Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Taylor | 585 F.Supp. 393 (D.C. Me. 1984) |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. |
Case | |
| Ecuador - Farm animals - Organic Code of agricultural health | Ley Organica de Sanidad Agropecuaria de Ecuador | The organic code of agricultural health of 2017 has as its primary objective to 1) prevent the entry, dissemination, and establishment of pests and diseases; promote animal welfare; and 2) control and eradicate pests and diseases that affect plants and animals and that could represent a phytosanitary and animal health risk. This law creates the Regulatory agency for Phytosanitary and Zoosanitary Control. This agency is responsible for regulating and controlling animal health and welfare, plant health, and food to maintain and improve the adequate conditions of agricultural production. | Statute | |
| ME - Lien, care - § 3352. Pasturage, food and shelter | 10 M.R.S.A. § 3352 | ME ST T. 10 § 3352 | This Maine law provides that a person who pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by contract or consent of the owner has a lien for the amount due. The lien may be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession. | Statute |
| US - Importation - Mailing of Injurious Article | 18 USCS § 1716 | All kinds of poison, all articles and compositions containing poison, all poisonous animals, insects, reptiles, all explosives, inflammable materials, infernal machines, and mechanical, chemical, or other devices or compositions which may ignite or explode, all disease germs or scabs, and all other natural or artificial articles, compositions, or material which may kill or injure another, or injure the mails or other property, whether or not sealed as first-class matter, are nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or station thereof, nor by any officer or employee of the Postal Service. | Statute | |
| AL - Bear Protection - Legislative findings. Prohibited activities; exceptions; applicability; penalties. | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-480 - 481 | AL ST § 9-11-480 to 481 | These Alabama statutes were signed into law in 2001. The laws declare that black bears are a species that require special protection in the state and make it illegal to hunt, wound, injure, kill, trap, collect, or capture a black bear, or to attempt to engage in that conduct during the closed season for black bear. It also makes it illegal to sell or purchase bear parts. | Statute |
| Hawaii v. Kaneakua | 597 P.2d 590 (Haw. 1979) |
Defendants stipulated that they were involved in cockfights and were prosecuted for numerous violations of § 1109(1)(d), part of Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute. The reviewing court found that the statute was not vague, and was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process with regard to the charge against defendants; nor was the statute overly broad as applied to defendants. |
Case | |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley | 335 F.3d 1097 (C.A.9 (Or.),2003) | 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,244, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6393, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8066 |
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition. |
Case |
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case | |
| IN - Transport of Animals - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS ON FOOT) RULES, 2001 | The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, regulate the transport of animals on foot. The rules apply to the transport of animals on foot is five kilometres or more from the boundary of the town/city/village of origin. New born animals whose navels have not completely healed, and those animals that are diseased, blind, emaciated, fatigues or have given birth in the past three days or that are likely to give birth during transport shall not be transported on foot. Animals may only be transported in their farm social groups. The owner of the animals must ensure that the animals have access to veterinary first aid equipment through their journey and that they have access to adequate water and fodder. | Statute | ||
| Viilo v. City of Milwaukee | 552 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Wis. 2008) | The court in this case denied summary judgement for the defendant after two police officers shot plaintiff’s dog four times which ultimately resulted in the dog’s death. The court denied summary judgment because it believed that there was a question as to a material fact of the case. The material fact in this case was whether or not the officers reasonably feared for their lives when the dog was shot the third and fourth time. After the dog was injured from the first two shots, there was inconsistent testimony as to whether the dog was still acting in an aggressive manner, which may have warranted the third and fourth shots. Due to the inconsistent testimony, the court held that a ruling of summary judgment was not appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted as to all claims except the claim that the third and fourth shots constituted an illegal seizure. | Case |