Dignity, Sentience, Personality: the Legal Relationship between Animals and Humans.

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Summary

In a new consideration of animals, whose fundamental critical point is the traditional consideration of them as things, it seems possible to identify three periods, or historic moments, that have marked an evolution in their treatment in the last decades, and precisely in the legal realm. These periods can be identified through the perceptible changes in legislation and jurisprudence. These three terms are: Dignity, Sentience and Personality. The antecedents of this proposal are examined the factors that appear to have provoked these changes are raised for discussion.

Keywords: legal status of animals, sentience, sentient beings, de-objectification, dignity, dignity of creation, dignity of creatures, person, legal personality, animal personality, global animal law
SUMMARY

I. Classify to understand

II. Classify to address
   a. Dignity
   b. Sentience
   c. Personality

I. CLASSIFY TO UNDERSTAND

The reference to animals, in thought and in culture, has been anchored in reality, and
could express a relation as complex as it is enigmatic; that that links humans and animals, in
an indelible but solid and constant manner.1 The same has occurred with legal thinking. The
Law has tried to find the most pertinent terms, which have been changing, to be able to more
adequately specify how it must treat animals and how it regulates the relationship with them,
at the core of an organised society. Reducing any reality to a name, to a term, will always be
imprecise, but at the same time it is indicative of strength to understand how we must behave
when confronted by this reality. From this the need, in the case of animals, to classify them,
to try to better understand them, or of attributing to their position in the Law an expression
that justifies the treatment bestowed upon them and the place it gives them.

Classifying animals with different perspectives and angles has been a constant
throughout history.2 These days, the widest classification is that which divides animals into:
animals for companionship, for production, for experimentation, in shows, which is nothing
more than a reflection of “use” that we make of animals. It is a classification marked strongly
by economics and, for this reason, it is the classification employed most by Animal Welfare
Sciences3 and in fundamentally European Animal Welfare legislation.4

Another classification, from roman roots, of scholastic nature5 and perpetuated in the
majority of the continental and Latin American Codes,6 is that which splits from of the
distinction between domestic, endangered and wild animals, among those that include
animals that are fished and hunted, as well as exotic animals, coming from far away lands,
for which man has always felt an irresistible attraction. Although there exist variants, this

1POLLO, S., Umani e Animali: Questioni di Etica (Rome 2016) 23ss.; rev. by CERSOSIMO R., en daA.
2With wisdom, on the anthropocentric need to classify animals, to indicate a dividing line between them
and human beings, ONIDA, P.P., Il problema della ‘personalità’ degli animali: l’esempio dell’orango
3 Animal welfare as an originally veterinary concept that is widely referred to, FRASER, D.,
50-S1-S1
4Vid. In relation to Spain, VILLALBA, T., 40 años de Bienestar Animal: 1974-2014 (Madrid 2015); in
the general area, BRELS, S., Le droit du bien-être animal dans le monde. Evolution et universalisation
(Paris 2017).
5Gai.2, 14-16.
6GIGLIO, F., Pandectism and the Gaian Classification of Things, in The University of Toronto Law
classification works alongside an eminently rural economy, that of the culture of Antiquity that saw it birthed.\(^7\) For this reason, because this vision of animals is connected with the role that animals play in the life of the land,\(^8\) in the concept of domestic animals, beasts of burden are equally included (oxen, donkeys, mules), those that serve as food (cows, pigs, goats, rabbits or chickens, which were certainly a species debated among jurists regarding their potentially threatened nature for their apparent inability to return to their corral: \textit{the animus revertendi})\(^9\)), as well as those that guarded the home (dogs) and those that cleared the area of rodents, cats, that also, as well as dogs, were used for company, but cats, certainly in their own way.

Beyond this typological classification, which is reflected by all classical authors and, of course, in Justinian’s Digest and, by consequence, in all the contemporary Codes, there have been certain attempts to classify animals by natural observation (to which we will no refer right now); so the anthropocentric and economic perspective repeats itself, with some variation.\(^10\) In reality, it would not be necessary to classify animals; classic Antiquity shows reluctance towards doing so, from the belief that animals formed a part of a respected nature known as the \textit{scala naturae}.\(^11\) In fact, if we follow the roman jurisprudential texts of the classical era there is a total absence of animal classification.

