Results
| Title | Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia - Cruelty - Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 of 2016, or “National Code of Safety and Citizen Coexistence.” Title XIII is titled “of the relationship with animals.” chapter one talks about the respect and care owed to animals, prohibiting behaviors that negatively affect animals, such as the promotion, participation, or sponsorship of betting activities involving animals; the sale of domestic animals on public roads; the wandering of animals on the streets; and the use of captive animals as shooting targets. Chapter II “Domestic animals or pets,” establishes that only species authorized by the law can be kept as pets. The ownership of wild animals as pets is prohibited. Services animals accompanying their owners are always allowed in public spaces. Dog fighting is prohibited in the entire territory. Chapter IV regulates the management and ownership of potentially dangerous dogs, tort liability, the registry of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| Sentencia T-622, 2016 | Sentencia T-622/16 |
This is not a judicial decision that touches on animal welfare issues. However, it is important to mention as the Constitutional Court granted for the first time the status of legal person to a river. The Plaintiff, ‘Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social “Tierra Digna”’ brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) in representation of various community councils of the Atrato region in the Colombian Pacific against the Presidency of the Republic and others. The basin of the Atrato river covers and area of about 40,000 KM2 (15,444.086 sq mi) It is considered one of the highest water yields in the world. There are many ethnic communities that live in the adjoined municipalities that include Afro-Colombian communities, indigenous communities and mixed communities that obtain their sustenance from activities such as artisanal mining, agriculture, hunting and fishing by this river. The water of the river is also used for direct consumption. The Plaintiff alleged that the contamination of the river is a threat to the health of the communities that use the river as a source of work, recreation and to obtain food. The Plaintiffs sought that the court stop the large-scale and permanent use of illegal extraction methods of minerals such as gold and platinum. Additionally, logging that includes the use of heavy machinery and highly toxic substances such as mercury and cyanide as well as other toxic chemicals used in mining of the Atrato river. They argued that the illegal mining in the Atrato river was resulting in harmful and irreversible consequences on the environment, affecting the fundamental rights of ethnic communities that live in the area and the natural balance of the territory. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs asked the court to declare protection of the fundamental rights of the ethnic communities: life, health, water, food security, a healthy living environment, to culture and to the territory, by ordering the implementation of structural changes. The lower courts denied the action of ‘tutela’ in first and second instance, arguing that the Plaintiff sought the protection of collective rights, rather than fundamental rights. Therefore, this constitutional mechanism was not appropriate. After holding that the action of ‘tutela’ was the appropriate mechanism for the protection of the fundamental rights of the ethnic communities, the court established in its ruling that the right to water was a fundamental right, as it is a necessary component to the right to a dignified life, and it is essential for many organisms that inhabit the planet to be able to survive. The use of mercury and other toxic substances in mining activities is prohibited, regardless the legality of the activity. In a new approach, the court held that the Atrato river is subject to rights that imply its protection, conservation and maintenance and instructs the national government to be the guardian and to exercise the river’s legal representation through the president or whichever he appointed, along with the ethnic communities that inhabit the basin of the river. Thus, it guarantees the Atrato river is represented by a member of these communities and a delegate of the Colombian government. |
Case |
| Colombia - Cruelty - Ley 1955 | Ley 1955 | “The National Development Plan for 2018-2022,” in article 324, instructs the national government to draft the national policy and guidelines for the protection and welfare of farm animals, stray animals, and animals subject to cruelty, among others. It instructs the government to define strategies, programs, and to propose laws for animal protection on issues such as responsible ownership, sterilization campaigns, the creation of welfare centers, rehabilitation and integral assistance to domestic and wild animals, the progressive substitution of vehicles of animal traction, and the strengthening of investigation and prosecution procedures for crimes against animals with the purpose of eradicating all forms of animal violence, cruelty, illegal traffic, and trade. | Statute |
