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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, | In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. | Pleading | ||
| State of Florida v. Peters | 534 So.2d 760 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1988). | This is an appeal from an order of the county court invalidating a City of North Miami ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs. The ordinance in question, City of North Miami Ordinance No. 422.5, regulates the ownership of pit bulls by requiring their owners to carry insurance or furnish other evidence of financial responsibility, register their pit bulls with the City, and confine the dogs indoors or in a locked pen. The court dismissed defendants claims that the ordinance violates equal protection and due process, and that the ordinance's definition of a pit bull is on its face unconstitutionally vague. | Case | |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6549. Releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters; confinement and disposition of companion ani | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6549 | VA ST § 3.2-6549 | This Virginia statute outlines the requirements for releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters. Included in the provisions are recordkeeping requirements, a requirement that each agency receives a signed statement from each of its directors, operators, staff, or animal caregivers specifying that each individual has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment, and owner notice provisions. | Statute |
| OH - Dog - Chapter 955. Dogs (Consolidated dog laws) | RC §§ 955.01 - 99; § 9.62; § 1533.19 - 221 | This is the Ohio statute that regulates dogs in general, outlining rules and regulations for dog owners. The state leash requirement appears limited to rabies quarantines (Sec. 955.26). It also gives the definition of what is considered a dangerous or vicious dog, the rules and regulations for owners of these dogs, and penalization for breaking these rules. | Statute | |
| MT - Great Falls - Title 6: Animals (Chapter 8: Animals) | Great Falls, Montana Code of Ordinances, Chapter 8: Animals, §§ 6.8.070 - 6.8.080, 6.8.310 |
In Great Falls, Montana, it is unlawful for any person, persons, or family to keep, harbor or maintain in or on the same premises a total of more than 2 dogs over 6 months of age or 2 cats over 6 months of age without first obtaining a multiple animal permit. A person found violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, which is punishable by a maximum fine of $500.00. Other penalties may also apply. |
Local Ordinance | |
| BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL | 59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899) | 14 Colo.App. 141 (Colo.App. 1899) |
In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare. |
Case |
| Ley Nº 23.899, 1990 | Ley Nº 23.899 | Ley 23.899, 1990 creates the National Service of Animal Health, and establishes its purposes, responsibilities and organization. According to this law, The National Service of Animal Health executes governmental policy on animal health. The main purpose of NSAH is to prevent, control and eradicate animal diseases and animal diseases transmissible to humans, to exercise hygienic-sanitary control of all products of animal origin, taking into account the advances in health technology and the most modern procedures for its control and the control of the products destined to the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of animal diseases. This entity is formed by an executive structure; a board of directors and provincial or regional commissions. The National Service of Animal is an entity of public private law with National scope, that maintains its relations with the national government through the Undersecretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing of the Nation. | Statute | |
| SD - Trust - 55-1-21. Trust for care of designated animal. | S D C L § 55-1-21 | SD ST § 55-1-21 | South Dakota's pet trust law was enacted in 2006. Amendments to the law in 2018 provide that trusts for the care of a designated animal or animals are valid. | Statute |
| NH - Veterinary - Chapter 332-B. New Hampshire Veterinary Practice Act. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | NH ST § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |