|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|PA - Ordinances - § 459-1201. Applicability to cities of the first class, second class, second class A and third class||3 P.S. § 459-1201||PA ST 3 P.S. § 459-1201||This Pennsylvania statute provides that cities of the first and second class are not affected by state dog licensing programs; existing city-level programs remain in effect. With cities of the third class, certain provisions of the state article on dog licensing shall not apply if the city has established a licensing program by ordinance.||Statute|
|GA - Wildlife, transportation - Article 3. Transportation||Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-90 to 94||GA ST § 27-3-90 to 94||This GA statute pertains to transporting wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife taken in this state without a license or permit. It is unlawful to transport wildlife by a carrier unless the person files with the carrier a written statement giving his name and address and the number of wildlife to be transported and specifying that he lawfully took the wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife (or parts) for propagation or scientific purposes without a valid scientific collecting permit.||Statute|
|Ladnier v. Hester||98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012)||
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.
|WERTMAN v. TIPPING||166 So.2d 666 (Fla.App., 1964)||
The plaintiffs, owners of a seven-year-old trained, registered full blood German Shepherd dog, sued the defendants for the loss of this dog from the kennels at the animal hospital owned and operated by the defendant. The dog had been boarded at defendant's place and while there escaped from the kennel and was never found. This case set the wheels in motion for companion animals damages in Florida when the court affirmed a verdict of $1000, for a purebred dog. The court declined in only applying the fair market value and held that recovery could include special or pecuniary value to the owner.
|US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations||1999 WL 379911 (F.R.)||
NMFS proposes regulations to implement provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). These regulations would allow the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations signatory to the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) that otherwise would be under embargo.
|US - Pets and housing - Subpart C. Pet Ownership for the Elderly or Persons with Disabilities.||24 C.F.R. § 5.350 to .380||
This set of HUD regulations set forth the mandatory pet rules for housing programs. The procedure for the development of pet rules is outlined as well as pet rule violation procedures. One rule states that an applicant for tenancy in a project for the elderly or persons with disabilities may reject a unit offered by a project owner if the unit is in close proximity to a dwelling unit in which an existing tenant of the project owns or keeps a common household pet. The rules also contemplate protection of the pet by allowing project owners to contact state or local authorities to remove the pet if the health or safety of the pet is threatened by the death or incapacity of the pet owner.
|State v. Hershey||401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017)||286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807||In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed.||Case|
|KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities||KRS § 65.877||KY ST § 65.877||This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion.||Statute|
|DC - Breeder - Subchapter II. Commercial Licensing Requirement.||DC CODE § 8-1821.01 - .02||DC ST § 8-1821.01 - .02||These D.C. laws require that the Mayor establish licensure requirements for commercial animal breeders in the District of Columbia. The rules must contain requirements as to licensing fees, standards of care, and facility inspection. For the purposes of this section, the term “commercial animal breeder” means any person, firm, organization, or corporation engaged in the operation of breeding and raising more than 25 animals per year for sale or in return for consideration.||Statute|
|Austin v. Bundrick||935 So.2d 836 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2006)||41,064 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/30/06), 2006 WL 1791161 (La.App. 2 Cir.)||
This Louisiana case involves a suit against the owner of a cow (Bundrick) that wandered into the road where it was struck by plaintiff Austin's vehicle. Bundrick and his insurer, Colony Insurance Company, appealed the partial summary judgment finding Bundrick liable for the damages resulting from the accident. In reversing the lower court's order for partial summary judgment and remanding for a trial on the merits, the court noted that it is well settled that when an auto strikes a cow on one of the enumerated "stock law" highways, the burden of proof rests upon the owner of the animal to exculpate himself from even the slightest degree of negligence.