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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU Directive 2010/63/EU Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. Statute
US - Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 - Chapter 68. Disaster Relief 42 U.S.C.A. § 5196 - 5196d The FEMA Administrator is directed to develop emergency preparedness plans that take into account the needs of individuals with pets and service animals prior to, during, and following a major disaster or emergency. The Administrator must also ensure that state and local emergency preparedness plans take into account the needs of such individuals. The Administrator may make financial contributions to the States and local authorities for animal emergency preparedness purposes to accommodate people with pets and service animals. Statute
People v. Flores 2007 WL 1683610 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.) Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d

Defendants were tried for allegedly invading an eighty-year-old woman's home and stealing, at gun point, and holding ransom eight seven-week-old puppies and two adult female Yorkshire terriers which she bred for the American Kennel Club for about $3,000 each.  The jury held the defendants responsible for 18 counts of various crimes, including robbery, grand theft dog, elder abuse, conspiracy and cruelty to animals, inter alia.  The appellate court reversed the counts of grand theft dog which were improperly based on the same conduct as the robbery conviction, reduced the sentence on the counts for abuse of an elder, and otherwise found no additional errors. 

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NM - Veterinary reporting - 16.25.3.8 CONDUCT NM ADC 16.25.3.8 NMAC 16.25.3.8 This New Mexico regulation appears to allow permissive reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians. Subsection (T) states: "The reporting of cruelty or illegal action is not a violation of confidentiality." Administrative
Tranchita v. Callahan 511 F. Supp. 3d 850 (N.D. Ill. 2021) 2021 WL 50349 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2021) This case involves a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction by Plaintiff Tranchita against Colleen Callahan, Director of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR). In 2019, agents of the IDNR seized four coyotes Tranchita was raising at her home. After the seizure, three of the four coyotes died, and the remaining coyote, Luna, is elderly and in poor health. Tranchita seeks return of Luna from the coyote rescue center where Luna now resides. The IDNR contends that it will not release Luna until a court declares that the Plaintiff can legally possess her. By way of background, Tranchita is a wildlife exhibitor and educator who has cared for orphaned coyote pups since 2006. In 2016, Tranchita forgot to obtain another Breeder Permit and then failed to do so for the successive three years. Consequently, while she possessed a USDA Exhibitor License, she did not possess the required Illinois state licenses to keep coyotes. In 2019, Plaintiff sought relief in Illinois state court, which found that should she regain possession of Luna again, she must possess a Breeder Permit. The court did not consider whether that permit alone was sufficient or whether a Hound Running Permit is also required. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed her state court complaint and, four months later, filed a six-count verified complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After that filing, Plaintiff moved for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from (1) requiring her to hold a Hound Running Permit in order to keep Luna in Illinois; and (2) seizing Luna so long as Tranchita holds a current Breeder Permit. Tranchita seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive remedies that are all directed to allowing her to keep Luna in Illinois without a Hound Running Permit. The court first examined Tranchita 's likelihood of success on the merits for her five claims: her “class-of-one” equal protection claim, preemption claim, free exercise claim, procedural due process claim, and substantive due process claim. As to the first "class-of-one" claim, the court found that Tranchita's displeasure and disagreement with Defendants’ failure to enforce the Hound Running Permit requirement against other alleged violators likely does not give rise to a class-of-one claim. Further, the court found Tranchita was not likely to success on her claim asserting that the AWA preempts the IDNR's policy requiring an individual who wants to possess a coyote to obtain a Hound Running Permit. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that hound running in Illinois constitutes an “animal fighting venture” that the AWA prohibits. Indeed, the court noted that the state definition for "hound running" includes when an authorized species "pursued with dogs in a hound running area, but not in a manner or with the intent to capture or kill.” Further, the court noted the Seventh Circuit held that Congress did not intend for the AWA to preempt or ban state legislation, like the Wildlife Code, that regulates wild animals. Tranchita also asserts that the Hound Running Permit requirement violates her rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court found that Hound Running Permit requirement is neutral and generally applicable and is rationally related to a legitimate government interest" (i.e., regulating who can keep coyotes (and where) in that it requires an individual who wants