Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX - Counseling - § 54.0407. Cruelty to Animals: Counseling Required. | V. T. C. A., Family Code § 54.0407 | TX FAMILY § 54.0407 | For juveniles convicted under the Texas criminal animal cruelty statute (found at Tex. Penal Code § 42.09), psychological counseling is required. | Statute | |
| Webb v. Avon | [2017] EWHC 3311 | This case addressed the power of the court to make a contingent destruction order under Section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended). These orders allow dangerous dogs to be released and kept under strict conditions. The court held that the 19991 Act is not clear as to the breadth of who these conditions apply to, but considered that dangerous dogs may only be released to their owners or other persons properly identified as being in charge. The case was remitted to the Crown Court for further determination. The court also addressed other aspects of the 1991 Act along with the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015. | Case | ||
| US - Assistance animals, housing - Subpart D. Prohibition Against Discrimination Because of Handicap. | 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 - 205 | These regulations set out the definitions relating to housing discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing Act. | Administrative | ||
| Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground | 2002 WL 31789336 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | 114 Wash.App. 1062 (2002) (Not Reported in P.2d) |
In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits. Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs. The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship. In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state. ( Note : publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ). |
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| Mills v. State | 848 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App. 1993). |
In an animal cruelty conviction, the law requires that sentences arising out of same criminal offenses be prosecuted in single action and run concurrently. |
Case | ||
| WI - Hunting - 951.09. Shooting at caged or staked animals | W.S.A. 951.09 | WI ST 951.09 | This Wisconsin statute prohibits the killing or aiding in killing or wounding by use of deadly weapon of any animal that is tied, staked out, caged or otherwise intentionally confined in a man-made enclosure, regardless of size. However, nothing in this section prohibits the shooting of any wild game in its wild state. | Statute | |
| PA - Ecoterrorism - § 3311. Ecoterrorism | 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 | PS ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; PS ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 | This collective set of laws comprises Pennsylvania's ecoterrorim and agroterrorism provisions. The state has an agricultural vandalism law (misdemeanor or felony, depending on pecuniary loss) and law prohibiting the destruction of agricultural crops (felony). A person is guilty of ecoterrorism if the person commits a specified offense against property by: intimidating or coercing a person participating in an activity involving animals, plants, or natural resources; or preventing or obstructing a person involved in such an activity. The law has a provision that states a person who is on public property, or on private property with permission, and is peaceable exercising his or her constitutional rights is immune from prosecution and from civil liability under Pa.C.S. Sec. 8319. | Statute | |
| Eureka Township v. Petter | Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2017 WL 3863144 (Minn.Ct.App. 2017) | 2017 WL 3863144 | In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed. | Case | |
| ID - Disaster planning - Idaho Emergency Operations Plan | Idaho Emergency Operations Plan 2021 | The Idaho Incident Annex (ID-IA) #5, Animal Health Emergency Management Annex defines the roles and responsibilities of the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA) and its supporting agencies in response to an emergency event. | Administrative | ||
| Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd | (2008) 244 ALR 161 | (2008) 165 FCR 510; (2008) 99 ALD 534; [2008] FCA 3 |
The applicant, an incorporated public interest organisation, sought an injunction to restrain the respondent Japanese company which owned several ocean vessels engaged in, and likely to further engage in, whaling activities in waters claimed by Australia. It was found that the applicant had standing to bring the injunction and the respondent engaged in activities prohibited by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Orders were entered against against the respondent even though it had no assets in Australia and the likelihood of being able to enforce judgment was very low. |
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