If one were to examine the roman sources without prejudice, one would be presented with an entirely different picture regarding the legal treatment of animals.\(^12\) The romans considered animals, from a natural point of view, as a legal object on which laws, and above all property laws, could be based, and that could be objects of trade. Until recent decades, there have not been great changes in this approach. However, the common reproach that in Rome animals were considered to be a material without life, and that the notion of ownership over animals is the starting point of animal cruelty or, at least, of the inferiority of animals and their lack of recognition by contemporary law,\(^13\) can easily be refuted, aside from by its serious inaccuracy, by forgetting the “natural” notion of Law (\textit{ius naturale}), that is common also to animals, at least in the often contested opinion of Ulpian.\(^14\)


\(^9\) Gai.2,68.

\(^10\) Always useful, DIERAUER, U., Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike (Amsterdam 1976) esp. 100ss.; 178ss.; 253ss.


\(^12\) ONIDA, P.P., Studi sulla condizione degli animali non umani nel sistema giuridico romano (2\textsuperscript{e}ed. Torino 2012).

\(^13\) Although with nuances and different results, it is important to take into account the influence of FRANCIONE, G., Animals, Property and the Law (Philadelphia Temple University Press, 1995); REGAN, T., The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press 1983); ROCHA SANTANA, L., La teoría de los derechos animales de Tom Regan. Ampliando las fronteras de la comunidad moral y de los derechos más allá de lo humano (Valencia 2018); Rev. by SALZANI C., DA 9/2 (2018) 128-131 \texttt{https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/da.332}; WISE, S., Rattling the Cage. Toward Legal Rights for Animals (New York 2000); WISE, S., Sacudiendo la jaula (Valencia 2018).

\(^14\) The discussion remains open on the genuine weight of Ulpian’s text, D.1,1,1,3. For all, FILIP-FRÖSCHL, J., Rechtshistorische Würzeln der Behandlung des Tieres durch das geltende Privatrecht, in HARRER/GRAF (Ed.) Tierschutz und Recht (Vienna 1994); ONIDA, Studi sulla condizione degli animali non umani nel sistema giuridico romano. Part. I, Cap.III, 110 y n.18, regarding Cicero’s famous text de Officiis, Cic. \textit{Off.}, 1,17,53-54, on the meaning of \textit{natura commune animantium}, extended to all
After revising the sources, one can conclude that the romans considered animals – respecting their essence as living beings – as res sui generis. The animals appear in texts as compared with lifeless objects, and are considered to be living beings, frequently uncontrollable and with special attributes, like the need to feed themselves, the capacity to reproduce or the possibility to move by their own volition. Furthermore, it is also clear from the classical texts that animals were differentiated in themselves by their basic needs. For this, the legal treatment of the animal has always been accompanied with the difficulty of encompassing (and containing) the animal phenomenon within the legal concepts. Ordering animals in legal categories means, a lot of the time, ignoring their natural characteristics. For this reason alone Roman Private Law hardly did it, in contrast to current private Law, which still insists upon it.

Notwithstanding the previous observations, our difficulty of encompassing the animal phenomenon and, in spite of this, the need to provide legal rules to be able to order their relation with human beings in conformity with organised society, has led to framing them – almost naturally – in the realm of property, which we always mistakenly consider to be an immutable institution destined to never change, that which could not be more imprecise; so property, as with the majority of relationships, categories and legal institutions, is destined to change and to adapt to specific and variable circumstances, of the society to which the regulation corresponds.15

The proprietorship over animals and the consideration of them to be things – which constitutes a real legal dogma – began to break in through philosophical, not legal, thinking, as the Law did not see the need to change this relation of domination between man and animal, given that society continued to be identical in itself: essentially rural and anthropocentric. However, leaving aside the fundamental critical thought on animals of Humanism16 and of the Enlightenment17 –the imprints of which have made themselves known in philosophical thought and in society – two centuries later, specifically in the 1980s and in the dawn of the 21st century, have indeed produced changes in legal systems, which have drawn into question whether animals should be things. The factors that explain these changes, the so-called “animal turn”,18 are of a different entity and nature, and this turn also presents variants that can be found temporally as much as geographically.

