Federal
|
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar |
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| Carl v. Resnick |
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| Campbell v. Supervalu |
North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. |
| Callahan v. Woods |
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| Californians for Humane Farms v. Schafer |
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| Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service |
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| Bundorf v. Jewell | Plaintiffs, individuals and environmental organizations, challenged a decision by the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) to authorize two rights-of-way for the Searchlight Wind Energy Project (“Project”) in southern Nevada (on BLM land) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the District Court remanded to the BLM for further explanation, the plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs raised claims that the activity violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), among other federal statutes. In effect, the plaintiffs argue that when the Court remanded for further explanation, it essentially reached the merits of their NEPA and ESA claims "by identifying explanatory gaps in the Remand Order." This then necessitated vacatur of the Record of Decision (“ROD”), Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”), and the Biological Opinion (“BiOp”). On appeal, the Court agreed with plaintiffs that clarification of the Remand Order is appropriate to include the ROD, the FEIS, and the BiOp with vacatur. Otherwise, the court notes, the Federal Defendants would get "two bites at the same apple . . . to fill the analytical gaps the Court identified in the Remand Order." The Federal Defendants must address the gaps related to: "(1) the density of desert tortoises, the adverse effects on desert tortoise habitat due to noise, and the remuneration fees and blasting mitigation measures for desert tortoises; (2) the status of FWS's recommendations regarding eagle take permitting and an Eagle Conservation Plan; and (3) BLM's conclusions about risks to bald eagles, protocols for golden eagle surveys, and risks to and mitigation measures for bat species." |
| Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke | Plaintiffs Buffalo Field Campaign and other environmental groups petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to add the Yellowstone bison population to the federal endangered species list. After the Service made a threshold “90–day” determination that Buffalo Field's petition failed to present sufficient scientific evidence that listing the bison may be warranted, Buffalo Field brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Service's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Service applied an improper standard when evaluating Buffalo Field's petition, granted Buffalo Field's motion for summary judgment, denied the Service's cross-motion, and remanded the case for the agency to conduct a new 90–day finding using the proper standard. In particular, the court observed that the Service "simply picked a side in an ongoing debate in the scientific community," thereby in inappropriately heightening the standard of evaluation for a 90-day petition. Because of that, the court agreed with the Service that remand is the appropriate remedy as opposed to to directing the Service to begin a 12-month review. |
| Bruno Project Rescue Inc. v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention | This case addresses whether the CDC's 2024 regulation requiring all imported dogs to be at least six months old, challenged by Caribbean dog-rescue organizations, exceeds the agency's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) and is arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court found the age requirement constitutes a permissible "inspection" measure directly related to preventing rabies reintroduction, as it helps officials screen for rabies, verify vaccination effectiveness, and deter fraudulent importation of underage dogs from high-risk countries routed through rabies-free nations. The court also held the regulation is not an import prohibition requiring country-specific findings under § 265, and that the CDC rationally considered reliance interests and fraud evidence, rejecting arguments that the rule was overbroad or underinclusive. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the CDC. |
| Brown v. Muhlenberg Tp. |
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