| Sentencia C-148/22 | Sentencia C-148/22 | El abogado Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez presentó una demanda de inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Constitucional, argumentando que la pesca recreativa violaba el principio de precaución, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y la prohibición de crueldad animal. Siguiendo el precedente creado con la sentencia C-045 de 2019, que prohíbe la caza deportiva, la Corte Constitucional de Colombia decidió el 2 de mayo del 2022 que las disposiciones relativas a la pesca recreativa contenidas en diversas leyes nacionales eran inconstitucionales, prohibiendo efectivamente esta práctica en todo el territorio. La corte determinó que pescar con fines recreativos, sin ningún otro propósito relevante como comercial o de sustento, constituye una forma de crueldad animal. Específicamente, la corte enfatizó que el mandato de protección animal se deriva del principio de la constitución ecológica, la función social de la propiedad y la dignidad humana. Además, se señaló que, en este contexto, tanto el legislativo como la corte han reconocido previamente a todos los animales como seres sintientes. La corte sostuvo que, aunque no es posible definir con certeza absoluta las consecuencias dañinas de la pesca recreativa en términos de principios de conservación y bienestar animal o la degradación de los recursos hidrobiológicos, existe información científica relevante que debe ser considerada para evitar efectos perjudiciales en los peces y el hábitat. Respecto a la sintiencia animal, tras un exhaustivo análisis, la corte enfatizó que hay razones convincentes para considerar que los peces pueden sentir dolor, y el mandato de protección animal requiere tratar a los seres sintientes con dignidad. De manera similar, según la FAO, actualmente no existe ningún método capaz de eliminar completamente el maltrato a los peces, y hay impactos ambientales que deben ser considerados seriamente junto con los beneficios económicos propuestos a favor de la pesca recreativa. Esta situación llevó a la Corte Constitucional a activar el principio de precaución. La corte determinó que hay un deber de proteger a los animales que implica proteger tanto el equilibrio ecosistémico como a los animales sintientes individuales con valor intrínseco. Esta protección se diferencia y pondera en función del tipo de especie involucrada, ya sea doméstica o silvestre. Además, el deber de protección animal lleva consigo un efecto vinculante indiscutible, que requiere evaluaciones de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en su aplicación tanto por parte de legisladores como de jueces. Tras un extenso análisis de los efectos positivos y negativos que conllevaría la prohibición de esta actividad, la corte concluyó que la pesca recreativa constituye una forma de crueldad animal que viola el derecho a un medio ambiente sano, específicamente la prohibición contra la crueldad animal de acuerdo con leyes y jurisprudencia constitucional que carecían de respaldo constitucional al no estar fundamentadas en límites permisibles constitucionalmente para el maltrato animal, como (a) la libertad religiosa; (b) los hábitos alimenticios; (c) la investigación médica y experimentación; y (d) prácticas culturales arraigadas. Teniendo en cuenta los intereses de aquellos afiliados a la actividad, que se verían significativamente afectados por la invalidación de las leyes sujetas a esta opinión, y que han estado llevando a cabo actividades bajo leyes previamente consideradas constitucionales, la corte decidió posponer los efectos de la decisión por un año. Esto con el propósito de permitir que aquellos afectados adversamente por ella se adapten a las nuevas circunstancias. | Case |
| Colombia - Zoos - LEY 611, 2000 | Ley 611 del 2000 | Ley 611, 200 regulates the usage and management of terrestrial and aquatic fauna, and their products. To accomplish this goal, this law permits such use and management to be done through direct harvest of species in their environment, or through zoo breeders of open and/or close cycle. It requires terrestrial and aquatic fauna to be used to obtain economic gain in a way that does not lead to the diminishment of the different species populations in a long term. To do so, this law requires the acquisition of operating licenses before the breeders begin their operations. | Statute |
| Decision STL12651-2017 | Decision STL12651-2017 | The Labor Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided on an action of ‘tutela’ filed by la Fundación Botánica y Zoológica de Barranquilla, Fundazoo against the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, Luis Domingo Gómez Maldonado, Corpocaldas and others. