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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Tighe v. North Shore Animal League 142 A.D.3d 607, 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) 36 N.Y.S.3d 500, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 In May 2012, Tighe adopted a dog from the North Shore Animal League after having been warned that the dog was possessive regarding food. After taking the dog home, Tighe noticed that the dog exhibited aggressive behavior, such as jumping at the backyard fence and growling at her when she attempted to feed the dog. In July of 2012, the dog bit Tighe’s hand when she tried to pick up a cookie off of the floor. As a result, Tighe spent three days in the hospital due to severe blood loss and swelling. Additionally, in September of 2012, the dog bit Tighe in the face causing severe injuries. After the incident in September, Tighe filed suit against the North Shore Animal League to recover damages for negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the claim of emotional distress but granted summary judgment in favor of Tighe with regard to the other claims of negligence. The North Shore Animal League appealed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New York overturned the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the North Shore Animal League on all claims. The court found that the North Shore Animal League was not a proximate cause to Tighe’s injuries for failing to adequately warn her about the dog’s aggreesive behavior because Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior three months prior to the incident that caused Tighe’s injuries. According to the court, once Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive tendencies, she was in the best position to take “precautionary measures to prevent harm to herself.” So, even if the North Shore Animal League had failed to warn Tighe of the dog’s aggressive tendencies prior to the adoption, Tighe “independently” learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior prior to the incident which eliminated the North Shore Animal League as being a proximate cause of her injuries. Case
In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1

In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity.  The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release.  An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA.

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MN - Habitat - Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (Chapter 116B. Environmental Rights) M. S. A. § 116B.01 - 13 MN ST § 116B.01 - 13 Minnesota protects the environment under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). Under MERA, citizens may bring suits for civil remedies where activities are interfering with their enjoyment of natural resources, including eagle nesting sites. The law provides a comprehensive scheme under which anyone with sufficient interest in protecting land, water, air, or any natural resources may bring suit to enjoin an action. Statute
HI - Dog - General Dog Provisions H R S § 143-1 - 20; H R S § 183D-65 HI ST § 143-1 to 20; HI ST § 183D-65 This Hawaii statute provides the pertinent regulations for dogs in the state. Included in its provisions are licensing, impoundment, seizure of loose or unlicensed dogs, and stray animals. Of particular note is a provision that makes it unlawful for any officer to knowingly sell or give any impounded dog to any person, firm, corporation, association, medical college, or university for the purpose of animal experimentation. Statute
University Towers Associates v. Gibson 846 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 2007) 18 Misc.3d 349, 2007 WL 4126442 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 27481
In this New York case, the petitioner, University Towers Associates commenced this holdover proceeding against the rent-stabilized tenant of record and various undertenants based on an alleged nuisance where the tenants allegedly harbored pit bulls. According to petitioner, the pit bull is an alleged “known dangerous animal” whose presence at the premises creates an threat. The Civil Court of the City of New York held that the landlord's notice of termination did not adequately apprise the tenant of basis for termination; further, the notice of termination and the petition in the holdover proceeding did not allege objectionable conduct over time by the tenant as was required to establish nuisance sufficient to warrant a termination of tenancy.
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Night monkey poking out of a soiled hideout Slideshow Images
Hayes v. State 518 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App. 2017) 2017 WL 1193845 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2017) Defendant appeals an order with the Henderson County Sheriff's Office to destroy his dogs under Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. More specifically, defendant claims reversible error after he was denied a jury trial. Defendant's three dogs were seized after they attacked an individual riding a bicycle in front of defendant's residence. After a hearing, the dogs were found to be dangerous pursuant to Section 822.041 related to dogs causing serious bodily injury to a person. The judge then ordered the dogs to be humanely destroyed. Hayes appealed the order and requested a jury trial, which was objected to by the Henderson County Attorney's Office and sustained by the court. The dogs were found to be dangerous at a bench trial and ordered humanely euthanized, while defendant was ordered to pay $2,780 to the county. On appeal, defendant argues the county court erred in removing his case from the jury trial docket. The court now considers two questions: "(1) whether the owner of a dog ordered to be humanely destroyed by a justice, county, or municipal court judge, pursuant to Chapter 822, subchapter A, of the Texas Health and Safety Code, has the right to appeal such order; and (2) if an appeal is allowed, whether a jury can be requested to hear the de novo appeal." The court here declined to adopt the state's interpretation that the statute's silence as to a right of appeal indicates that the legislature eliminated that right. In fact, the court observed Subchapter A of Chapter 822 dealing with less serious "dangerous dogs," allows a party to appeal a dangerous dog finding. The court found it would be inconsistent that the more severe Subchapter D denies an appeal of right where the less severe subchapter grants it, especially where a forfeiture of property occurs (i.e., dogs). As to the right to jury trial, the court found Chapter 822 silent on that issue. However, the court found the order for seizure and destruction of defendant's "special personal property" guaranteed him a trial by jury under Article I of the Texas Constitution. The trial court's Final Order was reversed and the case was remanded to county court. Case
IE - Cruelty - Protection of Animals, 1911 Protection of Animals Act, 1911 This Ireland law makes it illegal for a person to cause any animal “unnecessary suffering.” The act outlines all of the ways a person can be guilty of causing an animal harm including: beating, kicking, over-loading, torturing, and poisoning. If a person is found guilty under the act, the court has the power to take ownership of the animal and order the guilty party to pay any damages that resulted from the harm. Statute
LA - Hunting, Trapping, and Fishing - Chapter 1. General Provisions for Wildlife and Fisheries. LSA-R.S. 56:648 - 56:648.3 This section comprises Louisiana's hunter harassment laws. Under R.S. 56:648.1, no person may engage in such activities as interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife, disturbing a wild animal or otherwise affecting its behavior with the intent to prevent or hinder lawful taking, disturb any hunter, trapper, or fisherman who is engaged in lawful taking, or enter or remain on state-managed lands/water or private lands/water with the intent to violate this section. Violation of the provisions of R.S. 56:648.1 constitutes a class two violation. The section allows the issuance of an injunction and recovery of actual damages by persons affected by such conduct. Statute
DE - Trust for care of an animal - Chapter 35. Trusts 12 Del.C. § 3555 DE ST TI 12 § 3555 Delaware enacted its pet trust law in 2006. A trust for the care of one or more specific animals living at the settlor's death is valid. The trust terminates upon the death of all animals living at the settlor's death and covered by the terms of the trust. Statute

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