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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Macho v. Mahowald 374 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.App.,1985)

In this Minnesota case, a rider brought an action for personal injuries suffered after the defendant-owner's horse bolted while the rider was mounting the horse. The lower court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the owner. The rider appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence showing that the horse had previously bolted was sufficient to create an issue for the jury as to whether the horse had a propensity to be dangerous. Further, with regard to whether the owner was negligent in allowing the rider to mount without properly adjusting the saddle equipment, the court found that the jury could have properly found both parties were negligent in failing to adjust the stirrups.

Case
U.S. v. Rioseco 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988)

After defendant was found fishing in the Cay Sal Bank area of the Bahamas, Coast Guard officers informed appellant that possession of a Bahamian fishing license was necessary to fish in those waters and that failure to possess such a license would render such fishing a contravention of the United States Lacey Act.  On appeal, defendant contended that the Lacey Act is unconstitutional in that it incorporates foreign law, thereby delegating legislative power to foreign governments.  The court found that the Lacey Act which prohibited the possession or importation of fish and wildlife taken in violation of foreign laws, was not an improper delegation of legislative power simply by its reference to foreign law.

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Sentencia C-045/19 This Constitutional Court's decision declares sport hunting illegal in the entire territory. In its reasoning, the court stated that sport hunting is not an exception to the duty to protect animals against cruelty, as it does not satisfy any objective or purpose compatible with the Constitution. "It is not an expression of religious freedom, nor intended for food or medical or scientific experimentation. It is not done to control the species population and is not a deeply rooted cultural manifestation." The court further stated, "The sacrifice of an animal by humans is an extreme form of mistreatment as it eliminates its very existence and is an act of annihilation. When it is unjustified, an animal's death is cruel because it means understanding that the animal is exclusively a resource available to humans. Sport hunting, in short, is a harmful act insofar as it is aimed at capturing wild animals, either by killing, mutilating or catching them alive." "What happens here is an example of how the content and scope of constitutional norms adapt to a changing society. It is about the concept of a Living constitution, in which its scope and content take shape with the political community's economic, social, political, and cultural changes." Other forms of hunting, such as subsistence hunting, hunting for scientific and research purposes, and controlled hunting, continue to be allowed under the circumstances delineated by laws and regulations and with prior authorization of the natural resources managing authority. Case
Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack 2015 WL 514389 (D.D.C., 2015) The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuit by plaintiffs against U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack that challenged the United States Department of Agriculture’s New Poultry Inspection System (NPIS) promulgated under the US Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). The court held that plaintiff’s failed to state an injury-in-fact that was traceable to the actions of the defendants for which relief could be granted. Under NPIS, far fewer federal inspectors would be stationed along slaughter lines, and the employees themselves could conduct a preliminary screening of the carcasses before presenting the poultry to a federal inspector for a visual-only inspection. Plaintiffs contended that the revised processing procedures were inconsistent with the PPIA and would ultimately result in the production of unsafe poultry products. They sought a preliminary and permanent injunction by the court to prevent the USDA and the USDA′s Food Safety and Inspection Service from implementing NPIS. Case
FL - Immunity, Care For Injured Animals - Chapter 768. Negligence West's F. S. A. § 768.13 FL ST § 768.13 This section comprises Florida's Good Samaritan Act. Under the Act, any person, including those licensed to practice veterinary medicine, who gratuitously (without payment) and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment to an injured animal at the scene of an emergency on or adjacent to a roadway shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. Statute
CA - Hunting - § 3513. Migratory nongame birds; protection West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 3513 CA FISH & G § 3513 California law reiterates that it is illegal to take or possess any bird or its parts that is listed under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, of which the eagle is listed. Statute
Roose v. State of Indiana 610 N.E.2d 256 (1993)

Defendant was charged with criminal mischief and cruelty to an animal after dragging it with his car. The court concluded that, although some of the photos admitted were gruesome, the municipal court validly admitted the photos of the dog that defendant injured into evidence because the photos clearly aided the jury in understanding the nature of those injuries and the veterinarian's testimony as to the medical attention that the dog received.

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CO - Law enforcement animals - Law 2318, 2023 Ley 2318, 2023 The purpose of this law is to modify the provisions of the National Code of Police and Coexistence (Law 1801 of 2016) to prohibit the use of animals for deterring demonstrations, riots, and unrest while adhering to existing regulations and obligations regarding animal protection and welfare. Article 4, PAR1 states: "Under no circumstances should the involvement of animals be construed as a component of the application of force outlined in this article. Animals, such as canines and equines that have been trained by law enforcement, are only allowed to engage in surveillance, preventive measures, and control tasks during events like mass gatherings, rescue operations, searches, explosive detection, illegal crop eradication, or law enforcement deployment. The use of animals to disperse public demonstrations, incite riots, or quell public unrest by law enforcement is explicitly prohibited." Statute
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 450 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2006) 36 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,102, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6933

The issue in this case is whether the Endangered Species Act requires the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to complete formal designation of critical habitat for an endangered fish species , the threespine stickleback ("stickleback"), a small, scaleless freshwater fish, as an endangered species in 1970 under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), listed over thirty-five years ago. In 1990, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") awarded CEMEX, Inc., a contract to mine fifty-six million tons of sand and gravel from a location in Los Angeles County's Soledad Canyon. Although the mining would not take place within the stickleback's habitat, the project involves pumping water from the Santa Clara River and could cause portions of the river to run dry periodically. Parts of the Santa Clara River commonly dry out during the summer season, trapping stickleback in isolated pools. The Center for Biological Diversity ("CBD") filed suit in 2002, claiming that the Service violated the ESA by failing to complete the designation of critical habitat for the stickleback. In affirming the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit, held that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Service to decide not to designate critical habitat for the stickleback. The Service was not required to ensure compliance with federal and state laws before issuing an ITS (incidental take statement) to CEMEX, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking extra-record exhibits offered to establish a new rationale for attacking the Service's decision.

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Hayes v. Akam Associates, Inc. No. 156457/2013, 2019 WL 4695713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 25, 2019) In this case, plaintiffs sought recovery for property damage and for emotional distress and loss of companionship of their dog Toto, who died as a result of a fire in the building where plaintiffs resided. Plaintiffs were not home at the time of the fire. Upon their return, they learned their dog had died as a result of smoke inhalation. Plaintiffs found Toto’s body lying on the road, covered with a sheet. Plaintiffs alleged that their dog, who they considered a member of their family, had died as a consequence of the defendants’ negligence in inspecting, maintaining, supervising, operating, and controlling the building. In its opinion, the court stated that there was a well-settled common law precedent that pets are personal property and for that reason, damages for emotional injury were not allowed when a companion animal dies. The court declined to follow the cases that considered loss of companionship in determining the value of a pet and dismissed the causes of action seeking damages for the emotional injuries the plaintiffs alleged were caused by the loss of their dog. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted. Case

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