to raise a coyote to do so on at least ten contiguous acres of land). Because the Hound Running Permit requirement appears to be supported by a rational basis, Tranchita is not likely to succeed on her Free Exercise claim. Finally, Tranchita brings claims for procedural and substantive due process violations. The court stated that, to succeed on this contention, Plaintiff must provide something that happened after April 2019 that could arguably return her property interest in Luna or provide her with a new, independent property interest in Luna. However, the court found that Plaintiff did not have a property interest in Luna at the time of the seizure because she did not have a Breeder Permit at that time. Because Tranchita has not demonstrated that she is likely to establish a protected property interest in Luna, she has failed to show that she is likely to succeed on either due process claim based on this interest. Tranchita's argument that her current Breeder Permit (issued without the concomitant Hound Running Permit by Illinois) protects her property interest also failed to persuade the court because the law states that "[n]o fur-bearing mammal breeder permits will be issued to hold, possess, or engage in the breeding and raising of striped skunks acquired after July 1, 1975, or coyotes acquired after July 1, 1978, except for coyotes that are held or possessed by a person who holds a hound running area permit under Section 3.26 of this Act." That granting of the Breeder Permit without the necessary Hound Running Permit required by law led Tranchita to her last argument: "the IDNR's custom and policy of issuing her Breeder Permits and allowing her to keep coyotes without a Hound Running Permit created an entitlement to possess a coyote based on a Breeder Permit alone." In fact, Tranchita points out that IDNR issued her a Breeder Permit on several separate occasions without requiring her to first have a Hound Running Permit while she already possessed coyotes. The court noted that a protected property interest may “arise from mutually explicit understandings," but the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a mutually explicit understanding. Here, the Court was "skeptical" that sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate a department-wide custom or policy. In essence, the court found Tranchita had no likelihood of succeeding on the merits of the claims. The court did briefly engage in addressing the preliminary injunction factors. With regard to her claim that she will suffer irreparable harm in the form of Luna's imminent death, the court noted that the harm must be "likely" rather than just "possible." Tranchita's delay in seeking preliminary injunctive relief (four months after she withdrew her state court claims) undermines her irreparable harm argument. While the court was sympathetic and concludes that Luna's death would constitute irreparable harm to Plaintiff, it was not enough to persuade the court that death is likely absent the issuance of a TRO or injunction. Finally, on balancing the harms and public interests, the court found they do not weigh decidedly in Plaintiff's favor. Thus, the court denied Tranchita's motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Case
IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE MADHYA PRADESH GOVANSH VADH PRATISHEDH ADHINIYAM, 2004 6 of 2004 The law, specific to the state of Madhya Pradesh, criminalizes the slaughter of cows and their progeny, including bulls and bullocks. The Act criminalizes the possession and transport of beef and the transport of cows and their progeny for slaughter. The Act authorizes a competent authority to enter and inspect premises where they believe an offence under this Act has been or is likely to be committed. The state government must make rules for the economic rehabilitation of persons whose livelihoods have been affected by the Act. The Act imposes the burden or proof for an offence under the Act on the accused. Statute
NJ - Humane Societies - 40:48-5.1. Contracts with humane societies where no pound established; advertisement unnecessary N. J. S. A. 40:48-5.1 NJ ST 40:48-5.1 This law relates to municipalities that do not have public pounds for the keeping of stray dogs or cats.Those municipalities may contract with nonproift humane societies or similar associations that have been operating for one or more years for the keeping and redemption of those animals. Statute
Brower v. Evans 257 F.3d 1058 (2001)

The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm.

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AL - Initiatives - Amendment 5, Right to Hunt, Fish, and Harvest Wildlife Amendment 5 (2014) Amendment 5 will appear on the November 4, 2014 election. The proposed amendment asks voters "to clarify that the people have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife subject to reasonable regulations that promote conservation and management of fish and wildlife and preserve the future of hunting and fishing." Statute
Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co. 505 P.2d 919 (1973) 264 Or. 557 (1973)

This is a nuisance case involving the operation of a cattle feed lot.  Plaintiff sued to enjoin feed lot operators from interfering with use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property asked for damages. The circuit court rendered judgment and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that decree limiting defendants to having no more than 600 head of cattle on its feed lot at one time was reasonable.

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