Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Zealand - Animal Welfare - Code for Layer Hens 2012 | This code sets the minimum standards for the care and management of layer hens under all forms of management used in New Zealand. The purpose of this code is to provide guidance to the owners of layer hens and to persons who are in charge of them about the standards they must achieve in order to meet their obligations under the Animal Welfare Act 1999. | Statute | ||
| US - AWA - Animal Welfare Act Decisions |
This document contains references to both court decisions and administrative proceedings under the Animal Welfare Act on a section by section basis. |
Statute | ||
| Forest Guardians v. Veneman | 392 F.Supp.2d 1082 (D.Ariz.,2005) |
District Court held that United States Forest Service could issue permits that allow cattle on lands near waterways where spikedace and loach minnows live, both species are listed as "threatened" species, even though this grazing could delay their recovery. |
Case | |
| DICKERSON v. BRITTINGHAM. | 86 A. 106 (Del.Super. 1913) | 4 Boyce 93, 27 Del. 93 (1913) |
In this Delaware case, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse, alleged to have been caused by the negligent driving by the defendant of his team. This resulted in a head-on collision, which caused the death of the horse days after. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that if the jury believed from the evidence presented that the defendant was driving without ordinary care, the verdict should stand for the plaintiff. |
Case |
| MT - Dog - Dogs Act | Act XXI of 1985, Amended by VII of 1990 |
The Dogs Act was originally enacted in 1985. It provides that a person keeping a dog over the age of six months must obtain a licence for the dog. If a person does not have a licence for the dog, he or she shall be guilty of a criminal offence and will be liable to the punishment of a fine ( ammenda ) of five liri. |
Statute | |
| Dunham v. Kootenai County | 690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Idaho, 2010) | 2010 WL 556803 (D.Idaho) |
This matter involves the Defendant Kootenai County's motion for summary judgment this federal civil rights case filed by Dunham. The facts underlying the case stem from 2008, when county animal control officers went to Dunham's residence to investigate complaints of possible animal cruelty. During their investigation, Defendants entered Dunham's property to ascertain the condition of the horses residing there in a round-pen. Despite the conditions of the horses which necessitated their removal and relocation to an equine rescue facility, Dunham was ultimately charged and found not guilty of charges of animal cruelty. Dunham claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her property and seized her horses without a warrant. Defendants counter that the search was constitutional based on the open fields doctrine, and that the seizure was constitutional based on the plain view doctrine. Based on the open fields doctrine, the Court concluded that Dunham did not have an expectation of privacy in the searched area. |
Case |
| Juelfs v. Gough | 41 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2002) | In this case, the husband and wife had agreed to shared ownership of their dog, which the lower court incorporated into its order.Based on danger the dog faced by other dogs in the wife’s home and increased contention between the parties, the lower court next gave the husband custody with an order for the wife’s visitation, and finally awarded sole custody to the husband. The state’s Supreme Court affirmed the modified order. | Case | |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture | 545 F. Supp. 3d 50 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) | Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied. | Case | |
| Agreement APHIS v. FEI | This agreement was entered into by APHIS and Feld Entertainment, Inc. (FEI). FEI is an exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act and was issued non-compliance reports after numerous inspections. In this agreement, FEI paid $270,000 to the US Treasurer and had to develop and implement annual training to all of its personnel who worked with animals. The agreement also contains provisions that APHIS would not take action against FEI if FEI followed the agreement. | Pleading | ||
| New York Consolidated Laws 1938: Sections 180-196 | N.Y. Penal Law §§ 180-196 (Consol. 1938) | Article 16, entitled "Animals", concerns New York's Law about the treatment of animals from 1938. The act covers such topics as poisoning of animals to abandoning diseased or injured animals. In addition, the act provides definitions in section 180. | Statute |