II. CLASSIFY TO ADDRESS

In this new consideration of animals, whose fundamental critical point is the traditional consideration of them as things,19 in coherence with the Gaian summa divisio between persons and things,20 it seems possible to distinguish three different periods, or moments, in recent that have marked an evolution in their treatment precisely within the legal realm.
These periods can be identified, I believe, by the three terms that constitute the core of reflection that leads to perceptible changes in legislation and in Jurisprudence. These three terms are: Dignity, Sentience and Personality.

a. Dignity

An express reference to the Dignity of creature (“Würde der Kreatur”) as a governing principle of the treatment and consideration that is owed to animals\textsuperscript{21} appears only in the Swiss Constitution of 18 April 1999, Art. 120.2;\textsuperscript{22} this notion was renewed in 2008, then transformed into “dignity of animals”, in the Swiss Animal Protection Act, that had been completely revised:\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Art. 1} Zweck dieses Gesetzes ist es, die Würde und das Wohlergehen des Tieres zu schützen.

The purpose of this act is to protect the dignity and welfare of animals.

\textbf{Art. 3 a.} Würde: Eigenwert des Tieres, der im Umgang mit ihm geachtet werden muss. Die Würde des Tieres wird missachtet, wenn eine Belastung des Tieres nicht durch überwiegende Interessen gerechtfertigt werden kann. Eine Belastung liegt vor, wenn dem Tier insbesondere Schmerzen, Leiden oder Schäden zugefügt werden, es in Angst versetzt oder erniedrigt wird, wenn tief greifend in sein Erscheinungsbild oder seine Fähigkeiten eingegriffen oder es übermäßig instrumentalisiert wird.

\textit{Dignity: Intrinsic value of the animal, which has to be respected when dealing with it. The dignity of the animal is not being respected if the distress imposed on it cannot be justified by overriding interests. In particular, distress is present if pain, suffering or damages are inflicted upon the animal, if fear is caused or the animal is subject to humiliation, if the appearance or features are significantly changed or if it is excessively instrumentalised.}\textsuperscript{24}

In this respect, Switzerland must be considered to be the absolute precursor and pioneering country in this ambit.\textsuperscript{25} Already by 1893 the Swiss nation voted in favour of a constitutional prohibition of certain methods of slaughter without stunning before exsanguination. Therefore Switzerland was the first country in the world that imposed the obligation of stunning animals before slaughter, for which reason ritual slaughter continues to be prohibited. Switzerland was also the first European country to include animal welfare as a specific theme in its Constitution, as soon as by 1973, as can be seen in article 80 of the Federal Constitution.

But what is truly outstanding is that in 1992 a second constitutional order reinforced the position of animal welfare in a very unique way. As a result of a national referendum, Switzerland had to amend the Constitution by adding an order that obliged the legislative to

\textsuperscript{21}SITTER-LIVER, B., Recht und Gerechtigkeit auch für Tiere. Eine konkrete Utopie, in Tier und Recht (cit.) 29ss
\textsuperscript{22}Bundesverfassung des Schweizerischen Eigenossenschaft, Art. 120.2: “,,Der Bund erlässt Vorschriften über den Umgang mit Keim- und Erbgut von Tieren, Pflanzen und anderen Organismen. Er trägt dabei der Würde der Kreatur sowie der Sicherheit von Mensch, Tier und Umwelt Rechnung und schützt die genetische Vielfalt der Tier- und Pflanzenarten” https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html
\textsuperscript{23}TSchG, Tierschutzgesetz (Swiss Animal Protection Act, in effect since the 1st September 2008), https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20022103/index.html
\textsuperscript{24} TSchG, art. 1 and art. 3 (unofficial translation). Also, vid. Tierschutzverordnung (Swiss Animal Protection Ordinance, in effect since the 1st September 2008), https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20080796/index.html
\textsuperscript{25}GOETSCHEL, A., Tierschutz und Grundrechte (Zürich 1989);
pass laws on the use of genetic and reproductive material of animals, plants and other organisms, and in doing this, bearing in mind the dignity of other living beings, including the dignity of animals, as we have already mentioned.26

