|NY - Trusts - Chapter 17-B. Of the Consolidated Laws.||
This New York statute provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. Such trust shall terminate when the living animal beneficiary or beneficiaries of such trust are no longer alive. Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property as directed in the trust instrument or, if there are no such directions in the trust instrument, the property shall pass to the estate of the grantor. A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it determines that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use.
|NY - Veterinary - Article 135. Veterinary Medicine and Animal Health Technology.||
These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners.
|NY - Wild animal, possession - Part 820. Required Annual Reporting of the Presence of Wild Animals||
|NY - Wild Animals - § 11-0512. Possession, sale, barter, transfer, exchange and import||
This section provides that no person shall knowingly possess, harbor, sell, barter, transfer, exchange or import any wild animal for use as a pet in New York state, except that any person who possessed a wild animal for use as a pet at the time that this section went effect may retain possession of such animal for the remainder of its life. Certain other entities are also excepted from this ban.
|NY - Wildlife, Exotics - Title 1. Short Title; Definitions; General Provisions||
This set of statutes represents the definitional portion of New York's Fish and Wildlife Law. Among the provisions include definitions for game and non-game, a definition for "wild animal," which includes big cats, non-domesticated dogs, bears, and venomous reptiles, and the state's hunter harassment law. The section also provides that the State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership.
|O'Rourke v. American Kennels (Unpublished Disposition)||
|Overview of New York Great Ape Laws||This is a short overview of New York Great Ape law.|
|Panattieri v. City of New York||
Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law.
|People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery||This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings."|
|People of the State of New York v. Mary Dawn Sitors||This action is an appeal from dismissal of criminal charges against a woman accused of acts of cruelty on her horses. The Town Court dismissed the criminal charges, finding that since the Catskill Animal Sanctuary's petition seeking the posting of security to care for the horses was dismissed (which had a lower standard of proof than in a criminal action), this necessarily meant it would be impossible to obtain a criminal conviction under the higher standard. Essentially, the Town Court's decision reflected a determination that one cannot violate New York's state cruelty law unless the animal dies due to lack of sustenance or care. The County Court found this reasoning erroneous; a violation under the law occurs when one fails to provide necessary sustenance, not only those acts or omissions that result in an animal's death. The criminal actions were thus, reinstated against defendant.|