson   765 N.W.2d 619 (Mich.App.,2009)   The court of appeals held the owner of 69 emaciated and neglected horses liable under its animal cruelty statute, even though the owner did not have day-to-day responsibility for tending to the horses.  
People v. Johnson   305 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. 1981)  

Defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of cruelty to animals, arguing that there was not proof that the horses were under his charge or custody.  While the court agreed and reversed his conviction because he could not be convicted under the statute merely as the owner of the horses, absent proof of his care or custody of the horses, it further explained that the "owner or otherwise" statutory language was designed to punish cruelty to animals without regard to ownership.  For more, see Detailed Discussion.

 
People v. Koogan   256 A.D. 1078 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939)   Defendant was guilty of cruelty to animals for allowing a horse to be worked he knew was in poor condition.  
People v. Lohnes   --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2013 WL 6670466 (N.Y. App. Div., 2013)   After breaking into a barn and stabbing a horse to death, the defendant plead guilty to charges of aggravated cruelty to animals; burglary in the third degree; criminal mischief in the second degree; and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals. On appeal, the court found a horse could be considered a companion animal within New York's aggravated cruelty statute if the horse was not a farm animal raised for commercial or subsistence purposes and the horse was normally maintained in or near the household of the owner or the person who cared for it. The appeals court also vacated and remitted the sentence imposed on the aggravated cruelty charge because the defendant was entitled to know that the prison term was not the only consequence of entering a plea.  
People v. Minney   119 N.W. 918 (Mich. 1909)  

Defendant was convicted of mutilating the horse of another.  He argued on appeal that the trial court's jury instructions, which read that malice toward the owner of the horse was not necessary, were incorrect.  The court agreed and found that although the general malice of the law of crime is sufficient to support the offense, the trial court must instruct that malice is an essential element of the offense.  For more, see Detailed Discussion.

 
People v. O'Rourke   83 Misc.2d 175 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct. 1975)   The owner of a horse was guilty of cruelty to animals for continuing to work a horse he knew was limping. The court found that defendant owner was aware that the horse was unfit for labor, and was thus guilty of violating N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 353 for continuing to work her.  
People v. Peters   79 A.D.3d 1274(N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2010)   A veterinarian was convicted of animal cruelty and sentenced to three years of probation based upon his alleged unjustifiable failure under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 to provide a mare and her foal with necessary sustenance, food and drink in September 2005. After conviction by jury, the lower court denied defendant-veterinarian's motion to vacate judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that while defendant failed to preserve his challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In particular, the court found that the expert testimony contradicted the evidence that the foal was mistreated.  
People v. Proehl (unpublished)   Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2011 WL 2021940 (Mich.App.)  

Defendant was convicted of failing to provide adequate care to 16 horses. On appeal, Defendant first argued that, to him, nothing appeared to be wrong with his horses and, consequently, no liability can attach. The court disagreed, explaining: "Defendant's personal belief that his horses were in good health . . . was therefore based on fallacy, and has no effect on his liability under the statute." Defendant also maintained that he is an animal hoarder, which is a "psychological condition" that mitigates his intent. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that Defendant’s "hoarding" contention is based upon a non-adopted bill which, in any event, fails to indicate whether animal hoarding may serve as a proper defense.

 
People v. Tessmer   137 N.W. 214 (Mich. 1912)   Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing the horse of another.  Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because there was no proof of malice toward the owner of the horse.  The court held that the general malice of the law of crime was sufficient to support the conviction.  For more, see Detailed Discussion.  
Peterson v. Eichhorn   189 P.3d 615 (Mont., 2008)  

In this Montana case, the plaintiff brought claims for negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous domestic animal, and punitive damages against the defendant horse owner. She alleged that defendant's horse bit her while she was on land defendant used for pasturing the horse that adjoined her land. After the lower court granted summary judgment to the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court held that even though the Montana Supreme Court has not adopted the provision of the Second Restatement of Torts regarding an animal owner's strict liability for injury caused by an abnormally dangerous domestic animal, this was not the test case to do it. The court found that Peterson failed to produce any evidence or legal authority that the horse's biting constituted a “dangerous propensity abnormal to her class” to bring her under the Restatement's strict liability.

