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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Exotic - § 7-801. Exotic wildlife--Penalties for releasing | 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 7-801 | OK ST T. 29 § 7-801 | No exotic wildlife may be released into the wilds of Oklahoma without first obtaining written permission of the Director. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable of a fine of $100 to $2000, and/or imprisonment up to 30 days. | Statute | |
| European Union - Research - Protection of Animals | Official Journal L 358, 18 December 1986, pp. 1-28 | COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (86/609/EEC) | The aim pursued by this Directive is to ensure the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative provisions in the Member States for the protection of animals used for research avoid affecting the market. In this directive, an experiment not entailing the use of animals is preferred over one that does if that experiment can obtain the same result and is reasonably and practically available. Furthermore, each Member State shall ensure that experiments using animals considered as endangered under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora and Annex C.I of Regulation (EEC) No. 3626/82 are prohibited unless they are in conformity with the above-mentioned Regulation and the objects of the experiment are research aimed at preservation of the species in question, or essential biomedical purposes where the species in question exceptionally proves to be the only one suitable for those purposes. | Administrative | |
| State v. Archer | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) | This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part. | Case | ||
| U.S. v. Top Sky | 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) |
Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles. The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion. Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others. Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| Macho v. Mahowald | 374 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.App.,1985) |
In this Minnesota case, a rider brought an action for personal injuries suffered after the defendant-owner's horse bolted while the rider was mounting the horse. The lower court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the owner. The rider appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence showing that the horse had previously bolted was sufficient to create an issue for the jury as to whether the horse had a propensity to be dangerous. Further, with regard to whether the owner was negligent in allowing the rider to mount without properly adjusting the saddle equipment, the court found that the jury could have properly found both parties were negligent in failing to adjust the stirrups. |
Case | ||
| TX - Disaster - § 418.043. Other Powers and Duties (pet disaster planning) | V. T. C. A., Government Code § 418.043 | TX GOVT § 418.043 | The Texas Division of Emergency Management is directed to assist political subdivisions in developing plans for the humane evacuation, transport, and temporary sheltering of service animals and household pets in a disaster. | Statute | |
| CA - Crimes - § 597y. Violations; methods of killing; penalty | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597y | CA PENAL § 597y | A violation of Section 597u [Animals; prohibited killing methods] or 597v [Newborn dog or cat; methods of killing] is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| ID - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | I.C. § 25-3501 - 3521; I.C. § 18-6602 | ID ST § 25-3501 - 3521; § 18-6602 | These Idaho statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Every person who is cruel to any animal and whoever having the charge or custody of any animal subjects any animal to cruelty is guilty of a misdemeanor. "Animal" means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, except humans. "Cruelty" is defined as the intentional and malicious infliction of pain, physical suffering, injury or death upon an animal as well as the negligent deprivation of necessary sustenance, among other things. Dogfighting and cockfighting exhibitions are also prohibited, but the rearing of gamecocks regardless of their later intended use is not prohibited. | Statute | |
| NJ - Dog Bite - Chapter 19. Dogs, Taxation and Liability for Injuries Caused by | N. J. S. A. 4:19-16 | NJ ST 4:19-16 | This New Jersey statute provides that the owner of any dog that bites a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute | |
| People v. Miller | 159 A.D.3d 1608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | 72 N.Y.S.3d 750, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 02109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | In this New York case, defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal contempt in the first degree. The incident occurred when defendant went back over to his girlfriend's house after he called her to ask permission to visit the dogs. The complainant declined, saying she had plans for an outing with the dogs that day. Witnesses later observed defendant banging on the complainant's door and subsequently opening a window and climbing in her residence. After forcing entry, defendant took the dogs and complainant called 911. Subsequently, defendant led police on a high speed chase, and, after being arrested, defendant claimed the dogs were licensed to him. The appellate court viewed all the evidence of the elements for each crime and rejected defendant's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. Notably, two judges dissented on this appeal, finding that defendant "had at least a good faith basis for claiming an ownership interest the dogs." The dissent found the dogs may have been jointly owned and that, prior to his arrest, "defendant simply intended to take the dogs for a walk and then return them." | Case |