|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture||
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture||Animal Advocacy Organizations argued the district court erred in ruling United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)'s decision to renew an exhibitor’s license did not violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). According to the organizations, the USDA may not renew a license when USDA knows an exhibitor is noncompliant with any animal welfare standards on the anniversary of the day USDA originally issued the license. The 11th Circuit, however, found it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the organizations' challenge to the renewal under the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the USDA's interpretation—which did not condition renewal on compliance with animal welfare standards on the anniversary of the license issuance date—was a reasonable one. The district court’s decision was therefore affirmed.|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman||
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman||
|ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a California corporation, CHIMPANZEE COLLABORATORY, SARAH BAECKLER, AMAZING ANIMAL ACTORS, INC., a Ca||Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code.|
|ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, COMPLAINT FOR VALERIE BUCHANAN, JANE GARRISON, AND NANCY MEGNA DECLARATORY|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy||
In this case, animal welfare groups and two individuals challenged the regulation promulgated by Department of Agriculture that failed to include birds, rats, and mice as “animals” within meaning of Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (FLAWA). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and subsequently granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs could not demonstrate both constitutional standing to sue and statutory right to judicial review under the APA. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss.
|Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Perdue||The Secretary of Agriculture is directed by the Animal Welfare Act to promulgate regulations governing minimum animal housing and care standards and to issue licenses for animal exhibitionists only if they adhere to these standards. The Animal Legal Defense Fund sued the Department of Agriculture for renewing Tom and Pamela Sellner's Cricket Hollow Zoo in Iowa despite multiple violations of the animal welfare requirements set forth in the Act. In fact, the USDA had filed an administrative complaint against the Sellners and commenced a formal investigation in 2015 According to the court, the USDA has established a "bifurcated" approach to licensing, where initial applicants must comply with regulations and pass an agency compliance inspection, while license renewal applicants must only pay a fee and agree to continue to comply with regulations. After the District Court's dismissal of the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part but remanded back to the District Court the question whether the USDA's reliance on self-certification was an arbitrary and capricious action with instructions to get further explanation from the agency. As stated by the court, "On remand, the agency must, at a minimum, explain how its reliance on the self-certification scheme in this allegedly “smoking gun” case did not constitute arbitrary and capricious action."|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Thomas J. Vilsack||
In this case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sought to intervene on a proceeding dealing with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and a family owned-zoo in Iowa for alleged violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The USDA was seeking enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act against the Iowa zoo and the ALDF sought to intervene because it has long criticized the zoo's care and handling of its animals. The ALDF was prevented from intervening by the administrative law judge (ALJ) that was presiding over the matter. The ALJ did not allow the ALDF to intervene in the matter on the basis that the “ALDF’s stated interests were beyond the scope of the proceeding.” The ALDF filed suit challenging this decision according to Section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows “interested persons” to participate in agency proceedings “so far as the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” The court found that the ALDF should have been allowed to intervene in the proceeding according to 555(b) because the ALDF’s "demonstrated interest in the welfare of the zoo's animals falls squarely within the scope of the USDA enforcement proceeding.” The court also found that there was no evidence to suggest that having ALDF intervene would "impede the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” As a result, the court held in favor of the ALDF’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back the case back to USDA for further consideration of ALDF's motion to Intervene.
|Animal Legal Defense Fund; Animal Welfare Institute; Valerie Buchanan; Jane Garrison; Nancy Megna, plaintiffs-appellants v. Ann||
In this federal action, plaintiffs (ALDF, the AWI, and three individuals) challenged the USDA's decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of on-human primates in order to comply with the Animal Welfare Act. While the district court found that the USDA's decision did not constitute a reviewable final agency decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lower court did indeed have authority under the Administrative Procedures Act to review the agency's decision not to create a policy.
On June 4, 2007, the Court vacated the previous opinion and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Two judges wrote separate opinions, concurring and dissenting in part.