Results
Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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Grise v. State | Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881). |
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration. |
Case | |
Decision 09171-2015-0004-Ecuador-Do not publish | Case | |||
CL - Marine mammals - Ley 20293 | Ley 20293 | The cetacean law prohibits the killing, hunting, capturing, harassing, keeping, possessing, transporting, disembarking, preparing, or carrying out any transformation process, as well as the commercialization or storage of any species of cetacean that inhabits or crosses the maritime areas of national sovereignty and jurisdiction in Chile. | Statute | |
Shumate v. Drake University | 846 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa. 2014) | Plaintiff Shumate was barred from bringing a dog that she was training, into the classroom and to another school event. Shumate worked as a service dog trainer, while she was a student at Drake University Law School, the Defendant in this case. In 2011, Shumate filed a lawsuit alleging that Drake University discriminated against her as a service dog trainer in violation of Iowa Code chapter 216C. She alleged that chapter 216C, implicitly provided service dog trainers with a private right to sue. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the statute does not provide service dog trainers with a private right to sue, nor did it include them under the coverage of chapter 216. The Court reasoned that although Shumate trained dogs to assist the disabled, she was not covered because she is not a person with a disability. The Court stated that closely related statutes expressly created private enforcement actions to aid the disabled while chapter 216C does not. Because an implied right of action would circumvent the procedures of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, the Iowa legislature purposely omitted a private right to sue from chapter 216C. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Shumate's petition with prejudice. | Case | |
DC - Dogs - § 22-1311. Allowing dogs to go at large. | DC ST § 22-1311 | DC CODE § 22-1311 | The following District of Columbia statute prohibits dogs that the owner knows to be fierce or dangerous, to the danger or annoyance of the inhabitants, from running at large; it also prohibits female dogs in heat to run at large. | Statute |
SD - Fur - Chapter 40-35. Domesticated Fur-Bearing Animals. | S D C L § 40-35-1 to 6 | SD ST § 40-35-1 to 6 | These South Dakota statutes pertain to domesticated fur-bearing animals. These animals are subject to private ownership, and documentation is required to possess live fur-bearing animals. Products made from domestic furbearers are considered to be agricultural products and breeding such animals, or marketing the products, is an agricultural pursuit subject to the Department of Agriculture. | Statute |
NH - Exotic Pets, Wildlife - Chapter 207. Import, Possession, or Release of Wildlife. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:14 - 207:15-a | NH ST § 207:14 - 207:15-a | This New Hampshire section states that no person shall import, possess, sell, exhibit, or release any live marine species or wildlife, or the eggs or progeny thereof, without first obtaining a permit from the executive director except as otherwise permitted. The executive director has the authority to determine the time period and any other conditions governing the issuance of such permit. Any wildlife release or imported contrary to these provisions are subject to seizure. | Statute |
Hearn v. City of Overland Park | 772 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1989) | 244 Kan. 638 (1989) |
Syllabus by the Court In an action to enjoin the City of Overland Park from enforcing an ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs within the city, the record is examined and it is held: (1) The ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) the ordinance does not violate the due process rights of plaintiffs under the United States and Kansas Constitutions; (3) the ordinance does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions; and (4) the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). |
Case |
Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One | 95 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2006) | 2006 WL 1792842 (Tex.App.-Dallas) |
In this Texas case, a justice court divested an animal owner of over 100 animals and ordered that the animals be given to a nonprofit organization. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed appellant's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Code, an owner may only appeal if the justice court orders the animal to be sold at a public auction. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the statute limiting right of appeal in animal forfeiture cases precluded animal owner from appealing the justice court order. |
Case |
Animal & Natural Resource Law Review Volume XIX |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawAnimal & Natural Resource Law ReviewVol. |
Policy |