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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6023
Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation 627 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C.,2009) 2009 WL 1750413 (D.D.C.)

Plaintiffs Safari Club International and Safari Club International Foundation brought this action under the APA challenging the FWS's legal determination that the listing of the Polar Bear as "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act was a final agency action. At issue here is defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that plaintiffs fail to challenge a final agency action as required for judicial review under the APA. Alternatively, defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. This Court found that the action challenged by SCI and SCIF is final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to the APA. On the issue of standing, defendants argue that plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs have not alleged facts to establish that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the “procedures in question” threaten a “concrete interest" - an interest in conservation that is impacted by the import ban. Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was denied.

Case
BD - Cruelty - THE CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1920 Cruelty to Animals Act, 1920 (Act No. I of 1920)

This Act constitutes Bangladesh's prevention of cruelty to animals act. The act defines "animal" as "any domestic or captured animal." Any person who: overdrives, cruelty or unnecessarily beats, or otherwise ill-treats any animal; binds or carries an animal in a position as to subject the animal to unnecessary pain or suffering; offers or has in his possession an animal that is suffering because of mutilation, thirst, starvation or other ill-treatment shall be punished for every such offence with fine up to one hundred Taka, or imprisonment up to three months, or with both. Overloading an animal is also punishable with a fine or jail term, and animal fighting results in a fine.  

Statute
US - Assistance animals, housing - Service Animals and Assistance Animals for People with Disabilities in Housing and HUD-Funded Programs FHEO Notice: FHEO-2013-01 This notice explains certain obligations of housing providers under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with respect to animals that provide assistance to individuals with disabilities. The Department of Justice's (DOT) amendments to its regulations' for Titles II and III of the ADA limit the definition of "service animal” under the ADA to include only dogs, and further define "service animal" to exclude emotional support animals. This definition, however, does not limit housing providers' obligations to make reasonable accommodations for assistance animals under the FHAct or Section 504. Persons with disabilities may request a reasonable accommodation for any assistance animal, including an emotional support animal, under both the FHAct and Section 504. Administrative
LA - Rabies Immunization- Chapter 1. Anti-Rabies Vaccination Requirements for Dogs and Cats 51 LA ADC Pt III, § 101 to 111 La. Admin Code. tit. 51, pt. III, § 101 to 111 These regulations are Louisiana's rabies provisions. Under the chapter, a person is prohibited from keeping a dog, cat, or ferret over the age of three months that has not been vaccinated against rabies by a licensed veterinarian. Administrative
IA - Ordinances - 351.36. Enforcement I. C. A. § 351.36 IA ST § 351.36

This Iowa statute provides that local health and law enforcement officials shall enforce state provisions relating to vaccination and impoundment of dogs.  It further states that such public officials shall not be responsible for any accident or disease of a dog resulting from the enforcement of the provisions of the sections.

Statute
Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church 894 A.2d 329 (Conn.App., 2006) 94 Conn.App. 617, 2006 WL 797892 (Conn.App.)

The plaintiff, Virginia Auster, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357FN1 to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the dog of an employee of the defendant, Norwalk United Methodist Church.  Ms. Auster was a visitor who was on the premises to attend a meeting in the parish house when she was bitten by dog of church employee, who lived in an apartment in the parish house.  After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.  (See summary judgment appeal, 2004 WL 423189).  The Appellate Court held that church was not a “keeper” of the church employee's dog for purposes of statute which imposed strict liability on the keeper of any dog that did damage to the body or property of any person.  The court reversed the judgment and remanded the action for a new trial on the issue of common-law negligence

Case
TX - Lien, veterinary - § 70.010. Liens for Veterinary Care Charges for Large Animals V. T. C. A., Property Code § 70.010 TX PROPERTY § 70.010

This Texas law relates to veterinary liens for large animals, defined as ivestock or a cow, horse, mule, ass, sheep, goat, llama, alpaca, farm elk, or hog. The term does not include a common household pet such as a cat or dog. A licensed veterinarian has a lien on a large animal and the proceeds from the disposition of the large animal to secure the cost of veterinary care the veterinarian provided to the large animal. The lien attaches on the 20th day after the veterinarian first provided care to the large animal and attaches regardless of whether the veterinarian retains possession of the animal.

Statute
State v. Chilinski 330 P.3d 1169 (Mont. 2014) 2014 MT 206, 2014 WL 3842953 (Mont. 2014) After a call reporting the poor health of over 100 dogs at a large Malamute breeding operation and the recruitment of the Humane Society of the United States, including several volunteers, to help execute a warrant, defendant was charged with one misdemeanor count of cruelty to animals and 91 counts of felony cruelty to animals pursuant to § 45–8–211, MCA. Defendant was convicted by a jury of 91 counts of animal cruelty and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a total of 30 years with 25 years suspended. A prohibition from possessing any animals while on probation was also imposed on the defendant, as well as an order to forfeit every seized dog and all puppies born after the execution of the warrant. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, defendant argued the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held, however, that the search warrant authorizing seizure of “any and all dogs” and “any and all records pertaining to dogs” was not impermissibly overbroad; that the participation by civilian volunteers and Humane Society personnel in execution the warrant was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment or the Montana Constitution; and that the use of civilian volunteers to assist in execution of search did not violate defendant's right to privacy. The Supreme Court therefore held that the lower court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence. Next, the defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it improperly determined that the results of an investigation of his kennels in 2009 were irrelevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The court, however, agreed with the District Court, despite defendant's claim that 2009 inspection would show that the poor conditions of the kennels and the dogs in 2011 were justified due to economic hardship and health issues. Finally, defendant argued that the District Court was not authorized to order forfeiture of the defendant’s dogs that were not identified as victims of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute authorizing forfeiture of “any animal affected” as part of sentence for animal cruelty did not limit forfeiture of defendant's dogs to only those that served as basis for underlying charges, nor did it implicate the defendant's right to jury trial under the Apprendi case. The Supreme Court therefore held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to forfeit all of his dogs. The lower court’s decision was affirmed. Case
U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc. 611 F.3d 679 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 2010) 2010 WL 2600502 (C.A.10 (Kan.))

Appellants, Apollo Energies, Inc. and Dale Walker, were charged with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act after an agent with the USFWS discovered dead migratory birds lodged in each appellant's "heater-treater," a piece of equipment used in the course of appellants' Kansas oil drilling businesses, on several occasions. At trial, both Apollo and Walker were convicted of  misdemeanor violations for "taking" or "possessing" migratory birds. On appeal, Apollo and Walker contested that (1) the MBTA is not a strict liability crime or, (2) if it is a strict liability crime, the MBTA is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct. Bound by a previous holding that found misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes, the court concluded that the MBTA includes no mens rea requirement. As to Appellants' second contention challenging the constitutionality of the Act, the court concluded that while the Act is not unconstitutionally vague, "the MBTA requires a defendant to proximately cause the statute's violation for the statute to pass constitutional muster.

Case
Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. The New England Aquarium 836 F. Supp. 45 (1993)

The primary issue addressed by the court was whether a dolphin, named Kama, had standing under the MMPA. The court found the MMPA does not authorize suits brought by animals; it only authorizes suits brought by persons. The court would not impute to Congress or the President the intention to provide standing to a marine mammal without a clear statement in the statute.

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