Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN RE: RONNIE FAIRCLOTH AND JR's AUTO & PARTS, INC. | 52 Agric. Dec. 171 (1993) | 1993 WL 151164 (U.S.D.A.) | Individual who owned auto parts company, and who kept exotic animals on premises (allegedly as pets), was exhibitor for purposes of Act, even though economic benefit to him from exhibiting animals to public was de minimis, because individual's activities were in commerce. | Case |
| TX - Ordinances - § 215.032. Exhibitions; Shows; Amusements | V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 215.032 | TX LOCAL GOVT § 215.032 | This statute authorizes municipalities to prohibit or regulate circuses, exhibitions, and menageries. | Statute |
| Dilorenzo v. Costco Wholesale Corp. | 515 F.Supp.2d 1187 (W.D.Wash.) | 2007 WL 2852380 (W.D.Wash.) |
Plaintiff is a disabled individual who suffers from a variety of ailments arising after her service in the armed forces. Plaintiff's claims arise from interactions with Costco store employees on two separate shopping trips with her service dog. Store employees inquired as to what task the dog performed and objected to the dog being carried in plaintiff's arms around the store. Plaintiff brings her claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that Defendant's employees did not exceed the boundaries of a permissible inquiry under the ADA with regard to her service dog, where they never asked Plaintiff to state her disability or demanded proof of special training. |
Case |
| Animal Protection and Rescue League v. California | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 315709 (S.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel defendant City of San Diego to place a seasonal rope barrier at the La Jolla Children's Pool Beach to limit human interaction with harbor seals during pupping season. In denying the TRO, the court noted that plaintiffs failed to identify a single incident of harassment occurring since December 15, 2007 (the beginning of the pupping season) or any causal nexus between miscarriages and people walking up to the seals. While the parties agree placement of the barrier would not harm people and act as an effective tool, the court noted that the focus of irreparable harm is on the harm sought to be prevented not on the difficulty in carrying out the task. |
Case | |
| NV - Disaster - Chapter 414. Emergency Management. General Provisions. | N. R. S. 414.095 and 414.097 | NV ST 414.095 and 414.097 | In Nevada, an emergency management plan must address the needs of persons with pets or service animals during and after an emergency or disaster. | Statute |
| CA - Facility - § 868.4. Authorization for therapy or facility dogs to accompany certain witnesses in criminal | West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 868.4 | This law, effective in 2018, allows either party in a criminal or juvenile hearing to ask the court for approval to bring a therapy or facility dog for a child witness in a court proceeding involving any serious felony or any other victim who is entitled to a support person. Before a therapy or facility dog may be used, the party seeking its use must file a motion with the court that includes: (1) the training or credentials of the therapy or facility dog; (2) the training of the therapy or facility dog handler; and (3) facts justifying that the presence of the therapy or facility dog may reduce anxiety or otherwise be helpful to the witness while testifying. The court may grant the motion unless it finds the use of the therapy or facility dog would cause undue prejudice or be unduly disruptive to the court. Appropriate measures must be taken to assure that the presence of the therapy or facility dog as unobtrusive and nondisruptive as possible. | Statute | |
| England - Dogs - The Docking of Working Dogs' Tails (England) Regulations 2007 | 2007 No. 1120 |
These Regulations exempt hunt, spaniel and terrier breeds from the tail docking prohibition under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, provided that certain conditions are met. Tail docking must be carried out by a veterinary surgeon, and not past 5 days old. |
Statute | |
| U.S. v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc. | 217 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000) | 217 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000) |
After defendant received a shipment of dead frogs, he was convicted of violating a portion of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 42(c), which made it a misdemeanor to knowingly cause or permit any wild animal to be transported to the United States under inhumane or unhealthful conditions. Defendant appealed, and judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of not guilty. The government failed to meet its burden to prove not only that the defendant knowingly caused or permitted the transportation to the United States of a wild animal, but also that the defendant knew the conditions under which the frogs was transported were "inhumane or unhealthful." |
Case |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-1.1. Towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick, and Middletown and city of Woonsocket--Vicious dog ordinance | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1.1 | RI ST § 4-13-1.1 | This Rhode Island statute provides that the town councils of the towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick and Middletown may, by ordinance, provide that the owner or keeper of any dog that assaults any person shall be fined an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two hundred dollars. The investigation must prove that the dog was off the owner's property or that the assault was the result of owner negligence. It further provides that, in the city of Woonsocket, an owner shall not be declared negligent if an injury is sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort upon the owner's premises or was teasing, tormenting, provoking, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. | Statute |
| Brower v. Evans | 257 F.3d 1058 (2001) |
The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. |
Case |