Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK - Wildlife - Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 | 2017 No. 1012 | These Regulations consolidated the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, and made minor modifications. Part 3, regulation 43 makes it an offence (subject to exceptions) to deliberately capture, kill or disturb certain wild animals or to trade in them. Regulation 45 prohibits the use of certain methods of capturing or killing wild animals. | Statute | ||
| UK - Wildlife - The Humane Trapping Standards Regulations 2019 | 2019 No. 22 | These Regulations amend the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 in order to implement requirements contained in the agreement on international humane trapping standards concluded between the European Community, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation. They introduce a prohibition on using or setting in position any trap or snare for the purpose of killing or taking the Stoat or the European Beaver. The prohibitions in section 11(2)(a) and (b) (as revised) (relating to using or setting in position a trap or snare) do not apply in relation to any animal specified in Schedule 6ZA where the use or setting of the trap is under and in accordance with a Government issued license. | Statute | ||
| UK - Wildlife Trade - Ivory Act 2018 | Chapter 30 | This Act prohibits commercial activities concerning ivory in the UK and the import and re-export of ivory for commercial purposes to and from the UK. This includes: buying, selling and hiring ivory; offering or arranging to buy, sell or hire ivory; keeping ivory for sale or hire; exporting ivory from, and importing ivory to the United Kingdom for sale or hire. Minor exemptions include: pre-1918 items of outstanding artistic etc value and importance; pre-1975 musical instruments; and acquisition of items by qualifying museums. | Statute | ||
| UK - Zoos - Zoo Licensing Act 1981 | 1981 c. 37 |
The Zoo Licensing Act 1981 is an Act to regulate by licence the conduct of zoos. The Act defines a zoo "[as] an establishment where wild animals are kept for exhibition to the public otherwise than for the purposes of a circus and otherwise than as a pet shop; and this Act applies to any zoo to which members of the public have access, with or without charge for admission, on more than seven days in any period of 12 consecutive months". |
Statute | ||
| UK- Wildlife - Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 | Chapter 69 | An Act prohibiting and limiting actions involving wild animals, and the primary piece of legislation for wildlife protection in the UK. Prohibitions include taking, injuring, killing and disturbing. It is also an offence to disturb places used for shelter and protection. Provides protections for wild bird nests and eggs, as well as for animal species. Proof of intention is required for an offence under the Act. | Statute | ||
| Understanding Animal Law |
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Policy | |||
| Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n | 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) | 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order. |
Case | |
| United Kingdom Licensing and Regulation of Pet Shops | Alan Bates |
Brief Summary of the Licensing and Regulation of Pet Shops (UK)
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Topical Introduction | ||
| United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn. | 768 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2014) | 2014 WL 4637546 (6th Cir. 2014) | In June 2010, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with the City of Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints of neglect and unsanitary conditions at a mall pet store. Investigations revealed animals in unpleasant conditions, without water, and with no working air conditioner in the store. Animals were removed from the store, as were various business records, and the private, contracted non-profit began to revoke the store's pet-dealer permit. Pet store owners brought a § 1983 suit in federal district court against the City of Chattanooga; McKamey; and McKamey employees Karen Walsh, Marvin Nicholson, Jr., and Paula Hurn in their individual and official capacities. The Owners alleged that the removal of its animals and revocation of its pet-dealer permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizure of its animals and business records violated the Fourth Amendment. Walsh, Nicholson, Hurn, and McKamey asserted qualified immunity as a defense to all claims. On appeal from district court decision, the Sixth Circuit held the following: Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, could not assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in her personal capacity because there was no history of immunity for animal-welfare officers and allowing her to assert qualified immunity was not consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walsh and Nicholson acting both as private animal-welfare officers and as specially-commissioned police officers of the City of Chattanooga, may assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in their personal capacities. With respect to entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in the procedural due-process claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the animals, Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the permit, and Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the permit. Regarding entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the animals, Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the business records, and Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the business records.Because qualified immunity was not an available defense to an official-capacity suit, the court held that employees may not assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in their official capacities. The district court’s entry of summary judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case | |
| United States of America v. Kraft | 2005 WL 578313 (U.S., Dist. of Minn. 2005) |
A man was charged and convicted for violating the Lacey Act after illegally selling a tiger and grizzly bear. The trial court admitted the man's conversation into evidence in which he implicated himself in the illegal sale of a grizzly bear. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding the man's conversation was not protected by the Sixth Amendment because it was made before there were specific charges against him for the illegal sale of the grizzly bear. |
Case |
