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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
AZ - Endangered, nongame - Illegal Taking or Wounding of Wildlife A. R. S. § 17-268, § 17-296, § 17-298, § 17-298.01, § 17-314, § 17-402 - 407 AZ ST § 17-268, § 17-296, § 17-298, § 17-298.01, § 17-314, § 17-401 Arizona assesses a monetary civil penalty for the possession or taking of listed species of wildlife and endangered/nongame wildlife (including eagles). This fine goes to the state wildlife theft prevention fund and is in addition to any other fine or penalty assessed by law. Statute
Connecticut General Statutes: Chapter 338: Section 6619 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6619 (1918) Section 6619 of Chapter 338 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers information, procedure and bail. Specifically, the statute states the circumstances for reach a search warrant will be issued. Statute
San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose 402 F.3d 962 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2005) 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2853, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3920

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants-Appellants, seven San Jose City Police Officers and Deputy Sheriff Linderman, appeal from an order of the district court denying in part their motions for qualified immunity. This action arises out of the simultaneous execution of search warrants at the residences of members of the Hells Angels, and at the Hells Angels clubhouse on January 21, 1998. While executing search warrants at two plaintiffs' residences, the officers shot a total of three dogs. This court held that the shooting of the dogs at the Vieira and Souza residences was an unreasonable seizure, and an unreasonable execution of the search warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exigent circumstances did not exist at either residence, as the officers had a week to consider the options and tactics available for an encounter with the dogs. The unlawfulness of the officers' conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable officer at the time the officers planned for serving the search warrants.

Case
U.S. v. Tomono 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998)

Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences."  The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure.

Case
IN - Animal Testing - THE BREEDING OF AND EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS (CONTROL AND SUPERVISION) RULES, 1998 1843. G.S.R. 1074(E), dated 15th December, 1998 The Rules, drafted under the powers conferred by section (1)(1-A) and (2) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate the breeding and testing of animals in laboratories. It sets up an 'Institutional Animal Ethics Committee' that ensures the performance of experiments of animals in an establishment in a humane manner. The Rules specify the conditions that breeders are allowed to raise these animals in for testing, and the manner in which these animals must be treated in establishments where they are used for testing. Statute
Journals Available from the U.S. and the World

Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law (Michigan State University College of Law)

Policy
PA - Cruelty - De protección a los animales domésticos 2011 De protección a los animales domésticos

This document provides a link to De protección a los animales domésticos (.pdf).

Statute
Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises, Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests. Pleading
U.S. v. Braddock Slip Copy, 2011 WL 327416 (C.A.4 (S.C.),2011)

Defendant-appellants appealed their convictions following guilty pleas to offenses relating to illegal cockfighting and gambling activities. On appeal, they challenged the denial of their motion to dismiss for selective prosecution or, in the alternative, for discovery in support of their selective prosecution claim. In particular, appellants contend that district court should have dismissed the indictment or granted leave to obtain discovery because they, as Caucasians, were prosecuted federally, while two Hispanic co-conspirators and thirty-six Hispanic people arrested in connection with another cockfighting ring in Hampton County, South Carolina, faced only state charges. The Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found that appellants failed to show that they were similarly situated to the Hispanic defendants who were not prosecuted on federal charges.

Case
Williams v. Hill 658 So.2d 381 (Ala.,1995)

In this Alabama case, a motorcyclist and passenger were injured when they collided with defendant's dog while traveling on public roadway and brought an action for damages. The Circuit Court, Elmore County granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the motorcyclist and passenger appealed. The Court held that there is no recover at common law, as no negligence was shown. The Court would not accept the proposal that all owners should be charged with the knowledge that dogs will chase cars.   “We hold that the owner of a dog may not be charged with the general knowledge that all dogs chase motor vehicles, and therefore that the law will not impute such general knowledge to dog owners in actions for injuries incurred. We, therefore, affirm the defendant's summary judgment.”

Case

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