Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Hunting - Chapter 379. Fish and Wildlife Conservation. | West's F. S. A. § 379.105 | FL ST § 379.105 | This law represents the state's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person may not intentionally, within a publicly or privately owned wildlife management or fish management area or on any state-owned water body, interfere with or attempt to prevent the lawful taking of fish, game, or nongame animals by another or attempt to disturb wildlife or fish to prevent their lawful taking. Any person who violates this section commits a Level Two violation. | Statute | |
| Anzalone v. Kragness | 826 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 2005) | 292 Ill. Dec. 331 (2005) |
A woman whose cat was attacked while being boarded at veterinarian's office brought claims against veterinarian and animal hospital. Trial court dismissed claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Court of Appeals reversed holding dismissal was not warranted. |
Case | |
| New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall | 410 F.2d 1197 (C.A.N.M. 1969) |
The State of New Mexico filed an suit to prevent the U.S. Secretary of the Interior from killing deer in the Carlsbad Caverns National Park that were overbrowsing vegetation and posing a threat to the park's ecology without first having obtained the necessary state permit. The Court held that the Secretary has the authority to kill the deer to protect the park property, and it is immaterial that the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the lands within Carlsbad Caverns National Park as it has constitutional authority in the form of supervisory powers to manage national parks. To New Mexico and the other states involved in an amicus capacity in the suit, the real concern was over the federal encroachment into state management of fish and game, particularly in those states where much of the land is under federal control. |
Case | ||
| PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EXPTE. N° 450237 | "PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EX Sentencia número 86 de la Cámara de Apelaciones de lo Civil y Comercial y en lo Contencioso Administrativo, de la ciudad de Río Cuarto de 26 de octubre de 2012 | Este caso involucra una disputa entre German Luis Prieto (demandante) y Luciana Andrea Colonna (demandada) sobre la propiedad de bienes muebles. El demandante alega haberlos adquirido durante su convivencia con la demandada y busca su restitución. La demandada argumenta que los bienes son parte de un patrimonio común debido a su relación de convivencia y sociedad de hecho, y niega la obligación de devolverlos. El tribunal, luego de analizar los argumentos, determina que el demandante tiene derecho a la restitución de los bienes, excepto en el caso del perro "Bauty", al considerar que este último ha desarrollado un vínculo emocional significativo con la demandada, y que su entrega podría causar un sufrimiento innecesario. En consecuencia, se revoca parcialmente la sentencia inicial, se ordena la restitución de los bienes y se le permite a la demanda quedarse con el canino. | Case | ||
| Berg v. Nguyen | 201 So. 3d 1185 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) | 2016 WL 100267 (Ala. Civ. App. Jan. 8, 2016) | This Alabama case involves the appeal of summary judgment on behalf of defendants in a personal injury dog bite case. The plaintiff here was bitten as she walked through a parking lot of the retail store adjacent to the residence where the dogs were kept. The dogs (six or seven pit bulls) were kept by defendants' tenants at the residence. Some of the dogs were kept in outdoor, chain-link kennels and others were allowed to remain in the fenced backyard. Plaintiff Berg filed a complaint against the Nguyens and their business under a theory of landlord-tenant liability for the dog bite. The lower court granted the Nguyens' motion for summary judgment, finding that Alabama law does not provide for landlord liability in this case. On appeal here, the court was persuaded by defendants' evidence that they did not know of the dog's dangerous propensity and were aware of only two occasions where animal control had been called. Further, there were only a few times Than Nguyen was aware the dogs were left unchained in the front yard. This was sufficient for the court to find that plaintiff did not meet her burden establishing that the Nguyens knew or should have known of any dangerous propensities of the dog that bit plaintiff. As to the issue of defendants' knowledge that pit bulls were "inherently dangerous," the court held that the Alabama Supreme Court in Humphries established that breed alone is insufficient to impute knowledge. Summary judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| IN - Equine Activity Statute - Chapter 5. Equine Activities | I.C. 34-31-5-1 to 5 | IN ST 34-31-5-1 to 5 | This Indiana statute states that an equine activity sponsor or equine professional is not liable for an injury to a participant or the death of a participant resulting from an inherent risk of equine activities. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. The statute also requires the visible displaying of warning signs or warnings provided in contracts that alert participants to the limitation of liability by law. | Statute | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Authorization for Commercial Fisheri | RIN 0648-AH33 | FR Doc. 04-2981 |
NMFS issued a final rule to implement a new management regime for the unintentional taking of marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing operations, which was published in the Federal Register on August 30, 1995. The purpose of this document is to correct an unintended error in the definition of ``negligible impact,'' which provides a reference to a section number of the regulations that has been changed. |
Administrative | |
| CO - Impoundment - Article 15. Regulation Under Police Power. | C. R. S. A. § 30-15-104 | CO ST § 30-15-104 | This Colorado statute immunizes the board of county commissioners or other local governing entity from liability associated with the impoundment of pet animals. Specifically, it states the board or anyone authorized to enforce a local ordinance shall not be held responsible for any accident or subsequent disease that may occur to the animal in connection with the administration of the resolution or ordinance. | Statute | |
| Porter v. DiBlasio | 93 F.3d 301 (Wis.,1996) |
Nine horses were seized by a humane society due to neglect of a care taker without giving the owner, who lived in another state, notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The owner filed a section 1983 suit against the humane society, the county, a humane officer and the district attorney that alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process, conspiracy, and conversion. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a viable claim. On appeal, the court found that the owner had two viable due process claims, but upheld the dismissal for the others. |
Case | ||
| O'Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government | 662 F.3d 723 (C.A.6 (Ky.), 2011) | 2011 WL 5345409 (C.A.6 (Ky.)) |
Dog owners sued city-county government and director of city animal-control agency under § 1983 for violations of Fourteenth Amendment after a warrantless search of home and seizure of their dogs. The Court of Appeals held that the owners did not need a breeder's license because their home was not a “Class A kennel.” It also held that the initial entry into owners' home by undercover animal-control officers was not a Fourth Amendment search because it did not infringe on owners' expectation of privacy. However, the consent-once-removed doctrine did not allow uniformed animal-control officers to enter home without a warrant. |
Case |