Aside from this, a legal change came into power in 2003 that set a landmark in the history of the country, by changing the corresponding article of the Civil Code, in which it is established that animal are not things (“Nicht Sachen”), and of course this change had visible effect in the law of damages, in the law of succesions and title deeds, which has involved more than few discussions on whether the term Dignity is applied equally and with the same value to human beings as it is to animals.27

Article 641a of the Civil Code (BGB),28 in coherence with this, established that animals are not things. It is interest to observe that this article is composed of two parts; in the first, the legislator refers to the contents of property and general principles (Art. 641 A, Inhalt des Eigentums / I. Im Allgemeinen) and in the second, refers to the contents of property and, separately, to animals (Art. 641a A. Inhalt des Eigentums / II. Tiere) which, in my opinion, far from being a purely material distinction, reflects a new position for animals that, already seen in the mention by the title, are separate from things.

It can be affirmed that the reference to Dignity, as an intrinsic attribute of animals,29 forms part of the philosophical background and moral teleology unique to central European thought,30 which, by contrast, but with help also from the discussion generated by the Kantian consideration on animals,31 declines in expressions such as Dignity of creature, Dignity of creation, Fellow creature (“Mitgeschöpfe”), which form part not only of the mental horizon of Central Europe, but of the normative lexicon of constitutional orders and of the respective Codes. This is therefore the breeding ground that explains the Austrian reform of the ABGB that declares Non-things of animals and, almost as a planned concatenation, the same reform introduced in Germany,32 as well as, as we have seen, in Switzerland.

We can briefly see the corresponding regulations of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB, Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)33. In its article § 285 this Code defines the concept of thing in a broad sense:

Begriff von Sachen im rechtlichen Sinne
(Concept of things in a legal sense)

§ 285. Alles, was von der Person unterschieden ist, und zum Gebrauche der Menschen dient, wird im rechtlichen Sinne eine Sache genannt.

26The Swiss Constitution refers to animals in the following and separate articles: Art. 80 BV: competence to legislate for the protection of animals; Art. 84.1 BV: protection of animals against the disturbances of alpine transit traffic; Art. 118.2 b. BV: protection against dangerous illnesses; Art. 104.3 b. BV: protection against abusive exploitation in agriculture; Art. 120.2 BV: respect of the dignity of creature.
31KORSGAARD, C., A Kantian Case for Animal Rights, in Tier und Recht (cit.) 6ss.
All that differs from the person and serves for the use of man is considered a thing in the legal sense.

In this way the concept encompasses both corporal as well as non-corporal things. To this § was added § 285°, which excludes expressis verbis to the animal of the concept of the thing:

§ 285a. Tiere sind keine Sachen; sie werden durch besondere Gesetze geschützt. Die für Sachen geltenden Vorschriften sind auf Tiere nur insoweit anzuwenden, als keine abweichenden Regelungen bestehen. Animals are not things; they are protected by special laws. The orders referred to things are applied to animals if there is no alternate provision.

To complement this rule, in the field of regulating compensation a new § about the costs of recovery of an injured animal was simultaneously added, § 1332 ABGB. Here it says:

§ 1332a. Wird ein Tier verletzt, so gebühren die tatsächlich aufgewendeten Kosten der Heilung oder der versuchten Heilung auch dann, wenn sie den Wert des Tieres übersteigen, soweit auch ein verständiger Tierhalter in der Lage des Geschädigten die Kosten aufgewendet hätte. If an animal is injured, they are owed the actual costs of recovery or of intent to recover, even when this exceeds the value of the animal, so long as the legal owner of the animal has covered the costs in place of the injured party.

