Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michigan Compiled Laws 1929: Chapter 285: Section 1 | Mich. Comp. Laws ch. 285, § 1 (1929) | Chapter 285, entitled "An act for the more effectual prevention of cruelty to animals," concerns Michigan's Law about the treatment of animals from 1929. The act covers what qualifies as cruelty to animals and what is the punishment for crime of cruelty to animals. | Statute | |
| NE - Livestock - Article 23. Domesticated Cervine Animal Act | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | NE ST § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | This set of laws comprises Nebraska's Domesticated Cervine Animal Act. Under the act, it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter any domesticated cervine animal in this state unless such animal is individually identified and kept at a premises for which a domesticated cervine animal facility permit has been issued by the department. A municipal, state, or federal zoo, park, refuge, or wildlife area, a bona fide circus or animal exhibit, or any private, nonprofit zoological society is not required to obtain a permit in order to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter a domesticated cervine animal, but such facilities are still governed by the provisions of the act regarding the testing, control, and eradication of cervidae diseases including chronic wasting disease. | Statute |
| Gurtek v. Chisago County | 1988 WL 81554 (Minn.App., 1988) (unpublished) |
Appellants sought review of a denial of a special-use permit to build a large campground adjacent to a bald eagle nesting site. They contended that the denial by the county board was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the denial was reasonable where the county proffered two legally valid reasons for denying the permit: the danger to the sensitive nesting eagle population and the detrimental effect the increased human activity would have on the unspoiled nature of the property. |
Case | |
| MA - Initiatives - Question 3, Minimum Size Requirements for Farm Animal Containment (2016) | Question 3 | Massachusetts Question 3 is a law proposed by initiative petition and appears on the 2016 ballot. This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The Secretary of the Commonwealth's official summary states: "This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The proposed law would also prohibit any business owner or operator in Massachusetts from selling whole eggs intended for human consumption or any uncooked cut of veal or pork if the business owner or operator knows or should know that the hen, breeding pig, or veal calf that produced these products was confined in a manner prohibited by the proposed law. The proposed law would exempt sales of food products that combine veal or pork with other products, including soups, sandwiches, pizzas, hotdogs, or similar processed or prepared food items." A "yes" vote would prohibit any confinement of pigs, calves, and hens that prevents them from lying down, standing up, fully extending their limbs, or turning around freely. A "no" vote would make no change in current laws relative to the keeping of farm animals. | Statute | |
| Colleen Harrington v. David Hovanec, and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive | This California complaint for damages raises five causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) trespass to chattel; (3) conversion; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 3340 (related to damage to animals as property). The lawsuit arose from the negligent and/or intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant in May of 2004. According to the complaint, plaintiff's dog was shot at least thirteen times by defendant's two different guns. | Pleading | ||
| Reid v. Kramer | Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. | Case | |
| UK - Circus - Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 | 1925 CHAPTER 38 |
The Performing Animals Act 1925 requires any person who exhibits or trains any performing (vertebrate) animal to be registered with a local authority. This information is kept in the local register. The law also gives power to local authorities to prohibit animal training or exhibition where it is accompanied by cruelty. Any officer of a local authority duly authorised in that behalf by the local authority and any constable may inspect performance premises during reasonable hours. Failure to become properly registered or concealing an animal to avoid inspection makes a person guilty of an offence. |
Statute | |
| Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346 | Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 | This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the authorities were not entitled to seize the animals. | Case | |
| U.S. v. Taylor | 585 F.Supp. 393 (D.C. Me. 1984) |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. |
Case | |
| Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc. | 842 F.Supp.2d 1259 (S.D.Cal.,2012) | 2012 WL 399214 (S.D.Cal.,2012) |
Plaintiffs sued aquarium for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that wild-captured orcas were being held in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude. The court dismissed the action, holding that Plaintiffs had no standing because the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. |
Case |