Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bartlett v. State | 929 So.2d 1125, (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2006) | 2006 WL 1409122 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2006), 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1449 |
In this Florida case, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony cruelty to animals after the defendant shot an opossum "countless" times with a BB gun after the animal had left defendant's home. As a result, the animal had to be euthanized. The court wrote separately to observe that the felony cruelty section (828.12) as written creates a potential tension between conduct criminalized by the statute and the lawful pursuit of hunting. The commission of an act that causes a "cruel death" in Section 828.12 applies to even the unintended consequence of a lawful act like hunting. |
Case | |||||||
| Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 4932046 (E.D. Penn.) |
After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts. |
Case | ||||||||
| Indiana v. Massachusetts | 202 L. Ed. 2d 564, 139 S. Ct. 859 (2019) | 139 S.Ct. 859 (Mem) (U.S.,2019) | A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court. | Case | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 Núm 2 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| IL - Exotic pets - Act 68. Herptiles-Herps Act | 510 ILCS 68/1-1 to 510 ILCS 68/110–5 | IL ST CH 510 § 68/1-1 to IL ST CH 510 § 68/110–5 | Under the Herptiles-Herps Act reptiles and amphibians are exempt from the definition of “aquatic life” under the Fish and Aquatic Life Code. All rules and enforcement actions under the Illinois Conservation Law and the dangerous animals statutes related to reptiles and amphibians are now covered exclusively by this Act. | Statute | |||||||
| CA - Reptiles & Amphibians - Division 5. Protected Reptiles and Amphibians | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 5000 - 5062 | CA FISH & G § 5000 - 5062 | These sections are the California statutes that specifically protect certain reptiles and amphibians. The sections enumerate the protected species and strictly prohibit taking and possession, with a narrow exception that may be granted by permit to an educational or scientific institution or a public zoological garden. | Statute | |||||||
| AU - Wildlife - Nature Conservation Act 2002 (TAS) | Nature Conservation Act 2002 No. 63 of 2002 31.12.2002 |
An Act to make provision with respect to the conservation and protection of the fauna, flora and geological diversity of the State, to provide for the declaration of national parks and other reserved land and for related purposes. |
Statute | ||||||||
| IN RE: MICHEAL McCALL AND KATHY McCALL | 52 Agric. Dec. 986 (1993) | 1993 WL 459890 (U.S.D.A.) | This opinion held that the USDA may impose sanctions even if respondent dealer is not licensed. Respondents were operators of kennel facilities in Washington, Kansas, and in nearby Reynolds, Nebraska. In 1991 and 1992, Respondents each applied for dealer's licenses under the Act and both were denied. The Judicial Officer affirmed that part of the Order by Judge Bernstein (ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $7,500, and ordering Respondents to cease and desist from engaging in any activity for which a license is required without being licensed, and failing to maintain their facilities in accordance with the regulations and standards involving housing, shelter, veterinary care, records, sanitation, cleaning, food, and water. However, the Judicial Officer increased from 1 year to 10 years the period in which Respondents are disqualified from becoming licensed under the Act and regulations. | Case | |||||||
| Donald HENDRICK and Concerned Citizens for True Horse Protection, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (Aphis), Defendants. | Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2900526 (W.D.Ky.) |
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of “soring” (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define “sore” and “scar” beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the “scar rule”). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact. |
Case | ||||||||
| Beasley v. Sorsaia | 880 S.E.2d 875 (2022) | 247 W.Va. 409 (W.Va., 2022) | Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded. | Case |