Afterwards, the Austrian legislator changed the Enforcement Regulation in the sense of the exemption from seizure of animals (EO, Exekutionsordnung), but it was done – by consequence of the change introduced in the BGB – within the frame of a broad modification in the year 1996. Effectively, in paragraph § 250 (4) it determined the exemption from seizure of domestic animals that are not to be sold. In contrast to the German regulation, which will be examined a little later, and contains a clause of harshness in favour of the creditor, is limited to the exemption of seizure up to a value of 750 euros.

§ 250 EO (4): Unpfändbare Sachen Non-seizable things

(1) Unpfändbar sind: They are non-seizable

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4. nicht zur Veräußerung bestimmte Haustiere, zu denen eine gefühlsmäßige Bindung besteht, bis zum Wert von 750,-€ (10 000 S) sowie eine Milchkuh oder nach Wahl des Verpflichteten zwei Schweine, Ziegen oder Schafe, wenn diese Tiere für die Ernährung des Verpflichteten oder der mit ihm im gemeinsamen Haushalt lebenden Familienmitglieder erforderlich sind, ferner die Futter- und Streuvorräte auf vier Wochen; Domestic animals that are not to be sold, and in respect of those where an emotional attachment exists, up to a value of 750 euros (10 000 chelines), just like a dairy cow or, at the choice of the liable party, two pigs, goats or sheep, if these animals are necessary for the feeding of the liable party or the members of family that live in their house, along with the estimate for feeding and maintaining them for four weeks.

At the time of the Austrian reform, the German legislator also began a reform relating to the legal status of animals in the BGB. The fact that Germany had itself taken on this theme was to be expected, as in Germany broad changes had already been made in the field of animal protection. In 1986 a new version of the Animal Protection Act came into power. Through the “Law to improve the legal situation of animals in Civil Law”, it also modified
in Germany the Civil Code (BGB), for which reason, the regulations of the BGB are very similar to the Austrian ones.

The title of the chapter two of the first book broadens to include animals, which that which remains of the following form: Things. Animals. Al § 90, in which things are defined, and to which § 90a is added.34

The result is as follows:

(Concept) Things, in the legal sense, only constitute corporal things.

Animals are not things. They are protected by special laws. The following orders, valid for things, must be applied to them, as long as another thing is not planned.

It is interesting to observe that, in a different way to how this reform was addressed in Austrian Law, the BGB signals special treatment for animals, making reference to the rights and duties of the owner, such as in the third chapter, assigned to the property:

Dritter Abschnitt. 1) Eigentum  
Erster Titel. Inhalt des Eigentums
First Title: Contents of property

(Powers of the owner) The owner of a thing can make use of it as they like, so long as this does not contravene the law or the rights of a third party, and can exclude all others from intervention. The owner of an animal must observe the special provisions for the protection of animals when exercising their power.

It agrees to mark an important reform operated in the area of compensation, so completes itself in paragraph § 251 BGB – which regulates the compensation in cash and that, in part two, limits the obligation of restitution to adequate costs through a similar regulation to that of Austria, but with greater scope and weight.

§ 251(1) Soweit die Herstellung nicht möglich oder zur Entschädigung des Gläubigers nicht genügend ist, hat der Ersatzpflichtige den Gläubiger in Geld zu entschädigen.  
(2) Der Ersatzpflichtige kann den Gläubiger in Geld entschädigen, wenn die Herstellung nur mit unverhältnismäßigen Aufwendungen möglich ist. Die aus der Heilbehandlung eines Tieres entstandenen Aufwendungen sind nicht bereits dann unverhältnismäßig, wenn sie dessen Wert erheblich übersteigen.  
(1) If restitution is not possible, or is insufficient for the compensation of the creditor, the liable party must compensate the creditor with money.  
(2) The liable party may compensate the creditor with money when restitution is only possible with a disproportionate amount. The expenses arising for the recovery of an animal are not disproportionate even when they considerably exceed its value.

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With its meticulous recognition, the German legislator introduced, at the same time, rules adapted to the new condition of animals in the rules governing forced execution and changed the order of civil procedure to the following:

The § 765 of the ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung), which regulates the suppression of measures of forced execution in extreme cases, broadens through the following precision instruments, which are a call to the exercise of responsibility that human beings have in respect to animals, in coherence with the spirit that impregnates German animal protection legislation that, as it is well known, began with National-Socialism:35

§ 765a ZPO. Betrifft die Maßnahme ein Tier, so hat das Vollstreckungsgericht bei der von ihm vorzunehmenden Abwägung die Verantwortung des Menschen für das Tier zu berücksichtigen.

