Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Rabies - 246-100-197. Rabies--Measures to prevent human disease. | WA ADC 246-100-197 | WAC 246-100-197 | Among other provisions concerning rabies, this Washington regulation states that an owner of a dog, cat, or ferret shall have it vaccinated and revaccinated against rabies following veterinary and USDA-licensed rabies vaccine manufacturer instructions. | Administrative | |
| VT - Hunting, contest - § 4716. Coyote-hunting competitions; prohibition | 10 V.S.A. § 4716 | VT ST T. 10 § 4716 | This Vermont law, effective January 1, 2019, prohibits coyote-hunting competitions in the state. A “coyote-hunting competition” means a contest in which people compete in the capturing or taking of coyotes for a prize. Violation incurs a fine of $400 - $1,000 for a first offense. A second or subsequent conviction results in a fine of not more than $4,000.00 nor less than $2,000.00. | Statute | |
| CO - Louisville - § Sec. 6.12.160 Pit bulls prohibited. | Louisville, Colorado Municipal Code, Title 6, § 6.12.160 | This code prohibits ownership of pit bulls within the city and provides certain exceptions. | Local Ordinance | ||
| Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin | 740 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D.Wis. 1990) |
Action was brought to determine Indian tribe members' rights related to off-reservation hunting of white-tailed deer, fisher and other furbearing animals, and small game within the area of the state ceded to the United States by the plaintiff tribes. The Court held that Indians and non-Indians were each entitled to one half of game harvest within each harvesting area rather than as a whole territory to accommodate the longer Indian hunting season. With regard to hunting on private land in the ceded area, the Court held that plaintiffs' members have no more rights than non-Indian hunters to hunt or to trap on private lands, as tribal members who are hunting or trapping on private lands are still subject to state hunting and trapping regulations. The Court also held that the state could properly prohibit Indians from hunting deer during the summer and at night due to the safety risk to humans. |
Case | ||
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.090. Dangerous dogs--Requirements for restraint | West's RCWA 16.08.090 | WA ST 16.08.090 | This Washington statute outlines the state and local provisions related to dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. It first provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under physical restraint of a responsible person. Potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances and nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute | |
| WA - Enumclaw - Breed - Chapter 7.08
 PIT BULL DOGS | ENUMCLAW, WA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 7.08.010 - 7.08.030 (1990) |
In Enumclaw, Washington, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess a pit bull dog, with exceptions for dogs licensed before the effective date of the ordinance. Such dogs are subject to certain requirements, such as proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, posting “Beware of Dog” signs, the use of special orange collars, photographs and tattoos for identification purposes, keeping $100,000 liability insurance, and vaccinating the dog against rabies. Failure to comply may result in the humane destruction of the dog. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Brayshaw v Liosatos | [2001] ACTSC 2 |
The appellant had informations laid against him alleging that he, as a person in charge of animals, neglected cattle 'without reasonable excuse' by failing to provide them with food. The appellant had been informed by a veterinarian that his treatment of the cattle was potentially a breach of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) and that they were in poor condition. The evidence admitted did not rule out the possibility that the appellant's feeding of the cattle accorded with 'maintenance rations' and the convictions were overturned. |
Case | ||
| State ex rel. William Montgomery v. Brain | 422 P.3d 1065 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | 2018 WL 2348473 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | The special action considers whether a person who uses a dangerous instrument in committing an animal cruelty offense may be sentenced as a dangerous offender. The facts in the underlying case are as follows. A witness in an apartment complex heard a dog crying and observed Shundog Hu using a rod to hit a dog that was inside a pet enclosure. Hu was charged with both intentionally or knowingly subjecting an animal to cruel mistreatment, a felony, and under the "dangerous offense" laws because the animal cruelty "involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a pole and/or rod, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-105 and 13-704." Hu moved to dismiss the dangerous offense allegation stating that, as a matter of law, "a dangerous offense cannot be committed against an animal." Hu contended that the legislature's inclusion of the phrase "on another person" in the statutory definition for "dangerous offense" evinces this intent. The State, on the other hand, argued that sentencing enhancement is based on the use of the dangerous instrument rather than the target of the instrument. The superior court granted Hu's motion and the State petitioned for this special action. This court accepted jurisdiction because " the State has no adequate remedy on appeal and the petition presents a legal issue of statewide importance." This court first examined the statutory definition for a "dangerous" felony offense: "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person.” The State's contention is that the "or" in the definition is disjunctive and, thus, the phrase "on another person" only applies to the second independent clause. Hu counters that such an interpretation would cover harm to anything and lead to absurd results. This court first noted that the statutory definitions are silent as to whether they only apply to humans. Applying principles of secondary interpretation and sensible construction, the court held that legislature's purpose in drafting the dangerous offense definition and the related statutes was to enhance crimes to “dangerous offenses” to protect human life. The State cannot charge a crime as a dangerous offense unless the target is against another person. In reaching this conclusion, the court contemplated extreme examples involving felony damage to vegetation as well as comparison to a recent decision in Texas where a deadly weapon finding was limited to human victims only. | Case | |
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter D: Dangerous Dogs | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.041 - 047 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.041 - 047 | Chapter 822, Subchapter D addresses dangerous dogs and their treatment, including dog attacks, registration, defenses, violations of the statute. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Street | 257 F.3d 869 (8th Cir.2001) |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case |