 
Phillips v. North Carolina State University   697 S.E.2d 433 (N.C.App.,2010)   University operated a horse breeding management facility. Industrial Commission found that University was negligent in broodmare's death that occurred during transport. The Court of Appeals held that mare’s owners were entitled to lost profit for a single breeding cycle.  
Pine v. State   889 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App. 1994).   Mens rea in cruelty conviction may be inferred from circumstances. With regard to warrantless seizure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure when there is a need to act immediately to protect and preserve life (i.e. "emergency doctrine").  
Posnien v. Rogers   533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975)  

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers.  The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community.

 
Qaddura v. State   2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1493   The court held that the owner of livestock who placed them in the care of his tenant while he was on vacation for a month, but failed to provide his tenant with enough food for the livestock could be found guilty under the animal cruelty statute.    
Reams v. Irvin   561 F.3d 1258 (C.A.11 (Ga.),2009)  

On Plaintiff’s civil rights § 1983 action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Agriculture, based on the impoundment of forty-six horses and three donkeys from Plaintiff’s property following an investigation into potential violations of the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act (the “Act”), Plaintiff appealed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of her equines, adequate notice of Plaintiff’s right to and procedure for requesting a hearing, and adequate post-deprivation process. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal in light of the State’s compliance with the standards and procedures for inspection and impoundment prescribed by the Act, that the statutory notice of the right to contest the impoundment was reasonably calculated to provide Plaintiff with notice of her right to a hearing, and that the Act provided adequate power to review and to remedy violations of due process.

 
Reams v. Irvin   Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 906005 (N.D.Ga.)   The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C 1983 action against police officers she claimed violated her civil rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they impounded 46 of her horses on suspicion of animal abuse.  Upon a summary judgement motion by the defendants, the court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims.  Responding to the Fourth Amendment claim in particular, the court held that an old dairy barn, which was being used to hide dead horses, was neither within the curtilage of the home nor protected by the Fourth Amendment.  After applying the Dunn factors, the court determined that the barns distance of 150 yards from the dwelling on the farm, its use for the commercial production of dairy products, its lacks of enclosure, and its missing doors all militated against it being part of the curtilage of the home and it did not enjoy Fourth Amendment privacy protection.  
Reed v. Vickery   Slip Copy, 2009 WL 3276648 (S.D.Ohio)   A veterinarian performed a pre-purchase examination on a horse and indicated to the prospective buyers that the horse was in good health. The vet facility failed to disclose that a different vet at the same facility had injected the horse to mask lameness. The purchasers had a cause of action for negligence where the statements made by the facility constituted misrepresentations or concealment. The measure of damages was the difference between the horse’s fair market value before and after the loss.  
Roach v. Jackson County   949 P.2d 1227 (Or. 1997)   This is an appeal of a county board and circuit court decision ordering destruction of a dog for chasing livestock.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision and held that the dog must be killed in a humane manner.  
Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mendon   940 N.E.2d 891 (Ma. App., 2011)   A zoning board granted landowner’s application for a special permit, and neighbor property owners appealed. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that defendant’s proposed use of land for horse stables fit within the agricultural use exception of the zoning ordinance and by-laws, and that plaintiffs had standing to enforce a deed restriction on defendant’s property.  
Scharer v. San Luis Rey Equine Hosp., Inc.   147 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.)   Horse owner sued veterinarians and equine hospital for professional malpractice after horse was euthanized less than two months after surgery to remove horse’s ovaries. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants based on the one-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that equitable tolling did not apply because plaintiff was not prevented from pursuing her claim in a timely manner by the defendants or the court. A provision in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act extending the statute of limitations by 90 days did not apply absent a claim for personal injury or wrongful death to a person.  
Silver v. State   23 A.3d 867 (Md. App., 2011)   Defendants were sentenced by the District Court after pleading guilty to one count of animal cruelty. After defendants were convicted in the Circuit Court, they petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court could order that defendants pay restitution for the euthanasia cost for the deceased horse, but it was beyond the court’s authority to order defendants pay restitution for costs of caring for the two surviving horses because defendants had not been convicted in those cases. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike officer's testimony for prosecutor's failure to provide the officer's written report prior to trial. Finally, photos and testimony regarding the surviving horses were “crime scene” evidence and not inadmissible “other crimes” evidence because the neglect of the surviving horses was part of the same criminal episode.  
Smith v. Lane   832 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2005)  

