Displaying 1 - 10 of 5857
Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife 57 F.Supp.3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional Case
MO - Lost Dog - Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act V. A. M. S. 447.010 - 110 MO ST 447.010 - 110

This section comprises Missouri's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.

US - Assistance animals, housing - § 100.204 Reasonable accommodations. 24 C. F. R. § 100.204

This section states that it is unlawful any person to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public and common use areas. Examples of such situations are also given.

ID - Exotic - Chapter 39. Importation or Possession of Deleterious Exotic Animals I.C. § 25-3901 - 3905 ID ST § 25-3901 - 3905

In Idaho, all apes and other nonhuman primates are classified as “deleterious exotic animals,” which are dangerous to the environment, livestock, agriculture, or wildlife of the state. According to Idaho’s legislature, it is in the public interest to strictly regulate the importation and possession of those animals.

People v. Preston 300 N.W. 853 (Mich. 1941) 299 Mich. 484 (Mich. 1941)

Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing three cows.  The issue considered on review was: "Are the circumstances and testimony here, aliunde the confession of the respondent, sufficient to create such a probability that the death of the cattle in question was intentionally caused by human intervention and to justify the admission in evidence of the alleged confession of the respondent?"  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

U.S. v. Todd 735 F.2d 146 (C.A. Tex. 1984)

Larry Todd and James Short appeal their convictions for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act which prohibits the sale of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of federal law--here, The Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1976).  The court held that the judge's failure to give instructions related to the dates of the alleged acts constituting the conspiracy did not raise an ex post facto challenge since the facts allege only two overt acts that occurred prior to the effective date of the Lacey Act amendments; all of the other acts occurred during the effective period of the amendments and most of the evidence focused on events that occurred within the effective date of the amendments.  The appellants also contend that the government failed to establish that the game taken had a market value in excess of $350.   The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Short's conviction under the substantive violation of the Lacey Act because the government offered no evidence that the value of the dead eagle, deer, or javelina exceeded $350.

OR - Exotic Pets - Division 11. Livestock Health and Sanitation. Exotic Animals OR ADC 603-011-0700 to 0725 OAR 603-011-0700 to 0725

This set of regulations includes the Oregon Department of Agriculture’s rules governing the possession of non-human primates. Individuals wishing to possess a non-human primate must be qualified by experience and education, have an approved facility, and must obtain an exotic animal permit from the Department. All permittees must comply with the agency’s rules for the housing and care of non-human primates and any additional permit conditions that the Department imposes.

People v. Johnson 889 N.W.2d 513 (2016), appeal denied, 500 Mich. 951, 891 N.W.2d 231 (2017) 315 Mich. App. 163, 2016 WL 1576933 (Mich. App. Apr. 19, 2016) This case involves challenges to the courtroom procedure of allowing a witness to be accompanied on the witness stand by a support animal. Defendant Johnson appealed his convictions of criminal sexual assault after he was convicted of assaulting his six-year-old niece. During Defendant's trial, a black Labrador retriever was permitted, to accompany the six-year-old victim to the witness stand. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of a support animal because MCL 600.2163a(4) only allows a support person. The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that the trial court had the inherent authority to utilize support animals. Secondly, the Defendant argued that trial counsel should have objected to the notice of a support person on the basis that allowing the witnesses to testify accompanied by the support animal violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court of Appeals stated that there is no indication that the support dog used was visible to the jury, or that he barked, growled, or otherwise interrupted the proceedings. Therefore, the objection was meritless. Next, the Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request various procedural protections if the support animal was used. The Court of Appeals stated that the use of a support dog did not implicate the Confrontation Clause; the presence of the dog did not affect the witnesses' competency to testify or affect the oath given to the witnesses; the witnesses were still subject to cross-examination; and the trier of fact was still afforded the unfettered opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Finally, the Defendant argued that a limiting instruction should have been provided to the jury when the support animal was utilized and this rendered his counsel ineffective. The Court of Appeals stated, that there are no Michigan jury instructions addressing the use of a support animal. Counsel was then not ineffective in failing to ask for an instruction that does not yet exist in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence and remanded. Case
US - AWA - 2008 Public Law 110-234 2008 PL 110-234 122 Stat 923 2008 Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act. Statute
ME - Equine Liability - Chapter 743. Equine Activities 7 M. R. S. A. § 4101 - 4104-A ME ST T. 7 § 4101 - 4104-A

This act stipulates that an equine sponsor, equine professional, or any other person engaged in an equine activity, is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, as well as property damage, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities.   However, there are exceptions to this rule:   A person will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant.   In addition, a person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person.