Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Critical Habitat - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Klamath River and | 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.) | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AI52 |
This final rule is written to designate a critical habitat for the Klamath River and Columbia River populations of Bull Trout. The critical habitat designation includes approximately 1,748 miles of streams and 61,235 acres of lakes and marshes. The reason for this designation is that at the time of listing, there are only seven remaining non-migratory populations of bull trout, and the designation is mandatory pursuant to a court order. |
Administrative | |
| IA - Fur, traps - Chapter 481A. Wildlife Conservation. | I. C. A. § 481A.92 | IA ST § 481A.92 | A person cannot use colony traps for fur-bearing animals except for muskrats. Traps must be labeled with the user's name and address, and must be checked at least once every twenty-four hours, unless completely submerged under water. A person cannot use instruments such as chemicals or explosives to remove fur-bearing animals from their dens. | Statute | |
| CA - Docking - § 597n. Docked horses; prohibition of docking; importation or use of unregistered animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597n | CA PENAL § 597n | This law was amended in 2009 to prohibit the docking or cutting of the solid part of any horse or cattle. Violation of the law constitutes a misdemeanor. The new law does provide an exclusion for the docking of any cattle's tail in an emergency for the purpose of saving the cattle's life or relieving the cattle's pain provided that the emergency treatment is performed consistent with the Veterinary Medicine Practice Act. | Statute | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | Slip Copy 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah July 7, 2017) | This case deals with the constitutionality of Utah's "ag gag" law, enacted in 2012. The law criminalizes lying to obtain access to an agricultural operation and the subsequent recording or filming once inside. According to statements made enactment, it is directed at undercover operations that investigate farm animal abuse. Plaintiffs assert that the law violates their First Amendment rights. On review of motions, the court first looked at whether the First Amendment applies to this type of "lying." Because a recent U.S. Supreme Court case makes lying that causes "cognizable legal harm" outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court examined the type of lying at issue in the Utah law. Ultimately, the court found that lying to gain access to these agricultural facilities does not in itself cause a legally cognizable harm. Thus, "absent an additional showing of harm, under either interpretation, at least some of the lies criminalized by the Act retain First Amendment protection." With regard to First Amendment protections for the act of recording once at an agricultural operation and whether a strict scrutiny standard applies, the court looked to other circuits that found the act of making speech (i.e., recording/filming) is protected. The State countered with the fact that such recording occurs on private property, but the court found the government cannot place criminal restrictions on speech simply because it occurs on private property. The court noted that the property owner can indeed remove the person from the property and sue for any damages resulting from the trespass, which is different than prosecution by the state to curtail speech. Finally, after finding that the act impinges protected speech, the court then analyzed whether it withstood a strict scrutiny review. The State proffered government interests that include concerns over worker protection and disease outbreak. However, the court noted nothing in the legislative history on these claims or any actual incidents that supported these asserted government interests. The court found the Act did not survive strict scrutiny as it was not narrowly tailored and instead was directed at the content of the speech (the act of recording a facility). The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. | Case | ||
| Ward v. Hartley | 895 A.2d 1111 (Md.App., 2006) | 2006 WL 902553 (Md.App.), 168 Md.App. 209 |
In this Maryland case, a dog bite victim filed a negligence and strict liability action against the dog owners and their landlords. In plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment, the appellate court held that the landlords had no control over the premises where the "dangerous or defective condition" existed and thus had no duty to inspect. The court found that first, no statute, principle of common law, or provision in the lease imposed upon the landlord the duty to inspect the leased premises to see if a vicious animal was being kept. Second, there was no evidence presented that, at the time the lease was signed by the landlord, he knew, or would have had any way of knowing, that a vicious animal was to be kept on the premises. |
Case | |
| In re: JAMES E. STEPHENS AND WATER WHEEL EXOTICS, INC. | 58 Agric. Dec. 149 (1999) | 1999 WL 288586 (U.S.D.A.) | Ongoing pattern of violations establishes "history of previous violations" for purposes of 7 USCS § 2149(b). | Case | |
| US - Lacey Act - Conspiracy Statute | 18 USC § 371 | If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. | Statute | ||
| Auto 547, 2018 - Colombia | Constitutional Court. Auto 547, 2018 | The court held unconstitutional Law C-041, 2017, which held bullfighting and other exceptions in article 7 of this law should be prohibited as they are cruel and inhumane. However, Law C-041 deferred its effects and gave Congress a two-year deadline to allow Congress to rule on the issue. On Auto 547, the Court held, “Congress is the only body that has the power to prohibit traditional practices that involve animal abuse.” | Case | ||
| AL - Hunting - Article 19. Hunting of Native Game Animals and Certain Nonindigenous Animals. | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-500 - 505 | AL ST § 9-11-500 to 505 | This Alabama statute makes it unlawful to hunt or kill any species of nonindigenous animals for a fee or for recreation. This section does not apply to feral swine, nuisance animals, or to any nonindigenous animal lawfully brought into this state prior to 2006. | Statute | |
| Mouton v. State | 513 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. App. 2016) | 2016 WL 7445119 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2016), 04-16-00070-CR, 2016 WL 7445119 (Tex. App.--San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016) |
San Antonio Animal Care Services (ACS) responded to a call about 36 pit bull terriers that were chained, significantly underweight, and dehydrated. The dogs also had scarring consistent with fighting. Police obtained a search warrant and coordinated with ACS to seize the dogs. While the dogs were being secured, Appellant Terrence Mouton arrived at the residence. He told the officers that he had been living at the residence for a couple of weeks, but that he did not own all of the dogs and was holding them for someone else. Mouton was convicted in the County Court of cruelty to non livestock animals. On appeal, Mouton argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the Appellee, the State of Texas, failed to prove that the animals were in his custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mouton was responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs on his property and that the dogs were subject to his care and control, regardless of whether he was the actual owner of each animal. A reasonable jury could have also found that Mouton was “aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that he failed to provide proper nutrition, water, or shelter for the dogs. |
Case |