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants had violated their rights to due process and right to defense, as well as the principle of legality and contradiction, when the Defendant ordered the transfer of the spectacled bear ‘Chucho’ from the Barranquilla zoo to a natural reserve in Narino. Plaintiff sought to leave without effect Decision AHC4806 2017 that granted habeas corpus to ‘Chucho’, the spectacled bear, allowing the bear to stay at the Barranquilla Zoo, which according to Plaintiffs, is able to provide Chucho with all the requirements for his well being, including veterinary care, food, companionship and infrastructure. The Labor Chamber decided for the Plaintiff and left without effect the decision of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, arguing that the Civil Chamber had ruled based on norms that did not apply to the specific case, to a point that the effects of such application had resulted in an interpretation that completely deferred to what the legislative had intended. The Civil Chamber, the court said in its reasoning, wrongly applied the procedure of habeas corpus, which led to the violation of the due process of law of the Plaintiffs, as ‘Chucho’ has no legal capacity to be a party in a legal procedure. The labor chamber explained that from a constitutional view, the granting of habeas corpus for the protection of animals was not proper, as it is established to protect the right to freedom of persons, which is the basis for a society. For that reason, it can only be attributable to human beings that can be individualized. This rules out the other beings to use this mechanism, including legal persons, as it would erode the real essence of this legal mechanism, the court stated. Furthermore, the magister judge states that the legal treatment that has been given to animals corresponds to the sentients beings, which implies their protection, rather than persons. This means that humans have the responsibility to respect animals, but does not imply that animals can fight for their freedom through the mechanism of habeas corpus, in these cases the defense of animals cannot be resolved by giving them the status of persons, but rather through judicial mechanisms such as popular actions (for the protection of collective and diffuse rights and interests), or with preventive material apprehension | Case |
| Colombia - Transportation - Decreto 178, 2012 | Decreto 178, 2012 | This decreto relates to measures for the replacement of vehicles of animal traction. The term ‘vehicle of animal traction’ is defined by the National Traffic Code, Ley 769, 2002 as a “non-motorized vehicle pulled or moved by an animal. Decreto 178, 2012, regulates and approves the substitution of the vehicles of animal traction for cargo vehicles as a way to facilitate and incentivize the development of alternatives for the drivers. | Statute |
| Colombia - Slaughter - Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500, 2007, establishes the technical regulations that create the standards for inspection, supervision, and control in the meat production chain. This decree focuses on the sanitary and health aspects involved in the slaughter phase of livestock. However, there are some provisions that directly or indirectly address animal welfare. Some of these provisions include raising animals in facilities that pose a minimum risk for animal production and welfare. Primary production farms must implement good practices in animal feeding and animal welfare. Transportation vehicles must have adequate physical separation mechanisms to prevent overcrowding, crowding, and animal aggression during transport. In addition, vehicles must have adequate conditions for animal welfare, biosecurity, biocontainment, and sanitary management. Article 31 Num 3 establishes that animals must be slaughtered by non-cruel methods, which ensure that they are rendered unconscious before being slaughtered. The National Institute for Food and Drug Supervision -INVIMA- is the authority in charge of establishing and overseeing compliance with slaughter methods. | Statute |
| PETA's Investigation of Caucaseco Scientific Research Center in Cali, Colombia | Developments and relevant legal materials concerning PETA's investigation into the irregularities and welfare conditions of primates used by the NIH-funded Caucaseco Scientific Research Center, A Colombian institution dedicated to scientific research for the development of a malaria vaccine. | Policy | |
| Colombia - Cruelty - LEY 05, 1972 | Ley 05 de 1972 | This statute creates and regulates the creation of the Boards for Animal Defense. These boards, once legally constituted, become legal persons, with their main goal to raise awareness and educate the community about respect towards animals and animal protection through educational programs. Ley 5, 1972, establishes the creation of these boards as mandatory in all the municipalities in the country, as well as fines and arrests for those who are found responsible for committing cruel acts towards animals. At the same time, it establishes that the police have a duty to assist the Animal Defense Boards in the fulfillment of their goals. These boards are integrated by the Mayor or his/her delegate; the Parish Priest or his slender; the Municipal Representative or his/her delegate; a representative of the Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock of the respective Department; and a delegate chosen by the directives of the local schools. With the creation of these boards, the law seeks to promote educational campaigns that “tend to awaken the spirit of love towards animals that are useful to humans and to avoid cruel acts and unjustified mistreatment and abandonment of such animals." | Statute |