Pennsylvania

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Titlesort descending Summary
PA - Veterinary Issues - Rules of Professional Conduct The State Board of Veterinary Medicine is empowered under section 5(2) of the act (63 P. S. § 485.5(2)) to adopt rules and regulations of professional conduct appropriate to establish and maintain a high standard of integrity, skill and practice in the profession of veterinary medicine. In accordance with this authority, the Board has determined that the following rules are necessary in the public interest to protect the public against unprofessional conduct on the part of veterinarians.
Pennsylvania Law of Session of 1860: Cruelty to Animals Section 46 of Pennsylvania Session Law from 1860 covers cruelty to animals. The section describes what is cruelty to animal and the punishment for it.
Pennsylvania Statute Law 1920: Article 14: Criminal Law Pennsylvania laws concerning the criminal punishment for cruelty to animals from 1921. The laws cover such topics as transportation of an animal to the powers of an agent from any anti-Cruelty society.
Pennsylvania Statute Laws 1920: Article 16: Agriculture Laws Pennsylvania laws concerning the treatment of animals in agriculture. The laws cover such topics as maiming and disfiguring animals to the transportation of an animal.
Price v. Brown


The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment.  The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence.  The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery.  
Price v. Brown, V.M.D. Plaintiff's bull dog went to defendant veterinarian for surgery to correct a prolapsed urethra. The dog died a few days later. The plaintiff then sought to recover the value of the dog on a strict theory of bailment. Defendant filed a preliminary objection asserting that this doctrine was inapplicable and could not afford relief. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim from which relief could be sought and dismissed the complaint. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to amend the compliant.In holding to sustain the defendant's preliminary objection, the court reasoned that since veterinarians are part of a professional discipline, in order to recover damages for the injury or the death to an animal entrusted to a veterinarian's care, a plaintiff must prove professional negligence instead of a bailiff arrangement.
Republic v. Teischer


The Defendant had been convicted in the county of Berks upon an indictment for maliciously, wilfully, and wickedly killing a Horse; and upon a motion in arrest of Judgment, it came on to be argued, whether the offence, so laid, was indictable? The court affirmed the trial court's conviction of defendant for killing a horse.
Sheldon Park Tenants v. ACHA The Allegheny Public Housing Authority decided to enforce it's "no pets" rule after years of unenforcement. This is a brief in arbitration. The tenants won. Includes a very interesting discussion of depression as a disability.
Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania


This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized

after

Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages.  
Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n


A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.

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