Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. William | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4587250 (D.Virgin Islands) | Defendants charged with unlawfully taking an endangered species and unlawfully possessing, carrying and transporting an endangered species within the United States in violation of the Endangered Species Act filed motions to suppress all evidence, including undersized lobsters and a sea turtle seized in connection with their stop and arrest after they had been stopped on suspicion of being illegal immigrants. The District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix suppressed the evidence, finding that although the approaching police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was taking place at the time the stop was made, the subsequent confinement of Defendants and search of their vehicle exceeded the limited purpose of the investigative stop. | Case | |
| U.S. v. Williams | 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1990) |
Kenneth Ray Williams appealed his conviction for the illegal hunting of moose in violation of the Lacey Act. Williams claimed that his conviction should be overturned because the government failed to establish the validity of use of the wildlife law against a tribe member. The United States argued that there is no need for the government to establish the validity of the law's use against a tribe member. The court affirmed the conviction and held that the government must establish the validity of the use of wildlife laws against tribe members but that similar laws enacted by the tribe can establish this validity. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Winddancer | 435 F.Supp.2d 687 (M.D.Tenn., 2006) | 2006 WL 1722432 (M.D.Tenn.) |
This matter comes before the court on a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment filed by the defendant. The defendant, Ed Winddancer, was indicted on six counts relating to possessing and bartering eagle feathers and feathers plucked from other migratory birds. Winddancer did not have standing to challenge the manner in which the MBTA has been administered against him, because applying for a permit under the MBTA would not have been clearly futile. With regard to the BGEPA, the court found that defendant showed that the BGEPA substantially burdens his ability to possess eagle feathers. However, the court found that he did not show that his desire to possess the feathers arises from a sincere religious belief. Further, the court found that the government indeed has a compelling interest in protecting the bald and golden eagle, especially since there is no reasonable forensic method by which law enforcement can determine if a bird was accidentally or intentionally killed, killed a hundred years ago, or killed yesterday. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Zak | 486 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass., 2007) | 2007 WL 1427442 (D.Mass.) |
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts under the MBTA after agents determined that he killed 250 great blue herons; he then went to trial on the remaining counts under the MBTA and BGEPA related to his killing of a juvenile bald eagle on his commercial fish growing operation. On appeal, defendant contended that he cannot be found guilty under the MBTA unless the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the bird he was shooting was protected and intentionally shot it with that knowledge (defendant stated that he shot a "big brown hawk'). The court disagreed, finding the overwhelming authority requires no such specific scienter on the part of the actor. With regard to defendant's contention that the government failed to prove the "knowingly" prong of the BGEPA, the court was equally unpersuaded. The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly shot the eagle as it sat perched on the dead pine tree on the edge of his property, regardless of whether he knew the juvenile bird was an eagle or, as he said, “a big brown hawk.” |
Case |
| U.S. v. Zarauskas | 814 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 524250 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2016) | Defendant was found guilty by a jury of illegally importing narwhal tusks under several federal laws, including the Lacey Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, among others. On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred by allowing and failing to cure statements by the prosecutor that allegedly violated defendant's Fifth Amendment protections. Prior to being charged, defendant met with FWS and Canadian agents where he did not proclaim his innocence when questioned on the tusks. In the process of showing inconsistency in defendant's statements, the prosecutor pointed out defendant's failure to state his innocence with the federal agents, which defendant claimed improperly burdened him at trial. Other arguments by defendant also pointed to error by the prosecution during direct examination and rebuttal argument with respect to defendant's silence during interviews with agents. The appellate court found the errors to be harmless or in response to defendant's attorney's statements. Finally, as a matter of first impression, the court found that Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) reports logging date, time, and location of border crossing and license plate of the vehicle were admissible hearsay. The convictions were affirmed. | Case |
| UFO CHUTING OF HAWAII, INC. v. YOUNG | 327 F.Supp.2d 1220 (D. Hawaii, 2004) |
Parasail operators challenged the validity of a state law that banned parasailing in navigable waters. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held first that the statute in question was preempted by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and second, that the Endangered Species Act did not repeal the MMPA's preemption provision. Judgment for the parasail operators. |
Case | |
| UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Young | 380 F.Supp.2d 1166 (2005, D.Hawai'i) | 2005 WL 1907675 (D.Hawai'i) |
Some parasail operators brought an action against state officials challenging validity of a state law that banned parasailing in navigable waters. Defendants argued that the court's order should be reconsidered in light of an intervening change in federal law that they say allows for the seasonal parasailing ban. After vacation of summary judgment in favor of operators, 2005 WL 1910497, the state moved for relieve from final judgment. The District Court held that the federal law permitting Hawaii to enforce state laws regulating recreational vessels for purpose of conserving and managing humpback whales did not violate separation of powers doctrine, and federal law did not violate Equal Protection Clause. |
Case |
| Uganda - Cruelty - Chapter 220 Animal Act | Consolidation of 1988 of Ordinance No. 25 of 1957 as amended last by L.N. No. 224 of 1962 | This Uganda act, in English, provides provisions for the offense of animal cruelty. The act also allows the court to order the destruction of an animal when the animal's owner has been convicted of an offense of animal cruelty if the court is satisfied it would be cruel to keep the animal alive. The court may also deprive a person convicted of cruelty ownership of the animal and order for the animal to be disposed as it thinks fit. It is also illegal to permit a diseased animal to be at large in public places; a court may also order a diseased animal at large in any public place to be destroyed. No appeal can be made against either order of destruction. The sale of poisoned grain that is to be used as feeding stuff is also an offence. Also included in this act are provisions about experiments. | Statute | |
| UK - Animal Welfare - Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021 | 2021 c.21 | This Act increased the period that judges may impose prison sentences on those that breach the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (applicable in England and Wales). The Act came into force on 29 June 2021. Imprisonment has increased to 5 years (and/or an unlimited fine) for certain offences where a defendant is convicted on indictment at the Crown Court. This includes the offences of unnecessary suffering and dog fighting. Imprisonment on summary conviction for these offences at the Magistrates' Court is increased to 12 months, or a fine, or both. | Statute | |
| UK - Boarding - Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963 | 1963 c. 43 |
The 1963 Animal Boarding Establishments Act deals with places where the boarding of animals is being carried on as a business. This act requires such establishments to be licensed by the local authority. The act defines "boarding establishments" as those premises, including private dwellings, where the business consists of providing accommodation for other people’s cats and dogs. When deciding to issue a license, the local authority shall consider the suitability of the conditions (e.g., size of quarters, lighting, food, water, disease control, etc.) present at the boarding establishment. |
Statute |