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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Vehicle - 895.484. Civil liability exemption; entering a vehicle to render assistance | W. S. A. 895.484 | WI ST 895.484 | This Wisconsin law enacted in 2015 makes a person immune from civil liability for property damage or injury resulting from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle to rescue an animal or person. Immunity is provided only if certain conditions were met. The person must have a "good faith belief" that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm and used no more force than necessary to remove the person or animal. That person must have first determined the vehicle was locked and forcible entry was necessary, and that person must have dialed 911 or other emergency services prior to this action. In addition, the person must have waited with the person or animal until emergency services arrived or left information on the vehicle's windshield as described in the law. | Statute | |
| Lawrence v. North Country Animal Control Center, Inc | 126 A.D.3d 1078, 5 N.Y.S.3d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 919734 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | Plaintiffs adopted a basset hound from animal control despite the fact that the dog had been turned over by a prior owner to be euthanized. The basset hound, who attacked the plaintiffs on three different occasions without injury, attacked plaintiffs' other dog. When one plaintiff tried to separate the dogs, the basset hound attacked him. Defendant removed the basset hound from the home that same day and refused to return the dog to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to recover damages for injuries, asserting causes of action for, among other things, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, products liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal from the New York Supreme Court decision, the appellate court found that under the circumstances, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiffs reasonably relied on defendants' misrepresentation and whether plaintiffs could have discovered the dog’s dangerous nature with due diligence. The appellate court also found that the contract clause at issue did not preclude plaintiffs from recovering for negligence because it did not “advise the signor that the waiver extended to claims that might arise from the defendant's own negligence.” The appellate court did, however, find that plaintiffs did not satisfy the “rigorous ... and difficult to satisfy requirements for a viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” The court also found that sanctions were not warranted. | Case | |
| MA - Endangered Species - Chapter 131A. Massachusetts Endangered Species Act | M.G.L.A. 131A § 1 - 7 | MA ST 131A § 1 - 7 | This Massachusetts statute comprises the state's endangered species act. "Endangered species", any species of plant or animal in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range including those species listed under the federal ESA. The director shall conduct investigations and consult with the natural heritage and endangered species advisory committee in order to determine whether any species of plant or animal constitutes an endangered or threatened species or species of special concern. Habitat alteration permits are required under this act when any person undertakes a project that may alter a significant portion of habitat. | Statute | |
| US - AWA - Animal Welfare; Inspection, Licensing, and Procurement of Animals | 2004 WL 1561072 (F.R.) | Docket No. 97-121-3 |
Several changes and updates have been made to the licensing requirements, the procedures for licenses renewals, and restrictions upon acquisitions of dogs, cats, and other animals. Although there have been several minor changes, with little affect to the regulation, there have been some more significant changes as well. The new regulation seems to tighten restrictions, and provides specific guidelines for license applicants. |
Administrative | |
| US - Elephant - Asian Elephant Conservation Act | 16 USC 4261 - 4266 | A U.S. federal law that reaffirms the endangered status of Asian elephants and allocates money toward conservation efforts. | Statute | ||
| Beard v. State | 261 S.E.2d 404 (Ga.App., 1979) | 151 Ga.App. 724 (1979) |
Defendants were convicted of hunting with an unplugged pump shotgun and obstructing a law enforcement officer in the discharge of his official duties. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions, the admission of evidence of defendants' prior run-ins with the law was not error, and the judge's instruction that admissions should be scanned with care, if jury found defendant had made an admission, was a correct statement of law and not, as contended, an expression of the judge's opinion. |
Case | |
| Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning | 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002) |
This case questions whether Arizona's 10% cap on nonresident hunting of bull elk throughout the state and of antlered deer north of the Colorado River substantially affects commerce such that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the regulation. The Court that Arizona's cap on nonresident hunting substantially affects and discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was remanded to determine the extent of Arizona's legitimate interests in regulating hunting to conserve its population of game and maintain recreational opportunities for its citizens. |
Case | ||
| Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | This is a draft of a withdrawn "Amparo" decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting's legality. In this case, plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company specializing in organizing bullfighting events, filed a legal action against various governmental entities and individuals in the state of Coahuila, in Mexico. The plaintiff challenged the 2015 amendment to Coahuila's animal protection law, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, on the grounds that it violated their rights to work, property, and cultural expression. The lower court dismissed the case regarding Article 20, Section XV of the animal protection law due to a lack of legal interest and because these provisions were not applicable to the case. The court also rejected the Amparo concerning Article 20, Section XIV of the same law. The case was appealed and eventually transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, after hearing the case de novo, upheld the constitutionality of Article 20, Section XIV of Coahuila's animal protection law. The judge emphasized that the right to a healthy environment includes the protection of animals as an element of the environment, moving away from viewing animals purely as property. The court highlighted the presence of various laws recognizing the need for humane treatment of animals and prohibiting cruelty, even though Mexico lacks a national anti-cruelty law. This legal framework justified the ban on bullfighting and supported the broader legislative objective of protecting and treating animals with dignity. The court argued that allowing bullfighting caused suffering and death for the sake of entertainment, which was detrimental to the societal interest of protecting the environment and species conservation, as established in Article 4 of the Constitution. It also stressed the importance of governments adopting gradual measures to protect animals, and regressing on these measures would be undesirable. | Case | ||
| Rotunda v. Haynes | 33 Misc.3d 68 (App. Term 2011) | 933 N.Y.S.2d 803, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 808, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21360 | The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| ID - Dog, property - Chapter 28. Dogs. | I.C. § 25-2807 | ID ST § 25-2807 | This Idaho statute states that dogs are considered property. It further provides that no entity of state or local government may by ordinance or regulation prevent the owner of any dog from protecting it from loss by the use of an electronic locating collar. | Statute |