In this Illinois case, the passenger of horse-drawn carriage brought action in negligence and strict liability against driver of carriage and owner of horse and carriage for injuries passenger received when carriage went off road and overturned. The lower court dismissed all of passenger's counts.  On appeal, the Appellate Court held that, as matter of first impression, the passenger was not subject to provisions of EALA, and the alleged facts sufficient to state cause of action under state Animal Control Act.

 
Southall v. Gabel   293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972)  

This action was brought by plaintiff as owner of a 3 year old thoroughbred race horse, named Pribal, against defendant, a veterinarian, charging defendant so mishandled the horse that it sustained physical injuries and emotional trauma; that the emotional stability of the horse worsened until finally it was exterminated. The court held that the evidence failed to show any proximate cause between the surgery that was performed on the horse and the subsequent care and transport of the horse by the veterinarian. 

As the court stated, what caused Pribal to become mean and a "killer" is speculative; the O.S.U. Veterinary Clinic records in evidence did not indicate any causal relationship between the handling of Pribal by the defendant and the subsequent personality change resulting in Pribal becoming a "killer horse."

 
Southall v. Gabel   277 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio App. 1971)   This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner.  Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.'  Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded - See, 293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972).  
Stanton v. State   --- S.W.3d ----, 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013)   The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.  
State ex rel. Griffin v. Thirteen Horses   Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 1828459 (Conn.Super.)   Defendant's horses were seized on December 14, 2005 pursuant to a search and seizure warrant signed by the court. The warrant was sought, in part, on affidavits that alleged possible violations of the Cruelty to Animals statutory provisions. Defendant Rowley filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction because the state has failed to comply with the provisions of § 22-329a and because the search and seizure warrant is invalid. Specifically, defendant maintains that the phrase in subsection (a) authorizing the chief animal control officer to "lawfully take charge of any animal found neglected or cruelly treated" merely allows the officer to enter the owner's property to care for the animal, but does not authorize seizure of the animal without a prior judicial determination. This court rejected Rowley's interpretation of the phrase "lawfully take charge." The court found that, as a practical matter, it is inconceivable that animal control officers, having found animals that are neglected or cruelly treated, would then leave them at the property.  
State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell   2005 WL 957908 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005)  

A trial court granted a local humane society permission to humanely dispose of horses placed in their custody by the Sheriff.  A man filed petition for a writ of mandamus against the the trial judge and humane society to challenge the judge's order.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Humane Society of Missouri. Opinion transferred to State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell, 167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo., 2005).

 
State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell   167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo., 2005)  

Police seized 120 neglected horses pursuant to a search warrant and a Circuit Court Judge allowed humane societies to dispose of the horses.  The owner of the horses sought a writ of mandamus against the Circuit Court Judge.  The Missouri Supreme Court held the Circuit Court Judge had jurisdiction to permit the seized horses to be disposed of and the impoundment statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

 
State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell   167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo. 2005)   After a judge granted two humane societies permission to dispose of nearly 120 severely emaciated and malnourished horses, the horses' owner, instead of posting a bond or security, filed for a writ of mandamus with the court of appeals. The appeals court issued a stop order and transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. Here, the horses’ owner argued two points, but the Missouri Supreme Court found that (1) the spoliation of evidence doctrine does not apply at this juncture and that (2) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, nor does the owner allege that the statute discriminates based upon classification or that the statute discriminates in its application so as to violate the equal protection clause. The stop order was therefore dissolved and the petition for the writ of mandamus was denied.  
State of Washington v. Zawistowski   82 P.3d 698 (Wash. 2004)   Defendants were convicted of animal cruelty with regard to underweight and malnourished horses.  The Superior Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a jury finding, and the State appealed.  Held:  reversed.  
State v. Branstetter   29 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2001)   In a state prosecution for animal neglect, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the animals to a humane agency. An appeal by the owner of the animals was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the statutes controlling appealable judgments allowed the animal owner to appeal the forfeiture of the animals.  
State v. Davidson   Slip Copy, 2006 WL 763082 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1458   In this Ohio case, defendant was convicted of 10 counts of cruelty to animals resulting from her neglect of several dogs and horses in her barn.  On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient where the prosecution witness did not state the dogs were "malnourished" and said that a couple were reasonably healthy.  The appellate court disagreed, finding that defendant mischaracterized the veterinarian's testimony and that there was no requirement to prove malnourishment.  Further, the dog warden testified that she did not find any food or water in the barn and that the animals' bowls were covered with mud and feces.  
State v. Fessenden   --- P.3d ----, 2013 WL 5352270 (Or.App., 2013)  

