Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Lost Property - Estrays and Lost Property Act | 765 I.L.C.S. 1020/0.01 - 36 | IL ST CH 765 § 1020/0.01 - 36 | These Illinois' statutes comprise the state's Estrays and Lost Property Act. | Statute | |
| Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. | 624 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. App., 2000); lv. app. den. 631 N.W. 2d 339 (Mich. 2001) | 244 Mich.App. 173 (2000) |
Plaintiff pled damages that included plaintiff's pain and suffering, extreme fright, shock, mortification, and the loss of the companionship of his dog after negligent treatment by defendant animal hospital killed his dog. The court noted that there is no Michigan precedent that permits the recovery of damages for emotional injuries allegedly suffered as a consequence of property damage. Although this Court is sympathetic to plaintiff's position, it chose to defer to the Legislature to create such a remedy. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Groody | 785 F.Supp. 875 (D. Mont. 1991) |
In a Lacey Act prosecution for conspiracy to engage in conduct prohibited by the Act, the prosecution need not allege that all the defendants involved committed the underlying substantive violation of the Lacey Act to charge the defendants with conspiracy. Moreover, the alleged overt acts need not be criminal in nature. |
Case | ||
| PA - Rehabilitation, wildlife - Subchapter P. Wildlife Rehabilitation | 58 PA ADC § 147.301 - 312 | 58 Pa. Code § 147.301 - 312 | Under this Pennsylvania chapter of regulations, the Director may issue a permit to an individual who meets the requirements of 34 Pa.C.S. § 2901(a) (relating to authority to issue permits) and this subchapter for the purpose of wildlife rehabilitation, wildlife capture and transportation, and educational use of rehabilitation wildlife. "Wildlife rehabilitation"is defined as the treatment and temporary care of injured, diseased and displaced wildlife, and the subsequent release of healthy wildlife to appropriate habitats in the wild. | Administrative | |
| H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Brown | 519 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1983) | In this case, plaintiff filed suit challenging the California Penal Code, specifically sections 653o and 653r. Plaintiff manufactured boots from the hides of animals, including the hides of the African elephant, the Indonesian python, and the Wallaby kangaroo. Section 653o and 653r of the California Penal Code prevented plaintiff from selling his boots in California because the provisions forbid the sale of products made from dead bodies, or any part of the elephant, python, or kangaroo. Plaintiff challenged these provisions arguing that the provisions were preempted by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, thus making the provisions unconstitutional. The plaintiff also argued that the provisions were unconstitutional because of the burden placed on interstate commerce which violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Ultimately, the court held that the provisions of the California Penal Code were not unconstitutional and dismissed plaintiff’s claim. The court looked to whether or not the provisions were expressly or impliedly preempted and determined that because the provisions were not expressly preempted the court needed to do an analysis of implied preemption. Looking to legislative history, the court found that Congress did not intend to preempt the provisions of the California Penal Code with the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Lastly, the court held that the California statue was not a burden on interstate commerce because Congress was aware of the existence of the California provisions and decided that the Endangered Species Act would not affect the California provisions. As a result, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim and held for the defendant. | Case | ||
| U.S. v. Vance Crooked Arm | 788 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 3542707 (9th Cir. 2015) | A grand jury indicted Defendants on multiple counts of, among other things, knowingly and willfully conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (Count I) and unlawfully trafficking in migratory bird parts (Count II – IV). On appeal, as at the district court, Defendants argued that the counts to which they pled guilty were improperly charged as felonies because it was only a misdemeanor under the MBTA to sell migratory bird feathers. The court concluded first, that even under Defendants' interpretation of the MBTA, Count I charged a felony; and, second, that in regard to Count II, the allegations stated a misdemeanor only, not a felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, as to Count I, but reversed in part as to Count II. The court also vacated the sentence on both Counts, vacated the felony conviction on Count II, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the Defendants were given the option to withdraw their guilty pleas with regard to Count II, or the district court might consider whether to resentence their convictions on that count as misdemeanors. | Case | |
| MI - Natural Resources -Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. Natural Resources and Environmental Pro | MCL 324.1101 -1102 | MI ST 324.1101 - MI ST 324.1102 | These sections describe the ability of courts and the Commission to review the Department of Natural Resources decisions and the ability for the public to circulate and sign petitions. | Statute | |
| FL - Hunting - Chapter 379. Fish and Wildlife Conservation. | West's F. S. A. § 379.105 | FL ST § 379.105 | This law represents the state's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person may not intentionally, within a publicly or privately owned wildlife management or fish management area or on any state-owned water body, interfere with or attempt to prevent the lawful taking of fish, game, or nongame animals by another or attempt to disturb wildlife or fish to prevent their lawful taking. Any person who violates this section commits a Level Two violation. | Statute | |
| Anzalone v. Kragness | 826 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 2005) | 292 Ill. Dec. 331 (2005) |
A woman whose cat was attacked while being boarded at veterinarian's office brought claims against veterinarian and animal hospital. Trial court dismissed claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Court of Appeals reversed holding dismissal was not warranted. |
Case | |
| New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall | 410 F.2d 1197 (C.A.N.M. 1969) |
The State of New Mexico filed an suit to prevent the U.S. Secretary of the Interior from killing deer in the Carlsbad Caverns National Park that were overbrowsing vegetation and posing a threat to the park's ecology without first having obtained the necessary state permit. The Court held that the Secretary has the authority to kill the deer to protect the park property, and it is immaterial that the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the lands within Carlsbad Caverns National Park as it has constitutional authority in the form of supervisory powers to manage national parks. To New Mexico and the other states involved in an amicus capacity in the suit, the real concern was over the federal encroachment into state management of fish and game, particularly in those states where much of the land is under federal control. |
Case |