Oregon

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Titlesort ascending Summary
Matter of S. A. B. In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed.
Lockett v. Hill


In this Oregon case, plaintiff sued defendant after defendant's pit bulls mauled plaintiff's cat to death while they were running loose on plaintiff's property. The trial court found that defendant was negligent and awarded plaintiffs $1,000 in compensatory damages but denied plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship. Plaintiff sought appeal of the trial court's denial of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and loss of companionship. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the cat owner was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress.

Lockett v. Hill


Defendant's pit bulls killed plaintiff's cat while she watched. This is an appellate brief about non-economic damages.

Justice, an American Quarter Horse, by and through his Guardian, Kim MOSIMAN, Plaintiff, v. Gwendolyn VERCHER, Defendant. This Oregon complaint seeks economic and non-economic damages for Justice, an American Quarter Horse from Oregon, by and through his guardian. Justice suffered extreme pain, distress, and permanent injury due to the criminal neglect of Defendant Gwendolyn Vercher. According to the facts issued in the complaint, Defendant denied Justice adequate food and shelter for months, abandoning him to starve and freeze. As a result of this neglect, Justice was left debilitated and emaciated. Plaintiffs' attorneys plead negligence per se based on violation of Oregon's anti-cruelty statute. The attached opinion letter from Washington County Circuit Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of capacity to sue. In an issue of first impression, the court ruled that finding that a horse, or any nonhuman animal, has the capacity to sue would have "profound implications." In addition, the court found that a non-human animal lacks the capacity to "accept[] legal responsibilities." The court left it to the Oregon Legislature or the appellate court to wade into a policy debate on animal rights.
Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Julie Marie Grizzel v. James William Hickey d/b/a S & S Farms; Ron Lee Omara and S & S Farms, Inc. aka S.S. Farms Linn County, I


The plaintiff in this Oregon case brought an action alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, who was a licensed animal dealer. Plaintiff owned “My Girl,” a purebred cocker spaniel, whom plaintiff cared for and enclosed in a secure, fenced backyard. While My Girl was secure in her backyard, two other individuals seized her and transported her to defendant Hickey (who was known to be engaged in the business of selling animals to research laboratories).

In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order."
In re Kulka's Estate


This action relates to a court order in an estate case.  The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals."  The executor refused to pay the legacy.  This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands.  The court affirmed the payment of the legacy.

In Defense of Animals v. Oregon Health Sciences University


A nonprofit corporation petitioned the trial court for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding fees charged by a state university primate research center for document inspection.  The circuit court dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the fee issue and, assuming jurisdiction existed, the fees were in compliance with law.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the basis, reasonableness and amount of fees charged by the university.

Howard v. Chimps, Inc.


While cleaning a cage at a chimpanzee sanctuary, the plaintiff was twice attacked by a chimpanzee, which left the plaintiff without much of her thumb. Plaintiff brought a suit against the sanctuary based on claims of strict liability; under a statute and common law; negligence; and gross negligence. At the district court, the plaintiff lost because she had signed a waiver releasing the sanctuary from liability "on all claims for death, personal injury, or property damage" and because she failed to state a claim in regards to the gross negligence charge. In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court found an enforceable contract existed with the waiver, and that there was no evidence of reckless disregard on defendant's part to rise to the level of gross negligence.

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