Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Josephs | 328 Conn. 21, 176 A.3d 542 (2018) | 2018 WL 576792 (Conn. Jan. 30, 2018) | In this Connecticut case, defendant, Delano Josephs appeals his judgment of conviction of a single violation of § 53–247(a). The incident stems from Defendant's shooting of his neighbor's cat with a BB gun. A witness heard the discharge of the BB gun, then saw a man he recognized as defendant walking with a BB gun in his hands in a "stalking" manner. Over a week later, defendant's neighbor noticed blood on her cat's shoulder and brought her cat to the veterinarian who found three or four metal objects that resembled BBs near the cat's spine. After receiving this diagnosis, the cat's owner reported to police that her neighbor was "shooting her cats." Animal control officers then interviewed defendant who admitted he has a BB gun and shoots at cats to scare them away, but "he had no means of hurting any cats." At the trial level, defendant raised the argument that § 53–247(a) requires specific intent to harm an animal. The trial court disagreed, finding the statute requires only a general intent to engage in the conduct. On appeal, defendant argues that since he was convicted under the "unjustifiably injures" portion of § 53–247(a), the trial court applied the wrong mens rea for the crime. In reviewing the statute, this court observed that the use of the term "unjustifiably" by the legislature is meant to distinguish that section from the section that says "intentionally." Thus, the legislature use of two different terms within the same subsection convinced the court that clause under which defendant was convicted is only a general intent crime. On defendant's void for vagueness challenge, the court found that this unpreserved error did not deprive him of a fair trial. A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that shooting a cat for trespassing is not a justifiable act. While the court agreed with defendant that "unjustifiably injures" is susceptible to other interpretations, in the instant case, defendant conduct in killing a companion animal is not permitted under this or other related laws. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| MS - Hunting, birds - § 49-1-39. Killing animals or birds injurious to agriculture; | Miss. Code Ann. § 49-1-39; Miss. Code Ann § 49-5-7 | MS ST § 49-1-39; MS ST § 49-5-7 | Mississippi amended its laws in 2000 to specifically disallow the killing of any bird protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and was further amended to prohibit the killing or molestation of any wild bird (other than a game bird and some excepted species). While the law was written with an evident bias toward agricultural protection, it does specifically mention the eagle as one of the species protected under federal law. | Statute | |
| Hampton v.Hammons | 743 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1987) |
The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981). |
Case | ||
| People v. Parker (Unpublished) | 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999) |
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. |
Case | ||
| NY - Rehabilitators, wildlife - Part 184. Wildlife Rehabilitators. | 6 NY ADC 184.1 - 7 | 6 NYCRR 184.1 - 7 | These New York regulations concern the qualifications for appointment as a state wildlife rehabilitator. Section 184.1 first states that, "The purpose of this Part is to establish a specially trained group of individuals, collectively called wildlife rehabilitators, to provide for the care of injured and debilitated wildlife so that such wildlife may be returned to the wild." Under the chapter, "wildlife rehabilitation" means the practice of providing care for injured or debilitated wildlife, including their capture, housing, feeding, emergency treatment and release to the wild. | Administrative | |
| MN - Vehicle - M.S.A. § 97B.091. Use of motor vehicles to chase wild animals prohibited | M. S. A. § 97B.091 | MN ST § 97B.091 | This Minnesota states that a person may not use a motor vehicle to intentionally drive, chase, run over, kill, or take a wild animal. | Statute | |
| Fraudulent Service Dogs | The above map highlights the states that have laws against the use of fraudulent service dogs. As of 2022, there are 33 states with what can be termed true bans on the fraudulent representation of pets as service animals. States without these laws may have laws that prohibit the fraudulent representation of assistance animals in housing, but those laws are not included on this map and can be found here. In all states, violation of these laws are misdemeanor offenses or civil infractions and some states require community service with an organization that serves the disabled as part of sentencing upon conviction. | State map | |||
| ME - Hunting - Title 12. Conservation. | 12 M. R. S. A. § 10654 | ME ST T. 12 § 10654 | This law reflects Maine's hunter harassment provision. The law splits the conduct into two possible offenses. First, a person may not intentionally or knowingly interfere with the lawful hunting, fishing or trapping of a wild animal, wild bird or fish. Second, a person may not intentionally or knowingly disturb or attempt to disturb a wild animal, wild bird or fish with the intent to interfere with the hunting, fishing or trapping of a wild animal, wild bird or fish. A person who violates either section commits a civil violation for which a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500 may be adjudged. | Statute | |
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case | |
| Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 932 N.E.2d 448 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2010) | 2010 WL 2266081 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), 402 Ill.App.3d 62 |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation per se claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations. |
Case |