|Overview of Whaling||Tom Krepitch||Animal Legal & Historical Center||In 2010, Australia sued Japan at the International Court of Justice in an effort to force Japan to end its whaling program in the Antarctic. Though commercial whaling was banned in the 1980s, Japan claimed that its program was for scientific purposes and therefore legal. The ICJ sided with Australia, but its ruling left open the possibility that Japan could resume whaling in the future.||Article|
|Oshannessy v Heagney|| NSWSC 482||
The case focuses primarily on the procedural requirements for stating a case. However, there is also discussion concerning what are the appropriate steps that a motor vehicle driver, who has hit and injured an animal with their vehicle, must take. In this case, the trial judge found that a refusal to stop and inspect the animal did not constitute a failure to take reasonable steps to alleviate that animal's pain.
|New Zealand - Animal Welfare - Code for Layer Hens 2012||This code sets the minimum standards for the care and management of layer hens under all forms of management used in New Zealand. The purpose of this code is to provide guidance to the owners of layer hens and to persons who are in charge of them about the standards they must achieve in order to meet their obligations under the Animal Welfare Act 1999.||Statute|
|New Zealand - Animal Welfare - Code for Layer Hens 1999||Code of Animal Welfare No. 18||In New Zealand, hens are kept under conditions ranging from large commercial enterprises where the birds are totally reliant on humans for all their daily requirements to free-ranging hens which have access to outdoor runs or pasture. Provided those concerned with the day-to-day care of the hens treat them with skill and consideration, their welfare can be safeguarded under a variety of management systems. The code takes account of five basic requirements: freedom from thirst, hunger and malnutrition, the provision of appropriate comfort and shelter, the prevention, or rapid diagnosis and treatment, of injury, disease or infection, freedom from distress, and the ability to display normal patterns of behavior.||Statute|
|Mark, Stoner, Setter and Pearson v Henshaw||(1998) 155 ALR 118||(1998) 85 FCR 555;  FCA 556||
The four appellants, members of Animal Liberation, entered premises containing battery hens without permission. This was done allegedly on concern as to the treatment of those battery hens and the appellants claimed this constituted a reasonable excuse. After a second appeal, the convictions were upheld and it was found that the appellants did not have a reasonable excuse for trespass.
|Mansbridge v Nichols|| VSC 530||
The appellant was convicted of seven offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) related to the appellant's treatment of merino sheep in her care. The appellant was successful in overturning three of the charges on the basis that they were latently duplicitous or ambiguous. The appellant was unsuccessful in arguing that the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons.
|Larobina v R|| NSWDC 79||
The appellant appeal against a conviction for animal cruelty sustained in a lower court. After an examination of the elements of the statutory offense, it was found that the charge upon which the conviction was sustained was unknown to law.
|Kangaroo Culling in Australia||Jordan Sosnowski||
Brief Summary of Kangaroo Culling in Australia
|Joyce v Visser|| TASSC 116||
The appellant was convicted of failing to provide food and water to dogs who were chained to a spot. Citing the extreme nature of the neglect and the need for general deterrence, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to three months' imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate judge found the sentence to be manifestly excessive and reduced the sentence.
|Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc.||860 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2012) rev'd, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013) and rev'd, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013)||The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission.||Case|