Results
Displaying 1 - 10 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | KRS §§ 525.010 - 220; 258.500, 258.991; 189.575; 383.085 | KY ST § 525.010 - 220; 258.500, 258.991; 189.575; 383.085 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute | |
| Coe v. Lewsader | 64 N.E.3d 817, appeal denied, 77 N.E.3d 81 (Ill. 2017) | 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, 2016 WL 5679604 | In this case, Ryan and Hillary Coe filed suit against Eric and Trish Lewsader for damages resulting from an accident involving the Lewsader’s dog. Ryan Coe was driving his motorcycle while intoxicated on a public highway when he hit the Lewsader’s dog that was lying in the middle of the street. Coe suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit against the Lewsader’s according to Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Attacks or Injuries statute. According to the Act, “if a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages.” In order to be awarded damages under the Act, the Coe’s needed to establish “some overt act” of the Lewsader’s dog . As a result, the question before the court was whether or not the Lewsader’s dog was acting overtly when it was lying in the middle of the street at the time of the accident. Ultimately, the court held that the dog was not acting overtly by lying in the middle of the street. Also, the court rejected the Coe’s argument that the dog had acted overtly when it walked into the street before lying down. The court rejected this argument because the overt act needed to take place at the time of the injury, not before. As a result, the court found that the Lewsader’s were not liable for civil damages under the Act because the dog had not acted overtly at the time of accident and therefore the Act did not apply in this situation. | Case | |
| MI - Enforcement - Chapters 760 to 777 Code of Criminal Procedure. | M. C. L. A. 764.16 | MI ST 764.16 | This law authorizes private citizens to make arrests. | Statute | |
| HI - Disaster; Accomodations for Pets - Chapter 128. Civil Defense and Emergency Act. | HRS § 127A-1, § 127A-2, and § 127A-19 (Formerly cited as HRS § 128-1 et seq.) | These sections replace former HRS § 128-1. In terms of animal-related provisions, the definition for "evacuation" includes mention of animals. In the section on sheltering, the law states that "[c]ounty emergency management agencies shall be responsible for identifying and operating locations and facilities suitable for sheltering" both the public and pet animals. "Pet animal” has the same meaning as defined in section 711-1100. | Statute | ||
| US - Critical Habitat - Statements by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Regarding the Designation of Critical Habitat | 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.) | 69 FR 59996-01 |
This excerpt is from the Designation of Critical Habitat for the Klamath River and Columbia River Populations of Bull Trout, 69 FR 59996-01, 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.). It apparently expresses the opinion of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service that the current process for designating critical habitat does little for the conservation of listed species. |
Administrative | |
| Night monkey used in malaria research perched on top of a corrugated pipe nest soiled with feces. | Slideshow Images | ||||
| Animal Protection and Rescue League v. California | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 315709 (S.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel defendant City of San Diego to place a seasonal rope barrier at the La Jolla Children's Pool Beach to limit human interaction with harbor seals during pupping season. In denying the TRO, the court noted that plaintiffs failed to identify a single incident of harassment occurring since December 15, 2007 (the beginning of the pupping season) or any causal nexus between miscarriages and people walking up to the seals. While the parties agree placement of the barrier would not harm people and act as an effective tool, the court noted that the focus of irreparable harm is on the harm sought to be prevented not on the difficulty in carrying out the task. |
Case | ||
| Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. | 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| LA - Domestic Violence - Chapter 28. Protection from Family Violence Act. | LSA-R.S. 46:2135 | This Louisiana law allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order, without bond, as it deems necessary to protect from abuse the petitioner. Among the provisions is subsection (A)(7) that allows the court to grant ". . . to the petitioner the exclusive care, possession, or control of any pets belonging to or under the care of the petitioner or minor children residing in the residence or household of either party, and directing the defendant to refrain from harassing, interfering with, abusing or injuring any pet, without legal justification, known to be owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either party." In 2015, the state allowed the court shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse. | Statute | ||
| New York Consolidated Laws 1938: Sections 180-196 | N.Y. Penal Law §§ 180-196 (Consol. 1938) | Article 16, entitled "Animals", concerns New York's Law about the treatment of animals from 1938. The act covers such topics as poisoning of animals to abandoning diseased or injured animals. In addition, the act provides definitions in section 180. | Statute |