This Oregon case considers, as an issue of first impression, whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to animals in need of immediate assistance. Defendant appealed her conviction for second-degree animal neglect (ORS 167.325) based on the condition of her horse. The court found that the emergency aid exception extends to nonhuman animals when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals which are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or cruel death. Here, the deputy sheriff found that the horse was more emaciated than any other horse he had ever seen and there were signs of possible organ failure.

 
State v. Goodall   175 P. 857 (Or. 1918)   This case involved an appeal from this conviction. The trial court found that the defendant rode the animal while it had a deep ulcerated cut on its back, and supplied it with insufficient food. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.  
State v. Gruntz   --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 403932 (Or.App.,2012)   Defendant moved to suppress evidence after being charged with multiple counts of animal neglect. The Court of Appeals held that the warrant affidavit permitted reasonable inference that neglect continued to exist at time of warrant application. The warrant affiant stated her observations four months prior to the warrant application that horses appeared to be malnourished and severely underweight.  
State v. Kelso   689 P.2d 1307 (1984)   Appeal from a district court decision relating to mental state requirements of an animal owner.  The Court of Appeals reversed a district court finding which required a higher mental state than negligence in violation of a statute which provides that the owner or custodian of an animal or livestock shall not "permit" animal to run at large. The Court of Appeals found that the offense does not require a culpable mental state.  
State v. Nix   283 P.3d 442 (Or.App., 2012)  
Upon receiving a tip that animals were being neglected, police entered a farm and discovered several emaciated animals, as well as many rotting animal carcasses. After a jury found the defendant guilty of 20 counts of second degree animal neglect, the district court, at the sentencing hearing, only issued a single conviction towards the defendant. The state appealed and argued the court should have imposed 20 separate convictions based on its interpretation of the word "victims" in ORS 161.067(2). The appeals court agreed. The case was remanded for entry of separate convictions on each guilty verdict. 
 
State v. Peterson   --- P.3d ----, 2013 WL 2156837 (Wa. Ct. App.)  
In this case, defendant appeals six counts of first degree animal cruelty charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the statute she was convicted under, RCW 16.52.205(6), was unconstitutionally vague; that (2) starvation and dehydration were alternative means of committing first degree animal cruelty and that (3) there was no substantial evidence supporting the horses suffered from dehydration. The defendant also argued that the Snohomish Superior court had no authority to order her to reimburse the county for caring for her horses. The appeals court, however, held that RCW 16.52.205(6) was not unconstitutionally vague; that starvation and dehydration were alternative means to commit first degree animal cruelty, but there was substantial evidence to support the horses suffered from dehydration; and that the superior court had authority to order the defendant to pay restitution to the county.  
State v. Sego   2006 WL 3734664 (Del.Com.Pl. 2006) (unpublished)  

Fifteen horses were seized by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) because the animals were in poor condition. The SPCA sent bills to the owners for feeding, upkeep, and veterinary care, but the owners did not pay the bills. After 30 days of nonpayment, the SPCA became the owners of the horses, and the prior owners were not entitled to get the horses back.

