Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Jim | 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995) |
Court considered defendant's claim based on newly enacted RFRA. Court finds defendant's asserted need to kill 12 eagles a year would decimate eagle population in Oregon. While not perfect, court finds the eagle permit system the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling need of protecting eagles. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Kapp | 419 F.3d 666 (2005, 7th Cir.(Ill.)) | 2005 WL 1994104 (7th Cir.(Ill.)) |
A jury convicted William Kapp for multiple violations of the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act connected with the killing of, and trafficking in, endangered tigers and leopards and their meat, hides, and other parts. On appeal, Kapp claims he is entitled to a new trial because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and the district court erroneously admitted certain evidence. Kapp also argues that the manner in which he was sentenced violated the Sixth Amendment. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on all counts, and the district court did not err in its evidentiary ruling. His conviction was, therefore, affirmed, but a limited remand was ordered to determine whether Kapp should be resentenced . |
Case |
| U.S. v. Korn | 2010 WL 5110048 (D. Idaho Dec. 2010) | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d | The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) brought an administrative action against Defendants for alleged violations of the Animal Welfare Act in connection with Defendants' exotic animal exhibition activities. A judgment was entered for a civil penalty of $57,750 against each Defendant in the administrative action. Defendants have refused to pay, claiming that their due process rights were violated in the underlying administrative proceeding; the judgment, they argued, was therefore void and unenforceable. The United States filed this matter against Defendants seeking to enforce that judgment. Before this Court were the cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion was granted because the Court could not overlook Defendant's absence of any effort to follow up with the Hearing Clerk, considering the many avenues of communication available. There were also no disputed issues of material fact concerning service of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Order, and provision of notice of Defendants' appeal rights. Moreover, this Court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or otherwise vacate the Agency's final order. 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) also permitted the institution of a civil action by the Attorney General to collect the penalty imposed and no other facts were presented disputing the validity of the administrative judgment imposing the civil penalty. | Case |
| U.S. v. Kornwolf | 276 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2002) |
Defendant sells a headdress containing golden eagle feathers obtained before 1962 to an undercover officer. Court finds this case directly controlled by Andrus v. Allard . Court reiterates prohibition on any eagle commerce. For further discussion on the restriction of commerce in eagle parts under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lawson | 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir., 2012) | 2012 WL 1372172 (4th Cir., 2012) | Defendants appealed their conviction of violating, and conspiring to violate, the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, but held, in part, that the AWA is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and that the provision of different elements of the crime in jurisdictions permitting animal fighting does not violate equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. | Case |
| U.S. v. Lee | 937 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991) |
Fishermen who took part in importing salmon that they knew or should have known had been taken in violation of Taiwanese regulation, could be subjected to criminal penalties for violation of the Lacey Act, despite the fact not all fishermen who were involved actually violated the Taiwanese regulation. The fishermen argue that the term "any foreign law" encompasses only foreign statutes, not foreign regulations; however, the court previously ruled that a Taiwanese regulation prohibiting the export of salmon without a permit constituted a "foreign law" under section 3372(a)(2)(A) and thereby supported an Act violation. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lewis | 240 F.3d 866 (10th Cir. 2001) | 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 859; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 600 |
A jury convicted defendant of one count of violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-3378. The jury found that defendant had violated Oklahoma law by capturing wild elk, holding them captive, and organizing at least one commercial elk hunt, without a license for those activities. The court affirmed. Violation of a state hunting law was an adequate basis for a Lacey Act prosecution. There was sufficient evidence to prove that the Oklahoma statute regarding commercial hunting licenses applied to defendant, and that defendant had knowledge of the statute's requirements. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Lewis | 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9802 |
Defendant was convicted of a number of offenses related to his role in a wildlife smuggling operation. If trial did not begin within the requisite time period and defendant moved for dismissal prior to trial, the court had to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. The court held that the circumstances in the case, where it was clear that the delay in the trial caused the delay in the hearing, rather than the other way around, and where defendant repeatedly asked the court to set the case for trial and was otherwise ready to proceed to trial, plaintiff United States' pending pretrial motion could not serve as a basis for exclusion for a 117 day period. Because the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act, defendant's convictions had to be reversed, his sentences vacated, and his indictments dismissed. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Lopez (Abridged for Purposes of Eagle Topic Area) | 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) |
Laws governing intrastate activities will be upheld if they substantially affect interstate commerce. Under the Eagle Act, the power to regulate eagles has been summarily upheld as a valid exercise of commerce power, as it protects the eagle as a species by preventing the creation of a legal commercial market for the animal. For further discussion of the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lundquist | 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996) |
Defendant, a non-Native American practitioner of Native American religion, challenged his conviction as a religious exercise violation where there was no evidence that defendant was trafficking in eagle parts. Employing a RFRA analysis, the court found that while the limitation under the BGEPA to members of federally-recognized Indian tribes did substantially burden defendant's exercise of religion, the government asserted a compelling interest in protecting a rare species and maintaining Indian culture that was administered through the least restrictive means (e.g., the permit process). For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case |