Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UT - Impound - Chapter 46. Animal Welfare Act. Part 1. General Provisions | U.C.A. 1953 § 11-46-101 - 104 | UT ST § 11-46-101 - 104 | Under this act, animal control officers must hold stray animals in safe and humane custody for a minimum of 5 business days prior to making any final disposition of the animal. A stray animal may be euthanized prior to the completion of the 5-day period to prevent unnecessary suffering due to serious injury or disease. | Statute |
| NY - Fur - Chapter 20. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's General Business Law § 399-aaa | NY GEN BUS § 399-aaa | Makes it illegal for any person, firm, partnership or corporation to knowingly import, sell at retail or manufacture clothing with fur which is not properly labeled as containing "faux fur" or "real fur." Defines appropriate labeling by adding the appropriate description to the permanent tag attached to the clothing, a temporary tag to identify the clothing, or by affixing a sticker with the description in a conspicuous place on the clothing. Sets the maximum punishment to not exceed a $500 fine for the first violation and not to exceed $1000 for each subsequent violation. | Statute |
| State v. Smith | 223 P.3d 1262 (Wash.App. Div. 2, 2009) | 2009 WL 5108382 (Wash.App. Div. 2) |
In this Washington case, defendant Smith appealed his conviction for first degree animal cruelty following the death of his llama. Smith claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to (1) discover information before trial that may have explained the llama's death and (2) seek a lesser included instruction on second degree animal cruelty. This court agreed. It found that defense counsel's "all or nothing strategy" was not a legitimate trial tactic and constituted deficient performance where counsel presented evidence to call into question the State's theory on starvation, but not evidence related to the entire crime. The court found that the jury was "left in an arduous position: to either convict Smith of first degree animal cruelty or to let him go free despite evidence of some culpable behavior." The case was reversed and remanded. |
Case |
| Motta v. Menendez | 46 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09778, 2007 WL 4328459 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 847 N.Y.S.2d 612 |
This New York case arose following an incident that occurred on December 13, 2003, in which the appellant's two pit bull terriers entered the petitioner's property, and one of appellant's dogs ("Duke") attacked and injured the petitioner's pet dog. Following a special proceeding, the lower court determined that appellant's pit bull terrier named “Duke” was a dangerous dog and directed that it be destroyed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that the dangerous dog statute in effect on December 13, 2003, did not provide that one dog attacking another was conduct subject to the penalty of destruction (Agriculture and Markets Law former §§ 108, 121). |
Case |
| England - Fur - The Mink Keeping (Prohibition) (England) Order 2004 | 2004 No. 100 | An Order imposing an absolute prohibition upon the keeping of mink in England. | Statute | |
| RI - Veterinary - Chapter 25. Veterinary Practice | Gen. Laws, 1956 § 5-25-1 to 17 | RI ST § 5-25-1 to 17 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| NC - Dangerous Dogs - Chapter 67. Dogs | N.C.G.S.A. § 67-14.1 | NC ST § 67-14.1 | This North Carolina statute provides that any dog which trails, runs, injures or kills any deer or bear on any wildlife refuge, sanctuary or management area designated by the Wildlife Resources Commission, during the closed season for hunting with dogs on such refuge or management area, is hereby declared to be a public nuisance, and any wildlife protector may destroy it by humane method. Any unmuzzled dog running at large in such area shall be impounded and notice shall be published in some newspaper published in the county for two successive weeks. If no owner comes to claim the dog, it may be destroyed within 15 days after publication. | Statute |
| In re Capers' Estate | 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Pa.Orph.) (1964) | 15 Fiduc.Rep. 150, 1963 WL 6573 (Pa.Orph.) (1964) |
In this Pennsylvania case, the testatrix directed in her will that her Irish setter dogs to be destroyed in a humane manner. The executors were unsure of what action to take and sought declaratory relief. In attempting to construe the testatrix's intent, the court found that she "evidently feared that either they would grieve for her or that no one would afford them the same affection and kindness that they received during her life." The court found that the intent of testatrix would be carried out if her two favored Irish setters were placed in an environment where they are given the same care and attention that she she gave them during her life. The final question the court grappled with was whether it was against public policy to hold valid a clause in a will directing the summary destruction of certain of decedent's property after her death. The court held that the clause was void as not being within the purview of the Wills Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and being against the public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. |
Case |
| Anderson v. Christopherson | 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) | 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.) |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute. |
Case |
| AL - Animal Shelters - § 3-10-1 to § 3-10-5 | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-10-1 to § 3-10-5 | This statute defines an animal shelter and describes a monthly report that each animal shelter must compile. Among other things, contents of the report include number of strays, adoptions, health-related issues, and costs incurred by the shelter. This report must be made available to the public, though a reasonable fee is appropriate. There is no cause of action created by this statute. | Statute |