 
State v. Wood   2007 WL 1892483 (N.C. App.)   Plaintiff entered an oral agreement for defendant to board and train her horse, Talladega.  The horse died within  two months from starvation, and the Harnett County Animal Control found three other horses under defendant's care that were underfed, and seized them.  The jury trial resulted in a conviction of two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty from which the defendant appeals.  However, this court affirms the jury's conviction, stating that the assignment of error is without merit and would not have affected the jury's conviction.   
State v. Ziemann   705 N.W.2d 59 (Neb.App.,2005)   The petitioner-defendant challenged her criminal conviction for cruelly neglecting several horses she owned by asserting that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. However, the court of appeals side stepped the petitioners claim that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a farmstead, that she did not own or reside on, because she leased the grass on the farmstead for a dollar by invoking the “open fields” doctrine.  The court held that even if such a lease might implicate the petitioners Fourth Amendment rights in some circumstances, the petitioner here was only leasing a open field, which she cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in.  
Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm   2006 WL 3699549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)   An owner of a horse farm acquired a new horse that had only recently been broken in and got a woman with some health problems to ride the horse. The horse bucked and threw the defendant off the horse causing injury. The court held that even though riders assume the risk of most injuries, a horse owner can be liable for failure to take reasonable measures to match the rider to a suitable horse.  
Stout v. U.S. Forest Service   2011 WL 867775 (2011)   Plaintiff ranch owners grazed cattle within the Murderer's Creek Wild Horse Territory (WHT), an area in which the threatened Middle Columbia River steelhead was present. The Forest Service approved a wild horse management plan in the area, but failed to prepare a Biological Assessment (BA) to determine whether the plan was likely to affect the threatened species, and whether formal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was necessary. The Forest Service’s failure to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was arbitrary and capricious, and was ordered to consult with NMFS on its plan.  
Taylor v. Howren   606 S.E.2d 74 (Ga.App., 2004)   A family friend wanted to ride a horse and the horse owner told him it was rideable, despite knowing the horse was not fully trained yet.  The family friend sued after being kicked in the eye, knocked unconscious and paralyzed by the horse.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the horse owner on the basis that there was still a genuine issue of material fact as to the horse owner's immunity under the Equine Activities Act.   
Tennant v. Tabor   89 A.D.3d 1461 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.., 2011)   Motorist collided with a horse and sued horse owners for damages. The Supreme Court held that, even if horse owners violated statute requiring them to provide shelter to horse, this did not constitute common-law negligence, which was required for damages. In addition, horse owners were not liable because there was no evidence that horse exhibited propensity to interfere with traffic prior to incident involving motorist.  
Tilson v. Russo   30 A.D.3d 856 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2006),   In this New York case, plaintiff, an experienced recreational horse rider, was bitten by a horse she intended to use to practice her techniques at defendant's stable. The rider then brought a negligence action against owners of horse that bit her on the shoulder. In affirming the lower court's granting of summary judgment, the appellate court found that rider's injury occurred in the context of her participation in the recreational sporting activity of horseback riding, for purposes of primary assumption of the risk principles. She was aware of the inherent risks in sporting events involving horses, had an appreciation of the nature of the risks, and voluntarily assumed those risks.  
Trummer v. Niewisch   792 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y., 2005)   A woman fell from a horse during a riding lesson when her horse was frightened.  The woman brought claims against the riding facility and riding instructor for negligence.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed reasoning horses becoming frightened is an inherent risk when riding.  
Turner v. Benhart   527 SO.2d 717 (Ala. 1988).   Plaintiff horse owner appealed a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court (Alabama) entered on a jury verdict in favor of defendant veterinarian in a malpractice action arising from the death of the owner's horse. The horse owner contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the veterinarian in the malpractice action.  
United States v. Hughes   626 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980)   The defendant had adopted 109 wild horses through the federal Adopt-a-Horse program, whereby excess wild horses were adopted out to private individuals under the stipulation that the horses would be treated humanely and not used for commercial purposes.  The defendant was charged under the criminal provisions of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and with conversion of government property after he sold a number of the adopted horses to slaughter.  At trial, the defendant argued that he could not be found guilty of conversion because the federal government did not have a property interest in the horses, as the power to regulate wild horses on public lands does not equate to an ownership interest in the horses by the federal government.  The court held that, regardless of whether the WFRHBA intended to create an ownership interest in wild horses, the government has a property interest in wild horses that it has captured, corralled, and loaned out.    
Vanderbrook v. Emerald Springs Ranch   109 A.D.3d 1113 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2013).   While on a guided trail ride, plaintiff's horse brushed up against a tree that the plaintiff was unable to push away from. As a result, plaintiff's leg and hip sustained injuries and the plaintiff sued the ranch and the ranch's owners. Defendants’ appealed the Wayne County Supreme Court denial for the defendants' motion for summary. On appeal, the court found the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. First, the court found the defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issues of the horse's vicious propensity and defendants' knowledge of that propensity.  
Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership   36 A.3d 707 (Conn.App.,2012)  