If the measure affects an animal, the Enforcement Court must bear in mind, in its evaluation, the responsibility of man in relation to animals.

The new § 811c ZPO refers to the exemption of animals from seizure in the following terms:

Abs. 1: Tiere, die im häuslichen Bereich und nicht zu Erwerbszwecken gehalten werden, sind der Pfändung nicht unterworfen.

Abs. 2: Auf Antrag des Gläubigers läßt das Vollstreckungsgericht eine Pfändung wegen des hohen Wertes des Tiers zu, wenn die Unpfändbarkeit für den Gläubiger eine Härte bedeuten würde, die auch unter Würdigung der Belange des Tierschutzes und des berechtigten Interesses des Schuldners nicht zu rechtfertigen ist.

(1) Animals kept in the domestic environment and not for profit are not subjects of the pledge
(2) At the request of the creditor, the Enforcement Court will permit the pledge due to the high value of the animal, if the exemption from seizure will for the creditor be of excessive harshness, not justifiable in the appreciation of the interest of the defence of animals nor the legitimate interest of the debtor

At the same time it suppresses the rule of § 811 No. 14 ZPO, which prohibits the seizure of animals with a value of less than 500 marks (~ 250 € or £220).

Other European states36 have followed the same way as Austria, with a substantial amount of critics37 due to the difficulty involved in the practical application of this negative category. However, in these countries there is development of literature, discussions, the birth of animal protection groups, but a very moderate scientific and academic reflection up until now.38

Outside of Europe, two main lines of interpretation have concurrently opened up; of property, on the one hand, and of procedural action on the other. I am referring to the

35A recent revision of this little known aspect of German legal history, owed to PLUDA, M., Animal Law in the Third Reich (in print).
announced by the David Favre’s theory of Living Property, and the Non-Human Rights Project of Steven Wise and concession of *Habeas Corpus* to certain chimpanzees in Argentinian Courts. But this is a topic to be dealt with at another time.

b. Sentience

Animal Welfare Science, driven by the increasingly stronger verification of the sentience of animals, opens a front of discussion that has put into question, ever more intensively, that animals can only be objects of Law, and has begun to consolidate that animals, as sentient beings, are destined to be subjects of the law, through the recognition that they are living beings endowed with sensibility. It is in this area that we must identify the changes introduced by certain European Civil Codes through the affirmation of their capacity to feel. The support in this realm of European Animal Welfare legislation has been decisive. In no other way could one judge the influence that art. 13 TFEU has had, in spite of the limitations that the same article imposes in the second part of its composition. However, it has been the buttress for arguing the change of legal status of animals, beginning with the French Civil Code.

In France, The Glavany Amendment of 2015 recognised the condition of animals as “living beings endowed with sensibility”; a necessary linguistic turn, given that in the French language an equivalent term to “sentient beings” cannot be found, not have the expressions sentient beings or sentience been popularised, as has occurred, on the contrary, in Castilian. This new classification of animals, without separating them from the realm of property, introduces a conceptual change of great magnitude by removing them from the condition of things (understood to be assimilated with inert things). In effect, the Napoleonic Code has been a wake-up call for other continental Codes, which have continued linking together the pertinent reforms in their respective Codes; a movement that appears to know no break, for now. In Spain, for example, we have been immersed in this since February 2017 in a reform of the legal status of animals, that is itself considered to be both near and

