Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WV - Impound - § 19-20-8. Impounding and disposition of dogs; costs and fees | W. Va. Code, § 19-20-8 | WV ST § 19-20-8 | This West Virginia statute provides that dogs seized and impounded as provided in this article shall be kept housed and fed in the county dog pound for five days after notice of seizure and impounding has been given or posted. Upon expiration this time period, all dogs which have not previously been redeemed by their owners shall be sold or humanely destroyed (this statute outlines what constitutes "humanely destroyed"). The owner may, at any time prior to the expiration of five days retrieve his or her dog by paying the requisite fees and satisfying any other provisions. | Statute | |
| ME - Breeder - Chapter 701. Rules Governing Animal Welfare | Code Me. R. 01-001 Ch. 701, § I - VII | ME ADC 01-001 Ch. 701, § I - VII | The following Maine regulations reveal the state's requirements for the proper care/housing of animals at pet stores, kennels, and animal shelters. These regulations also establish civil penalties for pet stores, kennels, or animal shelters who violate either the following regulations or Chapter 719 of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated. | Administrative | |
| People v. Arroyo | 777 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. 2004) | 3 Misc.3d 668, 2004 N.Y.Slip Op. 24067 |
This case presents the court with a novel question: Does a pet owner commit an act of cruelty, for which he or she could be prosecuted criminally, by not providing an ill pet (in this case, terminally ill) with medical care? Defendant charged with violation of New York's anticruelty statute and moved for dismissal. In engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court held that: (1) provision prohibiting the deprivation of "necessary sustenance" was vague when applied to defendant, and (2) that the provision prohibiting "unjustifiably" causing pain to an animal was also vague when applied to defendant. Motion granted. |
Case | |
| MA - Cambridge - Title 6: Animals (Chapter 6.12: Care and Use of Laboratory Animals) | The Municipal Code of the City of Cambridge §§ 6.12.010 - 6.12.100 |
In Cambridge, Massachusetts, research institutions that perform experiments on animals must do so in conformity with all federal, state and local statutes, ordinances and regulations, as well as maintain or establish an autonomous animal care and use committee with the power to disapprove or restrict research, experiments or regarding the care and use of laboratory animals. This ordinance also establishes a Commissioner of Laboratory Animals (CLA) for the purpose of overseeing research institutions and their committees. Penalties for violating these provisions are also provided. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Benningfield v. Zinsmeister | 367 S.W.3d 561 (Ky.,2012) | 2012 WL 2361778 |
An 8-year-old boy and his sister were walking down a street when they were approached by a Rottweiler. Scared, the boy ran and was attacked by the dog, which caused the boy to suffer serious injuries. As a result, the mother of the child sued the owner of the dog and the landlord of the house where the dog resided under a Kentucky dog bite statute. The landlord won at both the trial and the appellate court level. Upon granting discretionary review for the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court investigated whether or not a landlord could be held strictly liable under the dog bite statute. The Court ruled that a landlord could, but only if the landlord permitted the dog to stay on or about the premises. Since the attack did not occur on or about the premises, the landlord was not found liable under the dog bite statute. |
Case | |
| Rabideau v. City of Racine | 627 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. 2001) |
Pet owner could not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after a police officer shot her dog. While the court recognized the bond between owner and pet, public policy prevented such recovery. However, under the proper circumstances, a person could recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the loss of a pet. |
Case | ||
| Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris | 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013) | 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv, 2013 WL 4615131 (9th Cir. 2013) |
Prior to California's Force Fed Birds law—which bans the sale of products that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size—coming into effect, two non-California entities produced foie gras that was sold at a California restaurant. When the law came into effect, all three entities sought to enjoin the state of California from enforcing the law; they argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court, however, denied their motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction. |
Case | |
| State v. Agee | --- N.E.3d ---- , 2019 WL 3504010 (Ohio App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-3107 | The Humane Society brought this action in response to a complaint regarding a dog tangled in a tether. Three German Shepherds were discovered that belonged to the Defendant, Shawn Agee, Jr. The dogs were suffering from maltreatment. All three had been restrained without access to water or food and one of the dog’s tethers was wrapped so tightly that its leg had started to swell. Two of the dogs were suffering from fly strike. The State charged the Defendant with 12 criminal misdemeanors relating to the treatment of the three animals. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of 10 of those counts because of his unrebutted testimony that he had been out of town for the weekend and had left the dogs in the care of his mother. The Defendant was found guilty to two second-degree misdemeanors relating to the two dogs suffering from fly strike because those particular injuries were long time, very painful injuries that were not being treated and the Defendant was the dogs’ “confiner, custodian, or caretaker.” The Defendant was sentenced to community control, a fine of $100, a suspended jail sentence of 180 days, the surrender of the two dogs with fly strike, and the proviso that the remaining dog be provided with regular vet appointments and various other conditions. This appeal followed. The Defendant asserted that the Court erred by finding that he had in fact violated the statute that he was found guilty of and that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Defendant argued that he did not qualify as the type or class of persons subject to criminal liability merely as an owner. The Court noted that the trial court did not impose liability due to his status as the dogs’ owner, but rather due to this having served as the two dogs’ confiner, custodian, or caretaker when they developed fly strike and should have been but were not properly treated. As for the second assignment of error, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant had violated the statute. The Defendant had admitted that he knew that the two dogs had fly strike “two or three weeks before he left town for the weekend.” The dogs were not treated before he left town. The Court ultimately affirmed both convictions. | Case | |
| VT - Education - § 912. Student's right of refusal; animal dissection | 16 V.S.A. § 912 | This Vermont law gives a student in a public elementary or secondary school (or approved independent school) a right to be excused from lessons requiring a student to dissect, vivisect, or otherwise destroy an animal, or observe any of these activities. Each school district must establish procedures for a student to exercise this right and alternatives methods of learning the material covered. School districts must also adopt a statement that no student shall be discriminated against based on his or her decision to exercise the right to be excused afforded by this section. | Statute | ||
| U.S. v. Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. | 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203 (D.N.D. 2012), appeal dismissed (Apr. 18, 2012) | The Government charged Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.with “taking” (killing) two migratory birds found dead near one of its reserve pits. But, the Court found that the use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Therefore, the Court held that the oil and gas companies' use of reserve pits did not violate Migratory Bird Treaty Act's prohibition against taking of protected birds, since death or injury was not intentional, and grated the defendant's motion to dismiss. | Case |