Minor sued farmer horse-owner for negligence after farmer's horse bit him. The Appellate Court reversed summary judgment, holding that a fact issue remained as to whether the farmer had notice that the horse belonged to a class of domestic animals that possessed a natural propensity to bite. Such knowledge may make certain injuries foreseeable, giving rise to a duty to use reasonable care to restrain the animal to prevent injury.

 
Westfall v. State   10 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App. 1999).   Defendant convicted of cruelty for intentionally or knowingly torturing his cattle by failing to provide necessary food or care, causing them to die. Defendant lacked standing to challenge warrantless search of property because he had no expectation of privacy under open fields doctrine.  
Whitman v. State   2008 WL 1962242 (Ark.App.,2008)  

Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of four counts of cruelty to animals concerning four Arabian horses. On appeal, appellant raised a sufficiency of the evidence challenge and a Rule 404(b) challenge to the admission of testimony and pictures concerning the condition of appellant's dogs and her house. The court found the photographic evidence was admissible for purposes other than to prove appellant's character, e.g., to show her knowledge of neglect of animals within her house, and thereby the absence of mistake or accident concerning the horses that lived outside.

 
ZENIER v. SPOKANE INTERNATIONAL RAILROAD COMPANY   300 P.2d 494 (Idaho, 1956)   In Zenier v. Spokane Intern. R. Co., 78 Idaho 196 (Idaho 1956), a rancher’s mare and colt was killed, and the rancher sought statutory damages and attorney fees. A jury found for the rancher and imposed damages mainly on his testimony as to value. The railroad sought review, stating that the rancher's own negligence in allowing the horses to run barred recovery and there was no objective evidence as to value. The court upheld the award, finding that the animal’s value to the rancher was permitted as a basis for determining damages where personal property has been injured by the willful or negligent act of another.  
Zimmerman v. Robertson   854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993)  

Defendant-veterinarian was contracted to castrate plaintiff’s horse. Post-surgical care resulted in a fatal infection of the horse.  The court found that, indeed, expert testimony is required in malpractice cases, as negligence cannot be inferred from the existence of a loss.  The court disagreed with plaintiff that defendant’s own "admissions" in his testimony at trial provided sufficient evidence of deviation from the standard of care to withstand a directed verdict by defendant.  As to plaintiff’s argument regarding a lack of informed consent, the court noted that a medical malpractice claim premised on a theory of lack of informed consent is a separate cause of action rather than an "element" in an otherwise specifically alleged claim of professional negligence.

 
Zimmerman v. Robertson   854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993)   Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment by the District Court of Yellowstone County, Thirteenth Judicial District (Montana), which entered a directed verdict in favor of defendant veterinarian on the owner's claims of professional negligence. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the owner was required to prove the veterinarian's negligence by expert testimony, and that he failed to do so.  In addition, the court The court found that the "defendant's admissions" exception to the expert testimony requirement did not apply because the veterinarian did not admit that he deviated from the standard of care.  
Zuckerman v. Coastal Camps, Inc.   716 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.Me., 2010)   This case arose after twelve-year old Samantha Zuckerman sustained injuries when she fell the pony she was riding during a horseback riding lesson at Camp Laurel in Mount Vernon, Maine. Samantha alleged that her instructors improperly saddled the pony, which caused her saddle to slip. In appealing the Magistrate's recommended decision, Camp Laurel again claims that it is immune from liability under Maine Equine Activities Act because a slipping saddle is a risk inherent to the sport of horseback riding. Camp Laurel contends that the faulty tack exception is limited to situations where the tack cracks, breaks, or frays and does not include  an “improperly tightened girth” or an “inappropriate pony” or “faulty horse.” This Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the record raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the “faulty” tack exception. The Court found that the negligence here was tied to an exception to the liability shield - faulty tack.  

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