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40WISE, S. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/
43For the maximal approximation of this transformation of European origin, the constitutive treaties (which always prevails over the Spanish), ALONSO GARCÍA, E., El bienestar de los animales como seres sensibles-sentientes: su valor como principio general, de rango constitucional, en el derecho español, en el libro colectivo Los Principios Generales del Derecho y el Derecho Administrativo, Ed Klouver 2010; WARTEMBERG, M., Art. 13 Lisbon Treaty/TFUE – Historical, Constitutional and Legal Aspects, en FAVRE, D. y GIMÉNEZ-CANDELA, T. (Ed.), Animales y Derecho (Valencia 2015) 353ss
44“The Glavany Amendment”, which consecrated the insertion of animal in such that is, in art. 2 of the law 2015-177 of 16 February 2015; MARGUÉNAUD, J.P., L’entrée en vigueur de “The Glavany Amendment”: un grand pas de plus vers la personnalité juridique des animaux, RSDA 2/2014 15ss.
positive. The de-objectification of animals\textsuperscript{47} seems to be a movement destined to remain, and in this way is not a temporary tendency.

It cannot be a shock that the legal reflection was not grateful, given the condition of animals, far from being a local question, without doubt has global dimensions, as has aptly been shown.\textsuperscript{48} Between the arguments that support this globalisation figures the affirmation that the animal question is only part of the protection of nature, an area in which legal reflection has not met any obstacle in personifying and empowering the Environment, or, as in some Latin-American legal orders, Mother Earth or Pacha Mama\textsuperscript{49}.

c. Personality

It cannot therefore be striking that one attempts to attribute legal personality to animals in a third period that rides on that of sentience, even though it disgusts those who identify the term person with that of human being\textsuperscript{50}. Nothing could be further than the legal reality\textsuperscript{51}. The term person and the concept of the person is nothing more than an abstraction attributable to any reality that carries out a “role”, a contemplated action, regulated and protected by the law.

The origin of the term person also supports this. Person is, as is well known, the funeral mask worn by the parents of the deceased, in funeral processions, by which they represent the different roles that the deceased had played throughout their life. Person is also the theatrical mask used by actors to represent different characters or stereotypes during dramatic plays. The Law makes use of the term person precisely to attribute to an individual (\textit{caput}) the different roles it represents in the legal realm, throughout its life and in different circumstances. It is certain, therefore, that person and human individual little in common regarding origin, but it is no less certain that the term person is used to attribute rights and duties in the legal order to entities that little resemble humans or, if one likes, physicality.

Since antiquity, and without any type of intellectual resistance, we use the term legal person to designate realities outside the individual. Person is used to designate corporations, societies, public and private entities, and endows them with legal personality, that is, the capacity to be the subject of laws and to act as such in the legal realm. It cannot be a shock to suggest the attribution of legal personality to animals can be coherent with a line of thought that is slowly but surely opening a path.

In this issue of the review, we publish a document of great interest that reflects a study conference organised by the University of Toulon\textsuperscript{52}. In this document, notice is given of the initiative undertaken by a group of French scholars and other European colleagues – myself included – that will elaborate a Project of law to request from the French Parliament the recognition of companion animals as legal persons.

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{49}RONCAL VATTUONE, X., La naturaleza…un sujeto con derechos. Apuntes para la reflexión, en Integra Educativa, 6/3 (2013) 122ss.

\textsuperscript{50}AUGSBERG, S., Der Anthropozentrismus des juristischen Personenbegriffs – Ausdruck überkommener (religiöser) Traditionen, speziesistischer Engführung oder funktionaler Notwendigkeiten?, in Rechtswissenschaft 3 (2016) 344ss.;

\textsuperscript{51}The association of person with being human is constant, e.g. in Church documents, such as that “Instruction Dignitas personae on Certain Bioethical Questions”, from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.


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It is no surprise that the initiative begins with companion animals. This is no doubt a good strategy and something more; it is the recognition that Jurisprudence has not confused itself when it has repetitively recognised their prominent role in our lives, when in some European codes they are considered members of the family; when bearing in mind their particular connection with human beings, to increase their protection, and to, as one of the outcomes of the project, find concrete and perceptible objectives.

Ultimately, beginning to deconstruct the term personality and the legal person⁵³ and shifting the centre of attention from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism or biocentrism will permit the inclusion of animals; if they have an animal personality and undeniable individuality, this would constitute one of the requirements for attributing them personality. This, in my opinion, is one of the possible ways that would allow us to improve the protection of animals in the future.